357. Memorandum From the Chief, Special Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
Washington, August 9,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Luis Somoza’s Involvement in Cuban Exile Operations
- 1.
- The so-called Somoza plan has probably not yet jelled. Recent talks between ex-President Luis Somoza and Manuel Artime, prominent [Page 854] exile leader, may have resulted in modifications. Inconclusive secondhand reports would seem to suggest that Somoza’s thinking on the subject of Cuba is oriented toward commando raids, guerilla warfare and sabotage of mounting scope and intensity, culminating in a general uprising. Hardly concealed is his conviction that such an uprising would give the United States Government little choice but to intervene militarily on the side of the insurgents, especially should Soviet troops be committed to quell the uprising.
- 2.
- As a corollary to the above-mentioned long-range considerations, the brothers Somoza, especially Anastacio who is director of the National Guard, have taken into consideration the prospect of exposure to a serious military threat if Nicaragua lends herself as a base for aggressive acts against Cuba. Reportedly Luis Somoza has stated that in the event that Cuba takes retaliatory action against Nicaragua, the United States would be forced to come to the aid of Nicaragua and thereby a confrontation would be achieved. In this context, the assurances which Luis Somoza claims to have been given by leading United States Government officials take on particular significance and continuing probing by him for more tangible promises of support can be anticipated.
- 3.
- Attached herewith is a listing of the names of prominent Cubans reported as having talked with Somoza about operations against Cuba from Nicaraguan bases.1 These include one former President of Cuba (Carlos Prio Socarras), one former Prime Minister (Jorge Garcia Montes) and one former Ambassador to Washington (Guillermo Belt).
- 4.
- It remains to be seen whether the Somoza concept can be sufficiently refined to accommodate and keep out of the limelight of public curiosity a project which, as we now see it, is essentially designed to rebuild an indigenous resistance movement inside Cuba. There is some question whether the Somozas could temperamentally adjust to the essential characteristics of such a program representing a long-term effort that can only prosper in an atmosphere of conspiratorial tranquility.
- 5.
- We consider that most if not all of the exile plans (with the
exception of Artime’s) which have been discussed with Luis Somoza will
probably come to naught in typical exile fashion. As to Artime, we
believe that any ill effects of Somoza’s long-range concepts could be
contained by the following lines of action:
- a.
- Artime to forego raids and externally based sabotage actions and to concentrate on resistance within Cuba.
- b.
- While leaving elements of his operational mechanism in Nicaragua and not breaking with Luis Somoza, Artime to shift to the use of the more limited facilities Costa Rica has to offer.
- c.
-
If additional pressures be needed, it should be remembered that ex-Ambassador Whelan, who is considered to enjoy the trust of the Somoza brothers, could be asked to help in tempering their zeal.
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
- 6.
- Sources of varying reliability have cited Luis Somoza as claiming to
have received the following assurances:
- a.
- The “green light” to rUN anti-Castro raider and resistance operations obtained in Washington discussions with President Kennedy and the Attorney General.
- b.
- Asked by President Kennedy and the Attorney General to take four Brigade leaders to Nicaragua.
- c.
- Appointed by President Kennedy to represent him in dealings with the five Central American presidents who are interested in overthrowing Castro.
- d.
- To have talked with United States Government representatives who promised “not to intervene” (i.e., in Somoza’s plan to offer Nicaragua as a base for operations against Cuba).
- e.
- To have found “that there are no obstacles, despite the fact that the United States Government did not tell me anything concretely.”
Desmond
FitzGerald