Office of the Historian

209. Notes on a Conversation0

Washington, August 30, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Notes on Conversation re the MLF with Mr. McGeorge Bundy

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
  • Ambassador F. E. Holting, Jr.
  • EUR—Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel
  • S/MF—Mr. Howard Furnas

In the conversation with Mr. Bundy the following were the principal points which emerged:

1.
On the basis of two years experience with Adenauer and one week in Germany, the President as never before is convinced that Germany is essential to United States foreign policy.
2.
Germany now is committed to the MLF. It is conceivable that in about a year’s time, if it proves impossible to interest other major countries (e.g., United Kingdom, Italy) in the MLF, the United States and Germany might go ahead with the MLF on a bilateral basis.
3.
While no perfect solution, the MLF is the best available one to deal with the problem of German participation in the nuclear strategy of the West.
4.
We should begin quietly consultations with the foreign affairs committees of Congress and specifically on the mixed-manning experiment, and should inform Senator Pastore of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, any formal consultation would seem to be premature.
5.
The President believes we are now in the correct posture on the MLF. Last spring we were too far out ahead of our allies in trying to “sell” the concept. On the other hand, Mr. Bundy showed some concern about the slow pace of the September work program.
6.
While agreeing about the crucial importance of Italy to the MLF, if any further “selling” is needed, we should leave this primarily to the other potential participants. For example, the Germans might make an effort with the Italians at the time of Adenauer’s planned farewell visit to the Pope.
7.
The British will not come in so long as Macmillan is pinning his election hopes on the results of Nassau and on the United Kingdom’s national nuclear program. After the election a change may be possible. The United Kingdom Treasury is opposed because of the expense and Mountbatten (who is increasingly irresponsible) and some of the British navy and defense officials are against the MLF because it’s a new concept and they didn’t invent it. Also they cannot face giving up the prestige that nuclear weapons presumably gives them.
8.
The schedule which we have in mind for further multilateral conversations in Washington, including passing out the scope paper,1 and for convening an MLF Working Group in Paris the first of October is satisfactory. So are the proposed arrangements for the military planning sub-group to meet in Washington at the end of September and to begin its work with a war-gaming exercise on the survivability of surface vessels.
9.
The mixed-manning experiment is approved if our allies can be interested in proposing it. The President would authorize necessary supporting actions to conduct the experiment. State should, through diplomatic channels, prepare the way.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF. Secret. Drafted by Furnas. The meeting was held at the White House.↩
  2. A copy of this 2-page paper, “Multilateral Force Discussion: Suggested Terms of Reference,” is attached to a memorandum from Furnas to Ball, August 26. (Department of State, Central Files, Def(MLF))↩