Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

189. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, April 7, 1963, 5–7 p.m.

SEATO COUNCIL MEETING

Paris, April 8–10, 1963

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Bohlen
• France
  • Couve de Murville
  • Charles Lucet

SUBJECT

• France’s Attitude towards the IANF

The Secretary inquired what was the French attitude towards the assignment of their two squadrons in Germany with American warheads to the inter-allied nuclear force.

Couve de Murville replied that his difficulty was to understand what our policy was. He could understand the British point of view but not that of the U.S. The British wanted to try and dilute the Nassau Agreement to make it more supple and to utilize emergency arrangements to keep control over their own force while at the same time supporting NATO. The U.S. realized that the problem of Europe was becoming more important and possibly this IANF was a mechanism to permit some appearance of European participation in the nuclear mystery. What he really didn’t understand is what change this force would produce in the NATO set up and he did not understand the feasibility of a Dutch general in command. He thought that he wished to make as little disruption as possible in NATO arrangements as well as in our individual bilateral arrangements with other countries. Ambassador Finletter had told him that France would be welcome to come in but if they didn’t nothing much would be changed.

The Secretary said that up to the middle 50’s the U.S. had had a monopoly of nuclear power but that since that time the Soviet capability had grown and therefore it was understandable that nations that could be struck wanted to have some knowledge of and participation in nuclear matters. Previous to that the question had not arisen since it would have been the other side that would have been struck and hurt. He said Nassau under Paragraph 6 introduced a new element into NATO, namely that by introducing the V bombers from the UK and Polaris missiles from the U.S., the strategic factor had been introduced and that it was therefore desirable that the entire targeting system for NATO should be worked out as a unit in close association with Omaha, and that European targets should be under NATO control.

Couve de Murville said he thought this changed nothing, and as far as the battle of Europe that the targeting was perfectly okay but that what he was interested in was the question of the use of these weapons and not so much the targeting, and he did not quite understand the difference between the strategic and tactical elements.

The Secretary replied the dual role might shift and the definition of tactical as the first step in any nuclear exchange might become more important. For example, airfields, anti-aircraft sites and missiles would have to be redefined. This would increase the mix and if NATO did get in on it it would be a very good thing. The U.S. did not wish to see a NATO nuclear club with France outside. He mentioned that of course the French national force was different and he was not referring to that.

Couve de Murville said he understood but he still did not see much to be changed and was rather afraid of an element of deception which would bring up the problem of the NATO organization. He said that the targeting for the French F–104’s was already done and it would not add anything new but might merely complicate the work of General Lemnitzer.

The Secretary said he thought that something new had indeed been added. He said the introduction of Polaris weapons and V bombers would provide NATO with something that it did not have, namely a strategic element and this should be combined with what already existed in other weapons.

Couve de Murville said that this raised a different question. He said that at present the weapons assigned to Europe had U.S. warheads as distinct from British V bombers. He then referred to the political problem which the Secretary had mentioned. He pointed out that not many of the Europeans really wanted to join in and were in effect indifferent to the nuclear problem. He mentioned Italy, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, etc.

The Secretary objected to the inclusion of Italy.

Couve de Murville said we will say that Italy is half interested but in reality there was only England, France and Germany. This was quite normal since they had traditions of defense responsibility. Apart from these countries, leaving aside Italy, the others do not count. Germany, however, remains the main problem. He was somewhat afraid that these proposals (he was now referring to MLF) would merely increase Germany’s appetite for nuclear weapons.

The Secretary said in regard to the MLF this was up to the NATO countries, specifically Germany and Italy to decide.

Couve de Murville said “we don’t object, this has no inconvenience for us”.

The Secretary then said, referring back to Paragraph 6, that the NATO commander should have responsibility to coordinate the various elements involved in targeting.

Couve de Murville said he could accept this idea but he did not think a Dutch officer could do it. He said that the Dutch had no experience in this field and he doubted if they could coordinate planning.

The Secretary said he did not wish to go into nationalities but felt that the problem was one of competence.

Couve de Murville said he still did not see what it did to the planning staff. What was needed was experience and capability and what should be considered was the efficiency, and that we should do what was technically necessary to try to avoid bringing in organizational disarray.

The Secretary inquired as to where they would put the Polaris and V bombers in the NATO structure.

Couve de Murville agreed that they should be in the NATO structure.

The Secretary then said he did not see why some tactical forces should not be added.

Couve de Murville said this is what the British originally wanted but we had differed; but now we agreed.

The Secretary said it was a problem of long-range and battlefield weapons. The Secretary, referring back to targeting, said it was very important that Europe should know that the targets vital for Europe were not being neglected.

Couve agreed.

The Secretary said that the Paragraph 6 Forces really did not make any startling and new change in the NATO force structure. However, the MLF might if the Germans agree. He would leave the question at this stage.

Couve de Murville said possibly the military technicians should study this question and that his reaction might change with further knowledge.

The Secretary said he hoped that the French would come in.

Couve de Murville said that this matter had now turned into a maneuver whereby if France refused she would be isolated and if she accepted would be accused of having retreated from her position.

The Secretary repeated that the assignment of French 104’s under Paragraph 6 would not produce any major change any more than the agreement to give these forces warheads, which the American newspapers had got all wrong.

Couve de Murville agreed that efficiency should be the criterion but did say that if the French assigned the F–104’s it would be interpreted as a retreat.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on April 10. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay. On April 8 Rusk briefly discussed the same question with de Gaulle. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid.