Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

220. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, December 2, 1963, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Preparations for December 1963 NATO Ministerial Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• (See attached list)¹

Secretary Rusk asked to turn first to the “concept” of the Ministerial Meeting. The events of the last 10 days have given what otherwise would be a routine session more importance. It would provide a useful opportunity for mutual reaffirmations of faith in the Alliance, more significant now both because of President Kennedy’s death and the numerous other governmental changes in the Alliance since the Ottawa meeting. Secondly, we need to seek a common assessment within the Alliance of several key questions, e.g., what is going on in the Bloc and how this affects East-West relations; the military and strategic questions treated in Secretary McNamara’s November 18 Economic Club speech; economic developments. He was doubtful that we should try to grapple with NATO strategy or let the December meeting become the scene of a sharp and acrimonious debate on strategic choices. The bilateral discussions would be more important in this area as well as in others, such as the successor to Stikker. Generally, the meeting should be used to consolidate, rather than to air differences. It is evident that the Alliance has the will to respond to external threats. The question for future discussion is whether the military posture is appropriate for the best response.

Secretary McNamara said he agreed with these comments. Specific matters which he agreed we should not raise would be, first, the potential withdrawal of U.S. air units from the UK, Spain and France and, secondly, the current difference with France on strategy. Skill will be required to avoid being drawn into the latter but we must make an effort, since only a sharp conflict will result.

Secretary Rusk said that in his view the prime objective was to avoid getting pinned to a single strategic plan, as the French had done, for example, in World Wars I and II. In his view the function of our defense establishments was to provide to heads of government the capabilities for alternative military responses to be used as situations required. We cannot know in advance what is going to be called for and we need a wide range of alternatives, not automatic action. Secretary McNamara said this was exactly the essence of the U.S. strategy and precisely the area of our greatest differences with France. He read excerpts from a recent Gallois statement showing that the French were locked into a strategy of massive retaliation. At some point, however, we will have to have a confrontation with France. Otherwise the Alliance will be led step-by-step into a force structure which would prevent us from having the alternatives to which Secretary Rusk referred.

Secretary Rusk asked whether Secretary McNamara could give NAC a more detailed analysis of the Soviet military position and its strategic implications along the lines of the Economic Club speech. Secretary McNamara said he would like to do this at the right time, but felt that now such an analysis would lead us directly into a discussion of strategy; therefore, he would like to play it down.

Secretary Rusk asked whether we could give some advance thinking on our next year’s military budget. Secretary McNamara said he would do so. He viewed this as another installment in a progress report to the Alliance, the first chapters of which were given at Athens and Paris last year. This time he wished to review our latest force plans and the implications thereof. He would want to deal with our strategic nuclear power and our tactical nuclear power in Europe. These should be placed alongside estimates of the Soviet military position and we should draw appropriate conclusions about strategy, but not in a way that would provoke the French. However, the French may be forced to respond, since this analysis will undermine their strategic concept completely. He intends to raise this matter with von Hassel tomorrow² and to point out bluntly that the French are proposing a bankrupt strategy with great consequences for the FRG. He will urge the Germans to bear a greater part of the burden in dealing with the French on this issue.

General Lemnitzer expressed the hope that Secretary McNamara’s comments would emphasize that there was no justification for relaxation in our efforts to meet conventional force goals. In some quarters in Europe the wrong conclusion had been drawn from the Economic Club speech: that we were in a good position and could relax.

In connection with his own proposed remarks Secretary Rusk said that he would hope to extract a reaffirmation of commitment to the Alliance from others as well. This was not a matter for just the US to make pledges about. He also intends to go over frankly the questions which arise in the US on the double standard within NATO. Without actually saying so, he wants to give the impression that if we did what the others are doing we would be charged with abandoning Europe.

