Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

324. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 25, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President, Rusk, McCone, McNamara, and Bundy, 25 April, to discuss low-level overflights

Bundy presented the DCI paper¹ and then explained the opposition which had been expressed to him by McNamara.² McNamara took very strong opposition to conducting low-levels because of political consequences, and furthermore stated that, in his opinion, there was absolutely no need for overflights from the intelligence point of view. McCone contradicted this statement stating that this matter had been carefully reviewed by USIB and that on last Wednesday³ each member of USIB, including all six representatives of DOD, the State representative, the CIA representative and others, had favored low-levels for the reasons expressed in the COMOR paper⁴ and because of the inadequacy of high-level reconnaissance. All of this was based on intelligence needs.

Rusk very briefly reviewed the political consequences as expressed by Johnson in the 5412 meeting,⁵ earlier in the day. However, he took no strong position. McNamara asked Rusk for a statement in writing of the political consequences. McCone put forth a very positive argument to the President, pointing out the areas in Cuba which had gone unsurveyed for as long as 12 days at a time and the incidents in which high-level photography could neither confirm nor deny reports which were ominous and gave McCone concern, and gave the intelligence community concern.

The President felt that the Administration could not very well ignore a request of DCI and USIB. He proposed three rather than six sorties on a trial basis and asked that such a recommendation be made. In any event, nothing will be done until Harriman’s return.

Action: General Carter should review this whole matter and should develop three most desirable targets including one of the armed camps. He should write a precise and full justification. (COMOR’s justifications are too broad and many other arguments are based on the need for increasing the total inventory of intelligence.) The President felt that justification should be on the basis of the fact that we did not know about specific locations, construction, or activities. He questioned whether we could justify low-levels which would be provocative if we were merely increasing our inventory of intelligence or technical information. DCI agreed this was to be done promptly.

Note: Rusk at one point mentioned that perhaps we should not escalate the tensions in Cuba but should wait until there was an indication of escalation by the Soviets and the Cubans, then go with low-levels. McCone reported that this might be too late, that it was possible that the Soviets would, in secrecy, develop some move which might threaten the United States and that we would not detect them. Therefore, we could not wait for the Soviet “escalation” to take place. What we have to do is keep the island under surveillance, develop all comprehensive intelligence, so that we would know in advance of any such escalation of ominous move on the part of the Soviets.

Note: I expect quite an argument over this problem. I therefore think our case should be very carefully prepared. I took the position that the intelligence community felt that they could not depend exclusively on high-level photography and still say with assurance that we knew all there was to know about what was going on in Cuba.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone.
1. Reference to an April 25 memorandum from McCone to the Special Group noting the USIB recommendation for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. The request had been deferred until the end of the Donovan mission and then deferred once more while Harriman was in Moscow. On April 24 the USIB asked again for low-level reconnaissance on 10 priority installations and facilities and expected coverage of 15 more. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
2. Evidence of McNamara’s opposition can be found in a telephone conversation with Ball, April 19. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) See the Supplement.
3. April 17.
4. Apparent reference to USIB-D-41, April 20, subject: “Priority Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba,” in which COMOR reanalyzed the requirements for such reconnaissance. The paper, which has not been found, is summarized in McCone’s memorandum to the Special Group, April 25; see footnote 1 above.
5. Reference is to the 5412 Special Group meeting; see Document 323.