265. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the French Ambassador (Alphand)0
Ambassador Alphand came in alone, at his request, for an informal talk on the present situation. Upon my request that he lead off, he said there seemed to be two separate problems—the nuclear problem and the Common Market situation.
On nuclear matters, he said that President de Gaulle had taken into account the fact that France was far behind the United Kingdom in nuclear development and that the Nassau offer, therefore, did not mean anything to France. Further, France has made it clear to us all along that they were determined to develop their own national nuclear force; the cost of this national force would make it impossible for France to participate in a multilateral force. He pointed out that President de Gaulle in his press conference1 had referred to the coordination of the nuclear forces of NATO and had referred to “technical and strategic” cooperation. He indicated that France expected to have perhaps 50 nuclear bombs in 1964 carried by Mirage aircraft and that they were working on their own missile and missile nuclear warhead. He said that they did not yet have a thermonuclear device nor did they anticipate having a warhead of sufficient sophistication in time to take advantage of the Polaris offer. He strongly intimated that it would be desirable for the United States to talk further with France about the possibilities of cooperation in the nuclear field.
With regard to the Common Market, he made the point, not very convincingly, that these discussions had been going on for more than a year, that they had made no significant progress and that it was obvious that Great Britain was not able or willing to accept the Treaty of Rome as it stands. This was what President de Gaulle meant by saying that the United Kingdom was not ripe for entry into the Common Market. He said that if Britain were tomorrow to accept the view of the Six on the remaining points of issue, France would not and “could not” prevent Britain from entering the Common Market. I told him that I had some impression that the nuclear question and the Common Market discussions were in effect linked and that perhaps the Nassau Agreement had been used as an additional reason for raising political objections to the entry of the United Kingdom into the Common Market. I told him that I [Page 751] had the impression that President de Gaulle was going to take his time before coming to a final decision on the Nassau discussions in order that a careful examination of the situation on both sides could be made to ascertain the relevance of a “similar arrangement” with the French. He confirmed his own personal understanding (and recommendation to Paris) that he had expected President de Gaulle to take considerable time before replying and that this was the sense of de Gaulle’s letter to the President2 on the subject. He indicated that he, personally, had been caught by surprise by the negative approach in de Gaulle’s press conference. I pointed out to him that we had supposed that, following Nassau, further elaboration on our side would be necessary both to go forward with the British and to talk in more detail with the French. The relevance of the Nassau offer to France could not really be determined without the French having more information about what we had in mind and our having more information about the French nuclear program and planning. We have given the rest of NATO much more information about the US nuclear program than we ourselves know about the French program, and, indeed, we feel we know more about the Soviet nuclear program than we do the French program. On the multilateral force, he indicated that the French understood that the multilateral force could and would go forward without French participation. I confirmed that we were prepared to discuss a multilateral force with the members of the Alliance who express an interest in it and that indeed several of them had expressed a very lively interest.
On the Common Market, I told him that it seemed to me that President de Gaulle had raised a major political objection to the UK entry and that this was not just a matter of failure of agreement on the remaining technical and economic points. When President de Gaulle said that the UK was not ripe for entry into the Common Market, this can only mean that France is not ready for the UK to enter the Common Market as only the British themselves could say that they are unable to accept the conditions for entry. Alphand attempted once again to reject this interpretation and repeat his conviction that the UK could enter tomorrow by accepting the Rome Treaty. I told him I could accept this as his own view as a Frenchman but I found it hard to believe that this was what President de Gaulle meant in his press conference.
I then mentioned to Alphand a number of disturbing reports which we have about rumors or charges emanating from French official [Page 752] sources about the position of the United States.3 I mentioned, among others, (a) the report that we were withdrawing nuclear weapons from NATO; (b) that the President and the Prime Minister had made some sort of deal on Berlin at Nassau and (c) the report that we were trying to encircle France or somehow embrace or smother Western Europe by the American presence. He was obviously interested in my factual statement of the great increase in American conventional and nuclear strength in NATO in the past two years and the reminder that Secretary McNamara and I had made this information available to Foreign and Defense Ministers in NATO. He did not respond to my reference to other rumors on the basis that he was uninformed but did point out various references in President de Gaulle’s press conference which indicated friendship, solidarity and cooperation.
I emphasized the importance of atmosphere and the intangible psychology factors which could be so disturbing to the unity of the Alliance. I said, for example, that the general impression in the French handling of the force de frappe was not that of an assumed unity of the Alliance to which France wished to make a contribution but the assumption of disunity and the possible need for a separate force through the unreliability of the United States. He admitted the accuracy of the impression but disclaimed the point of view as the official French position. I spoke of the impression being created from Paris that President de Gaulle looks upon Europe as threatened both by the Soviet bloc and by the US and that it was not always clear which of these threats was considered to be the more serious. I reminded him of the American presence in Europe in 1946, 1947 and 1948 and told him that no one has welcomed more than we a strong and vigorous Europe assuming control of its own affairs. For several years after 1945 the “Twenty Mule Team Wagon” was pulled largely by one mule, with the other mules in the wagon. Since then, the other mules had become revived and had been getting more and more into harness. No one welcomed this more than we: if we had to pause for a vigorous discussion among ourselves about which way we should all be going, this is nothing at all surprising given the nature of mules and sovereign states.
The above summarizes the principal elements in an hour and a half conversation in which Alphand disclaimed any instructions, indicated that he did not anticipate making a full report to the Quai d’Orsay and [Page 753] during which he did not make any proposals or seek to draw any from me. He did leave the impression that he hoped we would take fresh initiatives with Paris, particularly in the nuclear field, but I did not pursue the matter beyond saying that, although it appeared that President de Gaulle had rejected the Nassau proposals, the Nassau statement still stands as our own policy.
[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]
- Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 264.↩
- Dated January 2, it thanked the President for his offer to extend to France an arrangement similar to that made with the British at Nassau, and stated that France was studying the content and implications of the offer “with keenest interest.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)↩
- At 6:34 p.m. on January 18 Bundy had called Rusk to tell him that the President was angry about “what the French have been putting out in Brussels.” Rusk suggested that Bohlen might talk to the French and tell them that among friends this was an “outrage.” Bundy replied that the “Pres’ first impulse was to have B call Alphand and raise—” Bundy and Rusk agreed that Rusk should talk to the President about the President seeing Alphand on the matter instead. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