Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

132. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

• General Taylor’s Comments on His Recent Visit to Europe

You requested my reactions to General Taylor’s report on his recent trip to Europe, as set forth in his April 3 letter to you.¹ I have omitted reference to the French nuclear and the NATO multilateral force issues, except as they relate directly to other views of General Taylor.

Strengthening West German Ties to NATO. I concur generally in General Taylor’s comments on strengthening West German ties to NATO. There are several observations, however, that I would make.

• First, although I fully agree that we must develop a multilateral NATO nuclear force as one answer to German concerns, I do not concur that such a force should be justified on the basis of SACEUR’s military requirements. I feel that the basic need for the NATO multilateral force is political; it would have military utility, but not necessarily for SACEUR’s requirements, which the U.S. has not accepted. I also do not concur in General Taylor’s view that the force should be set up without delay, drawing on existing weapons of the U.S. and the U.K. and eventually of France. I believe that a multilaterally owned, controlled and manned force is essential to meet the political requirement.
• Secondly, I agree with General Taylor that the guidelines currently being developed in NATO are needed to give the Germans evidence of our determination to use nuclear weapons. Although there may be a problem in obtaining French agreement, the current discussions in NATO on these guidelines promise that something can be worked out which will meet some German concerns. Language in the guidelines as presently drafted states that nuclear weapons will be used in the event of (i) an unmistakable nuclear attack, in which case the possibilities for consultation will be limited; and (ii) a full-scale Soviet conventional attack, in which case it is expected that time will permit consultation. In a situation involving less than unmistakable nuclear or full-scale conventional attacks, but nevertheless involving a threat to the integrity of NATO territory, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be subject to prior consultation in the Council. Although we do not have formal German approval, the indications are that these guidelines will be acceptable to the Federal Republic.
• Thirdly, we also concur with General Taylor that there is need to give reality to a forward strategy which can be executed for the duration of a significant pause without general employment of nuclear weapons. We feel, however, that the problem here has two aspects: (i) The first aspect is to explain the basis for U.S. thinking on this issue, as Secretary McNamara began to do at Paris in December and as we hope to continue to do through the U.S. information program in the NAC. Only when the process is further underway will we be able to judge whether it would be useful to have a general NATO review of military requirements. (ii) The second aspect is to fill the large gaps which presently exist in NATO forces. The fact is that the Alliance today is deficient in the forces required to fulfill immediate needs and first priority must be given to filling these deficiencies.

As for the negative actions to be avoided, I agree that the multilateral NATO force should not be portrayed as a device to remove nuclear weapons from Europe. On the contrary, we are presently engaged in NATO in developing formal assurances that an adequate level of nuclear weapons will be maintained in Europe and that targets of concern to the Europeans will be covered. Furthermore, these assurances will be reinforced by the program for giving our NATO Allies full information, in general terms, on targeting and on the numbers and deployment of nuclear weapons.

Although the issue of our nuclear policy toward France is being covered separately, I would like, in commenting on General Taylor’s recommendations regarding Germany, to make the general point that a change in our policy of non-cooperation with France in nuclear or missile matters would basically contradict the objective of tying Germany into NATO more closely. A change in our policy of denying the French help for a national nuclear or missile program would inevitably lead, sooner rather than later in my view, to German pressures for similar treatment. However we responded to these pressures, such a development in Germany would make far more difficult the task of tying Germany more closely into the Alliance. We have made clear to the Germans why we do not provide help for the French missile or nuclear program, and any change in our posture would be taken by them as a sign of a basic shift of policy—in whose fruits they would expect to share.

The “New” U.S. Strategy. General Taylor’s comments on the “new” U.S. strategy are also, generally speaking, in conformity with my views. I agree that we should generally advance our strategic ideas without giving the appearance of lecture or exhortation. This does not mean, however, that we should not continue to make our case for a conventional buildup and for a strategy that does not rest on use of nuclear weapons from the outset. Although General Taylor’s proposal for a comprehensive review of military requirements in SHAPE might be a desirable technique, at some point, as indicated above, I believe it also important that there be discussion in the NATO Council so that the political authorities may be given a fuller comprehension of all factors involved in our thinking. In this connection, I am concerned that there be an adequate flow of information to our NATO Allies, both on the facts of conventional requirements and on nuclear matters.

On the conventional side, I am concerned that there appears to be a serious difference of view between the U.S., the Germans, and SHAPE, on the magnitude of the threat we face in Soviet divisions. You will recall that this difference came out sharply at the briefing of Adenauer last November. It has not been resolved. The same U.S. figures used in the Adenauer briefing were used in Secretary McNamara’s briefing of the NATO Council last December. The Germans again challenged our figures, as did Norstad privately. The JCS is currently studying the matter, but so far has not been able to provide us with the data required. This has seriously hampered our efforts to follow up on Secretary McNamara’s presentation at the December NATO meeting. I am informed that Defense is now working to remedy this deficiency.

On the nuclear side, I am concerned that we be in a position to give in the NATO Council as full information as is necessary to convince our Allies that there is adequate protection for them against the Soviet threat to Europe. Any failure on our part to provide the information necessary can undermine our basic purpose: to give the Europeans enough confidence in nuclear defense to head off pressures for independent national nuclear programs. Again, I believe that Defense is seeking to bring together the information necessary to meet this need.²

Dean Rusk³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Maxwell D. Taylor Trip to Europe, Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. Document 131.
2. In an April 25 memorandum McNamara commented on the 3d and 4th enclosures to Taylor’s report. Stating that he shared Taylor’s appreciation of the German concern and that a NATO nuclear force was justified by political-psychological factors rather than military, he stressed that the Germans should be given reassurances about the NATO response to an attack on Germany. McNamara also shared Taylor’s view that the new strategy should not be represented as something novel, but speculated that it was too early to tell if NATO conventional forces would be strengthened. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Maxwell D. Taylor Trip to Europe)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.