Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

212. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 23, 1963, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Atlantic Solidarity and Multilateral Force

PARTICIPANTS

• Italy
  • Foreign Minister Attilio Piccioni
  • Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea
  • Minister Piero Vinci, Foreign Ministry
  • Minister Gian Milesi Ferretti, Italian Embassy
• United States
  • The President
  • Acting Secretary Ball
  • Assistant Secretary Tyler
  • Mr. William J. Tonesk, U/PR
  • Mr. Galen L. Stone, WE
  • Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter

The President said that we were interested in the progress of the multilateral force. We hoped that the United Kingdom would come in. We thought that we ought to proceed with the establishment of such a force. Possibly this was the only way we could prevent a very sharp division in the NATO Alliance. If we proceeded to organize the force with the Germans and Italians, the President said he felt the U.K. would join.

Foreign Minister Piccioni said that Italy had made it clear that she completely adhered in principle to the concept of the multilateral force. Eventually they would like to see such a force constituted with all the members of NATO. There was a certain perplexity, in their view, of the British attitude. Perhaps this was due to internal politics. He said they were bewildered to see this shift in the British position. The position of France, however, surprised them less. German participation was of great importance. The Italians did their best to bring about the best solution from the technical point of view. They hoped the other members of NATO would also appreciate the need for setting up such a force so it would not be a “little lateral” force.

The President said it was important to get the force started. Once it was started others would join. Any such agreement was uncertain in the beginning but it then became more desirable as it got underway.

The President said he had talked in the past of the possibility that a multilateral force would evolve if Europe so desired it. The problem now was that the organization of the structure of such a force still had some time to go. It was our feeling that Europe and the United States would coordinate closely together until there was a significant détente. Foreign Minister Piccioni referred to the French proposal to call a meeting of the four nuclear powers for October to work toward disarmament. He said it remained to be seen what were the concrete possibilities that the French had in mind. He thought the United States might be able to do something to build the complete frame of nations on this fulcrum of Europe.

The Foreign Minister said that there had been certain problems between the Common Market and the United States and pointed out that Italy had always worked to overcome these problems. He was personally convinced of the approach advocated by the President in his speech at Philadelphia.¹ We must ask ourselves on both sides of the Atlantic how fast we could arrive at solutions.

The Foreign Minister said that during his dinner with Secretary Rusk he had raised the possibility of the future of a multilateral force in a European context. He felt the possibility should exist for Europe to dispose of a purely European multilateral force. This should not be taken as a contrasting of an European initiative with that of the United States. However, he felt we had to be realistic about this matter. The President said he agreed that the United States position ought to be to support whatever arrangement the Europeans arrived at. The problems we had in the 60’s might be described as follows: there was much less chance of a military attack from the Soviets; Europe was more secure than it had been in the past; Berlin also was more secure; the problem was political and monetary. We had to give stability to Germany. We also had to give an effective answer to the Communists in Italy and in France. We were moving toward the general lines of collective policy. It was now a problem to draw together for common purposes. This was the only question he had about de Gaulle. De Gaulle’s attitude divided Europe and the United States. The President said he did not think the situation with the Soviets was such that we should be divided. A few years ago all the premises on the defense of Western Europe were based on the monopoly of nuclear weapons by the United States. Now that the Soviet Union had achieved a nuclear capability there was some feeling that this changed the fundamental assumption on which the defense of the West was based. The acquisition of nuclear weapons brought with it a terrible responsibility. The effect had been that the Soviet Union was somewhat bolder in the 50’s than it was today. Some thought that Europe was in greater danger today than before and that our strategy was outmoded. No Soviet leader would be insane enough, however, to launch an attack on Europe, just as we would not launch an attack on the Communist Bloc. There was too much danger. The problems that we would be facing in the 60’s would consist of trouble in Latin America and Algeria. These were the trouble spots.

The President said that Italy had given us support when we needed it. If we proceeded with the multilateral force on a limited basis of participation by the Germans, Italians and the United States and got one ship on the ocean and showed that it could work with a multilateral crew, then the British would come in. The British would not join up now but they would when the force became a reality. The President said that Admiral Mountbatten was opposed to the concept but this would not be a fleet that would be manned by the military—politicians would man this fleet.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Def(MLF)3. Confidential. Drafted by Stone and approved in the White House on September 27. Piccioni was in the United States to attend the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly.
1. For text of the President’s address on July 4, 1962, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 537–539.