Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

311. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 11, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963

PRESENT

• Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone
• Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-3
• Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4

[Here follows discussion of items 1-3, unrelated to Cuba.]

4. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April,¹ giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray’s people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April,² on the three papers being considered at today’s meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper.³

[Here follows discussion of items 5-7, unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott⁴

0. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 83, April 18, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Gilpatric, and McCone.
1. Reference is to a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group, which outlines three specific sabotage operations proposed for April 15 to May 15. (Ibid., April 11, 1963) Another more general paper, also dated April 9, entitled “A General Sabotage and Harassment Program Against Cuba,” was sent from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group. (Ibid.)
2. Cottrell commented on both papers in April 11 memoranda to U. Alexis Johnson. (Ibid.) The third paper has not been identified.
3. Apparent reference to Document 318.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.