Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

339. Summary Record of the 5th Standing Group Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, May 14, 1963.

Mr. Alexis Johnson presented the paper he and Mr. Nitze had prepared entitled “Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights—a Contingency Plan.”¹ He said two basic problems are (1) getting the Cubans to act in such a way that we can escalate in a manner adequate to achieve our objectives of overthrowing Castro, and (2) how to go about this in such a way as to obtain the maximum amount of support in the UN and domestically. He said a major effort could be made to deal with the resulting situation in the OAS, but we should acknowledge now that we would not be able to keep our action from being discussed in the UN. Therefore, we should go to the UN immediately after our actions as a plaintiff rather than as a defendant. We will receive far less support for any of the actions contemplated in the paper than we did last October at the time of the crisis over the Soviet missiles.

Following a discussion of medium-level aerial reconnaissance, it was agreed that a paragraph would be added explaining the rationale for such expanded aerial surveillance.

Mr. Johnson agreed that if the Cubans or the Russians do not react to our actions, we are unable to make them do so.

There was some discussion as to whether the paragraph on page eight² stated the reaction of the Soviets accurately. There was also discussion as to whether the Soviets would respond in another area, such as Berlin, if we put into effect a full quarantine of Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen suggested that a paragraph be inserted listing as an alternative a situation in which the U.S. would announce that a state of war existed with Cuba. This might be done in lieu of a full blockade. If a state of war were announced in Phase 2, a blockade would become legal.

In connection with aerial surveillance, Mr. Bundy referred to the new international law of peaceful observation.³ He suggested that more public attention be drawn to our belief that observation from outer space is entirely peaceful and not a violation of national sovereignty.

Mr. Ball read part of page five,⁴ commenting that the Soviets would have to respond elsewhere if our actions in Cuba resulted in our killing Soviet soldiers.

The Attorney General said he believed the Russians would attempt to force upon us a choice involving the continuation of our aerial overflights of Cuba. He said Khrushchev had said he would try to bring about termination of our overflights. He foresaw a situation in which the Russians might take the overflights case to the UN after withdrawing their forces from Cuba.

It was agreed that a paper would be prepared to deal with the contingency of the Russians’ attempt to end our U-2 and aerial surveillance flights by measures short of force.⁵

There was a discussion of the April 24 paper which is the current draft of our contingency plans in the event a U-2 plane is shot down.⁶ This paper has been approved by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, but has not been presented to the President. It is being held in the event that the contingency materializes and will be used by the President at that time in deciding how to retaliate against a shootdown.

Mr. Bundy suggested that the threat of Cuba to the U.S. was an appropriate subject for officials to emphasize publicly. He referred to the study on post-Castro Cuba, adding that we are not in a position to undertake some of the actions described in the Johnson-Nitze paper unless we are convinced an improved situation in Cuba will result.

On page ten,⁷ the heading “Conclusions” was deleted in order to avoid confusion. The actions which follow this heading are aimed at building up the importance of aerial reconnaissance, thereby serving as a rationale for serious actions taken following an attempt to prevent us from continuing aerial reconnaissance.

The paper is to be revised to include the state of war suggestion by Mr. Sorensen and other suggestions. It will be considered further at a later meeting.

The second paper, entitled “Certain Cuban Contingencies” was discussed briefly.⁸ It consists of a catalog of other contingencies which have not been studied in depth as was the contingency of an attack on a reconnaissance plane. It contains no recommended actions or plans. Study of actions to meet these possible contingencies was not thought profitable. The military question centers around the necessity of obtaining a tenable presence in Cuba in a very short time after a decision has been made to react. The political problem is how to generate a right of intervention. The catalog of contingencies reveals that all are either unlikely or unhelpful. Even the contingency of a so-called Hungarian situation, namely, Russians attacking Cubans, is highly unlikely. Our statement that we would not permit such a situation to develop in Cuba is a good noise but deals with a highly unlikely contingency.

There was a discussion of the sugar paper presented by the State Department.⁹ Mr. McCone disagreed with the State recommendation that nothing be done to affect the world sugar market. He thought this was an area where action could be taken to prevent the Russians from financing their aid to Cuba by means of buying Cuban sugar cheaply and selling it at the much higher world market price.

There was a discussion of the current world sugar market. Mr. McCone cited a 4% increase in sugar consumption and an 8% decrease in production, very low stocks, resulting in a sugar price of 10# per pound.

It was agreed that Secretary Freeman be asked to produce a study of the current situation with particular reference to the effect of the very high sugar price on the future Cuban economy.¹⁰ This study will consider increasing U.S. production to force down the world market price, as well as to benefit domestic producers.

The paper produced by Sherman Kent of CIA entitled “Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro’s Death,”¹¹ was not discussed because of lack of time.¹²

Bromley Smith¹³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63. Top Secret.
1. Printed as attachment 1 to Document 337.
2. Reference is to sub-subparagraph (4) of subparagraph b of paragraph 6, “Phase III.”
3. Not further identified.
4. Reference is to paragraph 5, “Phase II,” subparagraph a.
5. Reference is to a May 27 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63) See the Supplement.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights—Contingency Plans) See the attachment to a May 15 memorandum from Johnson to Brubeck in the Supplement.
7. Reference is to paragraph 7.
8. Printed as attachment 2 to Document 337.
9. Apparent reference to Document 334.
10. See Document 340.
11. See Document 338.
12. McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, May 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63)
13. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.