Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

380. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 26, 1963, 11:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • Under Secretary Harriman
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Tyler-EUR
  • Mr. Bundy—The White House
  • Mr. Akalovsky—ACDA/IR
• USSR
  • Mr. Mikoyan
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Mr. Smirnovski, Chief of the American Section, Foreign Ministry
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT

• Call by Mr. Mikoyan on the President

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; for text, see volume V.]

The President then noted that the United States was not planning to invade Cuba, but that the Cuban problem was a very serious one with our people. He hoped that as days came and went we would be able to find a solution there which would make it possible to lead our peoples further towards peace and understanding. Actions already taken had gone part of the way and some lessening of tension had taken place. We had a number of problems at home which were quite troublesome, and if there was any indication at any time that we could in some way bring about better understanding and better relations we would go our part of the way. We were dedicated to our system and intended to preserve it, but this did not mean that we wanted it to dominate or enslave any other people.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was happy to hear these words uttered by the new President of the United States. The President’s desire to live in peace and friendship with the USSR and with other nations was in full accord with the views of the Soviet Union.

The President stated that there would be no change in the Kennedy policy. We were very happy that Congress had shown evidences of approving negotiations and exchanges of views between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. This had offered us real encouragement not only in their attitude but also in our people’s attitude. Our constant purpose, each day, would be to seek to travel the road of peace and to find solutions to many problems that engaged the two sides and to many differences existing between them.

The President continued that as an immediate comment he wished to say that the problem which was the biggest with our people was the result of the Castro-promoted subversion. This inevitably and invariably gave us strained relations. He hoped, however, that in future both sides would find that they had moved further to peace and had made gains greater than even those made by his predecessor and Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was very much gratified to hear this. However, there was only one point he wished to comment on, namely, the President’s remark concerning Cuban subversive activities. He said he could not understand how a small nation like Cuba could subvert anyone, let alone a big power. On the contrary, the whole world could see how small Cuba was being subverted by a number of various, well-financed organizations. The Soviet Union believed that all subversive activities should be ended everywhere. He asserted that he knew Cuba did not want to subvert anyone. In his conversation with Castro, the latter had told him that he wanted good relations with the United States. In his statement on the occasion of the tragedy falling upon the United States, Castro had shown himself as a great humanitarian as he had voiced deep regret about President Kennedy’s death. Therefore, Mr. Mikoyan continued, he wished to ask the President not to accept the allegations which were sometimes mentioned in the press. He wanted the President to believe him that good relations with Cuba were in the interest of the United States.

The President responded that his intention had been simply to give an evaluation of the feelings of our people and of what gave them problems. He said he had spoken sincerely and earnestly about US intentions with respect to Cuba. We had no plans for invasion, and we believed that there was no justification for Cuba to invade others by subversion or otherwise. The President reiterated that what he was seeking now was merely to give Mr. Mikoyan an evaluation and expressed the hope that better understanding could flow from this.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. Approved by the White House on December 2 and by Thompson on November 27.