General Lemnitzer pointed out there is still an inclination in Europe to overestimate the détente. Secretary Rusk said he would go over this subject in detail at the meeting, reviewing East-West developments in both the multilateral and bilateral spheres, and show why there were very narrow limits of validity in any talk about détente. There was nothing to justify relaxation. General Lemnitzer said there were many who will seize on any alibi to rationalize reducing our efforts. The UK as well as others had been “hurt” by a message he had sent to MOD’s expressing his concern about the dangerous “trend” in NATO, citing various force withdrawals and numerous reductions in terms of service.³

Secretary Rusk noted that we would prepare a brief statement from President Johnson to the Ministerial Meeting. Secretary McNamara expressed the hope that we would be in a position to exchange drafts of the two speeches before either he or Secretary Rusk departed for Paris. He wanted to get General Taylor’s views on his own statement before the General departed for Paris on the 11th.

Secretary Rusk raised the question of relocation of the Military Committee and Standing Group, noting that others may bring this question up in Paris. Secretary McNamara said he would like to avoid making any changes of this nature before fully considering our long-range objectives. We are not prepared to do this yet. General Taylor noted that the JCS has no objection to relocation if this would mean a great deal to the Alliance, but that they are not pressing for such a change. Personally, he sees no real advantage to be gained. He did believe there was room for greater staff internationalization than the modest measures now under consideration contemplated. He would, however, like to talk to the State Department about where we want to end up with all of this. General Lemnitzer noted that the Secretary General had a legitimate problem in that he had no place to turn for international military advice. Accordingly, he has to go to SACEUR, even though this does not meet his broader requirements. However, even if the Standing Group moved to Paris tomorrow the SYG could not get anything but three separate national views. Right now his only sources of international military advice are the major NATO commanders. In any event, on the question of reorganization there is insufficient unanimity of opinion in any single area to let us come up with an agreed step within the Alliance. Reorganization will raise problems immediately with the French, who occupy a large number of important positions, even though their contribution is limited to two divisions and 10 air squadrons. The Germans, with a much larger contribution, have a far less important role.

Secretary Dillon raised the question of Finance Ministers representation at Ministerial meetings. He noted that we were trying to shift the discussion of Annual Review questions from the morning to the afternoon of the 17th so that it would not conflict with the meeting of the Group of Ten. It was important to bring the Finance Ministers into discussions so that they will have a stake in budget proposals which arise at a later stage. This was particularly a problem in the case of coalition governments, where the Defense and Finance Ministers might be from different parties. He noted, further, that room should be made for Finance Ministers to attend restricted sessions so that they would not get bored with the meetings and refuse to come. This had been the problem in the past.

Ambassador Finletter supported Secretary McNamara’s ideas on what should be avoided. We do not want to break new ground at this meeting, and specifically, he hopes nothing comes up on NATO Force Planning. General Taylor noted that the subject of the impasse on NFP would inevitably be discussed in the MC/CS, and would have to be included in its report to the Council. Secretary Rusk agreed that all reference to this could not be avoided.

Secretary Dillon noted that Secretary McNamara had referred to the balance of payments problem in the outline of his remarks. He expressed the view that we should not make this a NATO-wide problem, since we could only lose. Secretary McNamara agreed that we would not want a multilateral analysis of our balance of payments problems, but that we should explain our difficulties and what we are trying to do.

Secretary McNamara said that he proposed to send MC 100/1 to State for official review. Since this will be the formal basis of our disagreement with the French, he wished to have this checked out with the political authorities. He would also send a revised copy of the Joint Chiefs’ new paper on U.S. strategy.⁴ He believed this was a good statement, the first of its kind, and said that he would be discussing it with von Hassel tomorrow. Nevertheless, he would like to send it to the Department for review and whatever comment we might have.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret, Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on January 6, 1964. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
1. Not printed.
2. No record of a meeting with von Hassel on December 3 has been found, although it is referred to again in Topol 733 to Paris, December 3 (ibid., Def 4 NATO), which summarized the conversation in Rusk’s office described here.
3. Not identified further.
4. McNamara sent Rusk a copy of CM–1044–63, November 29, under cover of a letter dated December 3. (Department of State, Central Files, Def 1 NATO)