131. Letter From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy0
Washington, April 3,
1962.
Dear Mr. President: As you know, I have just
completed a two weeks’ visit to Europe1 which included stops at several NATO capitals and discussions with numerous officials, both US
and foreign (Inclosure 1).2 While the
purpose of my trip was personal orientation, I should like to report to you
my impressions on some of the political-military problems which particularly
struck me after an absence of nearly three years from Europe. I have listed
them under three heads:
- a.
- The depressed state of US relations with France, resulting largely
from our opposition to the French atomic program.
- b.
- The problem of keeping West Germany a contented non-nuclear
power.
- c.
- The acceptance by NATO of the
“new” US strategy.
To avoid an unduly long letter, I have attached short supporting papers
covering each of these three topics. Here I will state only the principal
conclusions which I believe these papers to support. The first is that the
US, after consultation with Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer, should open negotiations with President de Gaulle
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directed at changing our policy
toward aid to the French atomic program in exchange for loyal French
cooperation within NATO, for French
participation in a multilateral NATO force,
and for an overall normalization of Franco-American relations.
The second is that we should strengthen German ties with NATO by supporting the forward strategy
recommended by General Norstad, by
giving Germany a voice in controlling the use of any multilateral NATO atomic force and by adopting a statement
of principles on the use of atomic weapons similar to the guidelines which
Secretary General Stikker is
proposing.
Third and last, in the NATO forum we should
advance our strategic ideas in a low key without giving the appearance of
lecture or exhortation, preferably by way of a NATO comprehensive review of the military requirements for
implementing a forward strategy capable of offering some degree of
protection to the exposed population centers of West Germany.
My reasons for arriving at these conclusions are set forth in the attached
inclosures.
Enclosure 24
THE STRAIN ON RELATIONS WITH FRANCE RESULTING FROM US
OPPOSITION TO THE FRENCH ATOMIC PROGRAM
It is impossible to go to Paris today and meet with representatives of
the de Gaulle Government without
becoming deeply impressed with their bitterness toward the US
Government. Their hostility results from our refusal to aid the French
atomic program and the extension of this non-cooperation to their
missile and nuclear submarine programs and then to remotely related
projects in a way which strains the imagination to find justification in
the requirements of the McMahon Act.
I found no European officials, US or European, who do not believe that
de Gaulle is going to carry
out his program to obtain national atomic weapons for France in spite of
the cost and in spite of American resistance.
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Most of them apparently believe that even if
de Gaulle disappeared from
the scene, a successor government would not be likely to cancel the
program. In case the French encounter technical difficulties beyond
their capability to resolve, it is probable that the French would turn
to the Germans for aid, a contingency which the latter do not like to
contemplate.
The US can either stand pat in refusing to help the French in all fields
however remotely related to the atomic weapons program, can modify its
position to one of non-cooperation in the atomic weapons field alone, or
can open negotiations with France with a view to trading technical aid
in atomic matters for important concessions such as:
- a.
- A French return to cooperation in NATO;
- b.
- Commitment of a significant part of French atomic weapons,
when available, to a multilateral NATO atomic force; and
- c.
- An overall normalization of French-American relations.
After exchanging views with Adenauer and Macmillan, I would be inclined to try the latter course,
i.e., negotiate with the French, and fall back to the middle course if
the negotiations proved fruitless. This suggestion is advanced under no
illusion as to the likelihood of de
Gaulle becoming a grateful, cooperative partner or a true
convert to integration of effort within NATO, but he may be induced to withhold his monkey wrench.
Also, I appreciate the argument that the existence of a French national
force will whet the appetite of the Germans for one of their own;
however I would try to meet this contingency through a multilateral
NATO atomic force in the use of
which the Germans would have a vote. This possibility is discussed in
the following paper.
Enclosure 35
STRENGTHENING WEST GERMAN TIES TO NATO
West Germany is in the geographical front rank of NATO facing (the Germans would say) 92
hostile divisions. Several of their principal cities, notably Hamburg
and Munich, lie forward of the main NATO battle position, and the German leaders know it. They
hear talk of a forward strategy to defend these centers but do not see
the conventional forces to execute it. At the same time, they hear of a
“new” American strategy which calls for imposing a pause on these
hostile divisions by conventional means without the use of nuclear
weapons. In combination, the lack of conventional forces to implement a
true forward strategy
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and the
alleged reluctance on the part of the US to use atomic weapons at the
outset of an attack are matters which give pause to many German leaders
concerned with the long-term security of their country.
If West Germany is to continue to be a contented non-nuclear member of
NATO, particularly after France
obtains national nuclear weapons, these problems need to be faced before
a critical situation arises in the heart of the Alliance. Several
courses of action suggest themselves and deserve serious
consideration.
The first is to develop the concept and then plan for a multilateral
NATO nuclear force which will
include Germany among a restricted group of nations controlling the use
of this force. The composition of the force should be designed to meet
the requirement of giving the Europeans—and particularly the West
Germans—a feeling of participating more directly in determining the use
of atomic weapons in NATO. The weapons
in such a force should be counted against SACEUR’s military requirements to strike targets of primary
interest to the Alliance and be subject to his control as are his other
atomic weapons, but the justification for the force would be primarily
political-psychological. It should be set up in business without delay
by allocations of existing weapons by the US and UK (and eventually by
France); the subsequent modernization of these weapons by the
introduction of a new MRBM should be
planned as a part of the overall modernization program for all of SACEUR’s atomic forces.
