Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

336. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, May 7, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Plans for Cuba (U)

1. In response to your inquiry, dated 29 April 1963,¹ I wish to assure you that our contingency plans for invasion of Cuba have been and are being maintained up to date. A revision of CINCLANT’s basic invasion plan for Cuba was reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 February 1963.

2. Intelligence reports received since last October do indicate the assignment of additional materiel to the Cuban armed forces. Responsible commanders are being kept fully informed of the changing intelligence picture and our plans are continually updated to insure that the U.S. forces and equipment and their planned employment reflect the latest information available. For example, the order in which U.S. forces and their supporting equipment are committed is being restudied in the light of the estimated increases in Castro’s T-34 medium tanks and self-propelled anti-tank guns.

3. The most significant change in the basic invasion plan since last October has resulted from our increasing capability to introduce larger numbers of troops and heavy combat equipment into the objective area early in the operation. This capability is being achieved by the reactivation of 11 LST’s, which will materially expedite the delivery of combat forces and equipment. In the longer term, programmed acquisition of additional C-130 aircraft into the air lift force will expedite the delivery of airborne and airlanded forces during the initial assault. Through these measures the weight of our early attacks will be increased and the probability of their success further enhanced.

4. The time factors for the Cuba operation are today as follows:

[6 lines of source text not declassified]²

Robert S. McNamara

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret.
1. Document 327.
2. Duration of air attacks depends upon post-strike reconnaissance, supporting intelligence, and readiness to execute the assault. [Footnote in the source text.]