Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

322. Summary Record of the 2d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, April 23, 1963, 5 p.m.

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled “A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives.”¹

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that Castro’s position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR on the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro’s position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR andnot yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2.

b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months.

c. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major importance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a statement of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it were no longer rUN by Castro or tied to Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows:

a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing.

b. Agree on military responses which we should make to contingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane.

c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.

d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.

e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.

f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.

g. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba.²

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A). Top Secret.
1. See the attachment to Document 320.
2. The Record of Action of this meeting, April 23, reads as follows: “Following discussion of U.S. Policy Towards Cuba, it was agreed that discussions would be continued at the next meeting scheduled for 10:30 am, Tuesday, April 30. It was also agreed that it is important that present lines of policy and operation should be continued.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A))
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.