Office of the Historian

365. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, September 12, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Exile Raids From Outside Areas—Pros, Cons, and Public Position

I understand that the President may be interested in stopping free-lance exile raids which originate from outside the U.S., as well as those which originate from the U.S. I find the case for stopping raids from the U.S. vaguely convincing because the possibility of Russian reaction to our direct involvement is greater. However, I find less convincing the case for trying to stop raids which originate from outside the U.S. Here are a few thoughts I jotted down, admittedly in a hurry, this morning; anyway, you might find them useful for the press conference.1

Arguments in Favor of Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S.

1.
They might provoke a Russian reaction.
2.
They don’t hurt Castro much.
3.
They are haphazard and kill innocents. Inter alia, this might mean a bad press in some friendly countries.
4.
They might provoke the Cubans to extreme retaliatory meas-ures.
5.
They increase Cuban alertness, [1 line of source text not declassified].

Arguments Against Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S.

1.
The exile action program seems to be gaining momentum. Pretty soon, as they become more expert, they may start to hit something worthwhile.
2.
There is a fair chance that these raids hurt Castro more than we think; he seems to be screaming louder than necessary if the raids don’t hurt him at all. At the least, intelligence reports indicate that the raids cause a considerable amount of activity in the Cuban armed forces—and this is undoubtedly not inexpensive. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
3.
The raids may cause more psychological damage than we now think. I keep thinking of my own reaction (and I am a red-blooded American) if I were working in a sugar mill and the mill down the road were attacked. The fact that it was a Piper Cub which dropped two bombs, 100 yards wide of the mark, wouldn’t be terribly reassuring to me. Inter alia, absenteeism in Cuba, which is already a serious problem, conceivably could be made more serious.
4.
If our opposition to the raids becomes known we rUN into a number of problems. First, exile reaction. Second, reaction of activists in Latin America; among other things, we may get another cooling-down period in which it will be very tough to get cooperation in our isolation policy. Third, reaction of the hard-noses in the U.S. (e.g. “the Administration won’t even let others try to solve the Cuban problem”). Fourth, Cuban and Soviet reaction. If our opposition is known and we are successful in stopping the raids (and I think we could be successful if we really set our mind to it), substance will be lent to the Soviet/Cuban belief that we can control all the activities in the Caribbean. [1 line of source text not declassified] The Soviets and the Cubans will certainly raise the noise-level when some U.S. sponsored attacks really hurt them and when the history of such operations clearly indicates that we control them. Fifth, we can probably expect Castro to crow as he did last spring. “The U.S. has capitulated on one of my 5 points.”

I personally think we should be very careful about the way we handle this problem. As it stands now, we should seriously consider the desirability of taking the public position (1) that we have already made our position clear with respect to attacks originating from the U.S., (2) that we intend to enforce this policy, (3) that while we sometimes doubt the effectiveness of attacks originating in third countries, we are obviously not in a position to control them; these are sovereign nations which determine their own foreign policy.

I am a complete non-expert in Russian policy but feel that we may want to take the following line with them, when and if pressed; (1) that we have made our policy clear with regard to raids from within the U.S. and (2) that we have no control over raids originating from areas outside of the U.S. In this regard we might note that the Russians seem to have no control over Communists in Laos, Vietnam, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, etc. These people, like the anti-Castro forces, seem intent on overturning established governments.

GC
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
  2. Reference is to the press conference of September 12, at which questions were asked about Cuba in general, but none specifically about exile raids. For a transcript of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 672-679.↩