Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

188. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 5, 1963.

SUBJECT

• The MLF and the IANF

PARTICIPANTS

• The President; Undersecretary Ball, Messrs. Tyler, Merchant, Smith, Weiss and Admiral Lee of the Department of State; Messrs. Nitze, McNaughton and General Goodpaster of the Department of Defense; Mr. Bundy

Bill Tyler reported to the President on his MLF discussions with the Germans and the Italians.

He was optimistic about possible German participation. The Germans are supporting the MLF for political reasons. (According to Ambassador Dowling, Schroeder told Adlai Stevenson that if the MLF did not materialize, the Germans would be forced to seek equal status with the British and French.) However, to make the MLF politically viable, the German Government has to be able to make a convincing case for a surface as opposed to a submarine force.

As for the Italians, Bill Tyler felt the principal consideration was German participation. So long as there is no German decision, the Italians will continue to agitate on the issue of the surface vessel vs. the submarine. Bill Tyler said Fanfani also had reservations about mixed manning. He appears particularly concerned about the possible distribution of tasks and wants some assurance that Italian mariners will have the same opportunities as the others.¹

To deal with the problems created by submarine vs. the surface vessel debate, the President approved a suggestion that Admiral Ricketts lead a mission to Bonn early next week for technical discussions with German officialdom—to make the case for the surface ship MLF and give the German Government the arguments it needs to rally the necessary political support for the MLF. The President agreed to Mr. McNaughton’s joining Admiral Ricketts and added that Ambassador Dowling should provide the political guidance for the group. He asked also that the Ricketts’ mission be adequately staffed with submariners.

To avoid a combined German and Italian maneuver against the surface force, the President decided against joint technical briefings for the Germans and Italians. In fact, the question of arrangements for technical discussions with the Italians was left open since the Italians, unlike the Germans, have not asked for them and in this pre-election period seem reluctant to have them.

Mr. Merchant asked for and was given authority to resume his visit to capitals, going to those he did not reach the last time. The President, however, asked him to by-pass Paris on this round to avoid resurfacing the MLF in NAC at this time.

In view of continued Congressional interest in the Merchant mission, Mr. Bundy undertook to inform the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at an appropriate time, about Merchant’s plans to return to Europe.

Before leaving the MLF and the question of the survivability of the surface vessel, there was an inconclusive discussion about the possibility of substituting a Savannah type ship or a conventionally powered submarine for the surface vessel. However, DoD undertook to discuss the security problems of a nuclear powered surface vessel with Admiral Rickover.

It was also agreed to cease calling the surface ships merchant ships and instead refer to them as “surface missile warships”. In this connection, Bill Tyler indicated that in his talks with the Europeans, he left open the possibility of considering at a later date—after the MLF was operational—the possibility of including nuclear powered submarines in the MLF.

Mr. Nitze took the opportunity to bring the President up to date on the progress of the IANF negotiations. He said he felt the formula now under discussion eliminated the control problem and was less likely than the earlier British blueprint to encounter French obstructionism. In response to the President’s question about making the IANF more attractive, Mr. Nitze said he would recommend against considering any changes in the IANF plans prior to the Ottawa meeting, although expansion and/or modification could be considered after that meeting, and particularly if MLF seemed to be failing.

The President also asked about possible tactics for dealing with French obstructionism in NATO. Mr. Nitze said a scenario was under consideration calling for Mr. Finletter to do some preliminary work with the French and for Secretary Rusk to follow through when he reached Paris.

As a result of this morning’s meeting, John McNaughton was asked to prepare necessary instructions for the Ricketts’ mission and to send them to the President for approval after the details were worked out by State and Defense.

The Department of State was asked to notify Ambassador Dowling immediately of the Ricketts’ mission to assure there was a clear understanding that these meetings would be held in Bonn, rather than in Washington, and get from the Ambassador some sense for timing and arranging the mission.

David Klein²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, MLF. Top Secret. A longer, but less detailed record of this meeting, drafted by Seymóur Weiss, is in Department of State, President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.
1. Tyler discussed the MLF with Fanfani on April 3, stating that the President was prepared to proceed if the major European allies were interested in proceeding with the MLF. Fanfani stated that he had been and still was a strong supporter of the MLF, but that Italy believed that a submarine force was better than a surface fleet. (Telegram 4000 from Paris, April 4; ibid., Central Files, Def(MLF))
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.