Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

221. Scope Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁰

TNT/B–1

Washington, December 2, 1963.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Paris, December 16–18, 1963

1. The Current Situation

The Ministerial Meeting takes place this year in an atmosphere not of crisis but of uncertainty. The following factors dominate the scene:

(a) Although the Johnson Administration does not intend to change the course of American foreign policy, our allies will be carefully examining our day-to-day actions to discern any differences in content or style in the new U.S. approach to international problems. The December Ministerial Meeting will provide the first occasion since the tragic death of President Kennedy to give the NATO Foreign Ministers a considered review of U.S. policy.

(b) The meeting occurs at a moment when new governments are applying themselves to NATO problems for the first time in Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Thus, of the five major NATO powers, only France enters the meeting with the same leaders as it possessed at the time of the Ottawa meeting last spring.

(c) French opposition to the organizational features of the NATO Alliance—that is, to integrated military command and planning and to more intensive political cooperation—is now more clearly revealed than ever before.

(d) Initial apprehensions regarding the outcome of East-West negotiations, particularly those of the Germans and French, have been allayed. While no immediate action is in prospect on an East-West non-aggression arrangement, an observation post agreement, or a nondissemination accord, resumption of negotiations on any of these matters will revive underlying differences of approach in NATO.

(e) Nevertheless, the atmosphere of détente following conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty has already impeded efforts to strengthen NATO forces in Europe. The recent Annual Review disclosed a gradual downward drift in strength.

(f) This situation highlights the long-standing problem of the proper distribution of the burden of maintaining NATO armed forces, as between the U.S. and its allies. U.S. moves dictated by balance of payments considerations will be subject to very close scrutiny, particularly by the Germans.

(g) The control of NATO’s nuclear strength continues to pose a fundamental challenge to the Organization, despite the progress which is being made in preliminary discussions on the Multilateral Force.

The foregoing circumstances seem to call for a more than ordinarily firm expression of American leadership in NATO. Our allies will be expecting the U.S. to buttress the Organization and to give it a sense of direction in coping with its immediate difficulties. A Presidential statement pledging continuity of policy on vital issues could be effective in maintaining Alliance confidence both in the constancy of the American purpose and in the solidarity of NATO itself. Such a statement, from President Kennedy, was read to the Permanent Council on February 15, 1961.¹

2. Objectives

The general U.S. objectives at the meeting should be:

(a) To sustain Allied confidence in the constancy of U.S. policy and strength.

(b) To fortify NATO morale through reaffirmation by Member Governments of their reciprocal obligations to maintain the vitality of the Alliance.

(c) To create the broadest possible area of agreement on future East-West relations, through consultation in the meeting and bilaterally and through assurances as to continuing consultation in future.

(d) To avoid, if at all possible, a disruptive confrontation with the French over NATO’s powers and functions, without sacrifice of fundamental NATO principles.

(e) To seek the most effective means of proceeding with the analysis of Alliance strategy, forces, and resources which is required if the Organization is to deter or to respond rationally to Soviet aggression, whatever its scale.

3. Political Issues

(a) East-West Relations. The Permanent Council has, of course, been informed and consulted frequently on East-West negotiations since the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed on August 5. The current meeting, however, will provide the first opportunity to discuss with Ministers collectively not only past developments but, more important, what we believe may lie ahead. It will be advisable for the U.S. to maintain a balance between wishful thinking on the so-called détente, on the one hand, and opposition to all discussion with the Soviets as dangerous or pointless, on the other.

Ministers will expect a review of the prospects for and obstacles to a non-aggression arrangement, a system of observation posts, a non-dissemination agreement, a reduction in military budgets and other measures proposed by the USSR to reduce the risk of war. We might usefully present as well a brief status report on our bilateral negotiations with the Soviets on wheat sales, the use of outer space, a consular agreement, cultural exchanges and civil aviation.

A realistic survey of this negotiating scene, sketched against the background of the potentially inflammatory situations in Berlin and Cuba, comes appropriately from us as the prime mover of the Alliance and its principal exponent of political consultation. It provides a setting for efforts to induce the British to join in forestalling a harmful, competitive relaxation of credit terms for trade with the Soviet Bloc. And it helps to dispose of allegations that the U.S. would be willing to reach security agreements with the USSR over the heads of its allies.

(b) NATO and Atlantic Partnership. In the unlikely event of a direct French attack on NATO, we shall have to make a firm but moderate reply. To remain silent could cause serious injury to the Alliance. The real though limited degree of military integration and political cooperation thus far attained in NATO is the cement of the Alliance; without it there is no assurance of NATO’s utility in a crisis. In any event, we will wish to make clear our continued commitment to the goal of creating an effective Atlantic partnership. Our objective in this regard assumes both a vigorously functioning Alliance and further progress toward European integration.

(c) Organizational Matters. Recognizing that an organizational change may sometimes help to reinvigorate what many consider a static or dispirited agency, we have nevertheless concluded that no significant initiative of this character could be successfully pressed at this time. At this stage it is preferable for us merely to discuss any ideas we or others may have, for future disposition.

In two respects, however, we must contemplate more immediate action. First, we must begin now to search for a candidate of suitable stature and dedication to Alliance objectives to replace Dr. Dirk Stikker when he relinquishes the post of Secretary General next year. Second, as a long-term objective, we could encourage the trend toward creation of a NATO international military staff, which could provide military staff advice on a non-national basis to the Military Committee and replace the tripartite Standing Group. This development would have farreaching organizational implications and would, inter alia, have the additional advantage of permitting the more equitable representation of German and Italian officers, as well as those from the smaller NATO countries, in the higher military activities of the Alliance.

4. Military Problems

(a) NATO Force Planning Exercise. It is now apparent that this exercise may well provide the only means of reconciling NATO strategic doctrine and the force structure and military outlays of NATO members in a more fully consistent pattern, within a relatively short time. Increasingly stiff French opposition to the exercise confronts us with a dilemma. Yielding to it could result in the long run in stultifying NATO’s ability to engage in long-range military planning and coordinated defense; resisting it might provoke a much more serious French estrangement from NATO than anything we have yet observed. Our primary objective at this meeting must, therefore, be to seek some compromise permitting the exercise to proceed, if not with French participation, then at least with French acquiescence or benevolent abstention. If this proves impossible, we shall ultimately have to decide whether to carry on the exercise outside the NATO framework. However, we must avoid promoting or dramatizing French isolation on the procedural and strategic issues involved at the Ministerial Meeting.

(b) The American Military Commitment. With the change in the Presidency, Europeans worried at the prospect of cutbacks in American force levels in Europe for balance of payments or other reasons will seek reassurance at the meeting. Discussion on this subject should be cast in terms of the need for common effort by all the Allies to carry the burden of NATO defense.

At the same time, this would be a poor moment to initiate general discussion of further retrenchment measures now being planned for possible future implementation. Any such discussion would be construed as forecasting a new direction in American military policy; as a justification of the de Gaulle thesis on American undependability; and as an open sesame to force cuts by every NATO country. We should, however, bear in mind the utility of laying the groundwork for the return, as early as politically practicable, of those combat units we are maintaining in Central Europe over our NATO commitments. This consideration is in no way inconsistent with assurances as to fulfillment of the commitments themselves.

We can perform a useful service to the Alliance by providing a thoroughgoing analysis of the military needs and defensive potentialities of the Alliance as we see them, along lines forecast in Secretary McNamara’s address on November 18. Beginning with our estimate of Soviet capabilities, we can espouse the principle of a measured response adjusted to the scale of a Soviet aggression; stress the prospects for non-nuclear resistance short of an all-out war; and set in proper perspective the effects of recent technological and strategic developments. The main thrust should be to demonstrate the utility of adequate general purpose forces, and not to encourage a reduction in their numbers.

(c) Nuclear Problems. While the basic problem of nuclear responsibility and nuclear control in the Alliance is still very far from solution, there is likely to be less emphasis on it at the pending meeting than in past years. No aspect of this subject is ripe for action at this time. We should refer realistically to the status of the preliminary discussions on the Multilateral Force now in process in Paris and Washington, making clear our continuing support and, in bilateral discussions, our willingness to proceed toward establishment of the Force whenever the Germans and Italians are prepared to do so. Moreover, we can as desired cite the nuclear planning, targeting and assignment arrangements completed as a result of the decisions taken at Ottawa last spring. Only if the French precipitate a debate on national nuclear forces should it be necessary to intervene in a major way on the nuclear issue.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D110, CF 2341. Secret. Drafted by Popper and cleared by Tyler, Schaetzel, Owen, Rostow, Weiss, GER, WE, and the Department of Defense.
1. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 6, 1961, pp. 333–334.