West Germans need reassurance not only through the provision of this
NATO nuclear force but also through
evidence of a determination to use all NATO atomic weapons under certain predetermined conditions
which will satisfy German security requirements. For the moment, some
declaration of principles governing the use of atomic weapons such as
Stikker’s currently proposed
guidelines, if approved both by the President of the United States and
by the North Atlantic Council, seems the most feasible way to give the
needed reassurance to Germany.
Finally, there is need to give reality to a forward strategy which can be
executed for the duration of a significant pause without a general
employment of atomic weapons. In the eyes of the Germans, means for such
a strategy do not exist now. The first step is to agree within NATO upon what these means should be; in
short, to embark on the NATO military
review which is discussed in the following paper.
The foregoing actions are affirmative suggestions to tie the West Germans
more tightly to the West. There are some negative actions which would
work strongly against this objective if the Europeans—particularly the
Germans—became aware of them. They include any action which might
suggest that the multilateral NATO
force is a device to remove atomic weapons from Europe or to deflect a
general modernization of NATO atomic
forces. Another would be to advocate a pseudo-forward
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strategy based on an obviously fragile
defensive shield without the depth, durability, or logistic means to
support sustained combat. The Germans know too much about war and the
facts of life to be taken in for long.
Enclosure 46
THE “NEW” US STRATEGY
General Norstad feels, and I
agree, that the sure way to defeat our purpose of gaining NATO acceptance of our reoriented thinking
on military strategy is to present it as something new and
extraordinary, made in the USA. He
points out that many of the cardinal points, particularly the increased
emphasis on conventional weapons and the concept of creating a pause
before using atomic weapons, have been a part of NATO thinking for a long time. In his
recent Emergency Defense Plan7 now disseminated to NATO commanders, there is recognition of the possibility of
a conventional conflict in resisting an aggression less than general
war.
In listening to the views of General
Norstad and the SHAPE
staff, I was struck both by their support of the need for a forward
strategy to reassure the Germans and by what I view as their reluctance
to face up to the need for larger forces to give reality to such a
strategy. One thought was advanced that the pause imposed on the Soviets
might occur prior to firing a shot, presumably while they contemplated
the consequences of an attack on NATO
forward positions. This would be accomplished by placing a sufficient
number of NATO ground forces far enough
forward to oblige the Soviets to mass for a major military thrust
thereby exposing their forces at the outset to the possibility of
effective use of nuclear weapons. If the attack then came, the NATO forces would be expected to expend
themselves on these forward positions, since their numbers would not
permit anything like an effective resistance forward and a defense in
depth as well. In the background of these views, I detected a
fundamental disbelief in the practicability of getting an increased
NATO contribution to support a
forward strategy with adequate forces.
Returning to the problem of influencing our NATO allies in the direction of our strategic thinking, if
direct explanation and exhortation must be avoided, it remains to find a
better way. I would recommend a
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comprehensive NATO review of the
requirements for an adequate forward strategy as a vehicle to argue the
case for the modified strategy. To do such a job in a professional
military way, it would be necessary to give to the Allied planners—and
through them their governmental leaders—much of the new information on
weapons effects, targeting plans, and enemy capabilities which would be
otherwise suspect if suddenly released to support US arguments on NATO strategy. In this NATO forum, we could thrash out the
differences in assessing Soviet capabilities which now plague our
international discussions.
In passing, I would mention that the assumptions for such a review would,
as always, largely control the outcome. I would suggest the inclusion of
the following assumptions if the end product is to have the desired
value:
- a.
- NATO should defend far enough
forward to cover the main population centers of the exposed
member nations.
- b.
- NATO forces should be
sufficient to prevent without the general use of atomic weapons
any serious inroad into NATO
territory for at least ______ days (the exact figure to be based
on a political estimate of the time requirement).
- c.
- SACEUR should have
operational control of all the weapons necessary to strike the
principal targets primarily threatening Western Europe, to
include the Soviet MRBM
deployment.
The establishment of agreed NATO
requirements for a forward strategy would have generally good
consequences apart from the progress which it might make in educating
our Allies. One result would be to require SHAPE to justify the need for NATO
MRBM’s both as modernization of
existing bomber and cruise missile forces and as a contribution to the
NATO nuclear force previously
discussed. Another would be to establish the role for very low yield
atomic weapons in extending the capability of conventional forces. Such
matters could not be considered without getting into questions of NATO organization, command and control. In
the full context of Western European defense and in the relatively cool
atmosphere of military planning, we might hope for more progress than in
high temperature political discussions, where these intricate matters
are often considered in isolation.
On the negative side, it is probable that an honest study of requirements
would be opposed, possibly frustrated, by national interests desirous of
controlling the end result. If this result is a requirement for a
greatly increased contribution to NATO,
efforts will be made to discredit and bury the review. Nonetheless, even
in this case, it would have important collateral benefits and is, I am
convinced, worth giving a sincere try. There is not much likelihood that
the project will be started—certainly its conclusions will not be
adopted and implemented—without vigorous US backing all the way.