Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

300. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, March 27, 1963, 7 p.m.

2420. Eyes only for Secretary. Deptels 1933 and 1950;¹ Embtels 2315² and 2321.³ Gromyko called me in at 4:00 p.m. Moscow time to make oral statement in response my March 16 statement to Kuznetsov. Translation his statement contained next following tel.⁴

Subsequent 30-minute discussion began with Gromyko’s asking me transmit contents of statement to President and saying he wished to add a few words about note Embassy received earlier today regarding attack on L’Gov (Embtel 2422).⁵ He said MFA had received word just before our meeting about analogous provocation involving another Soviet ship in Cuban port.⁶ MFA did not yet have details and would in due course give Embassy Soviet reaction to this new provocative act. But, it appeared USG underestimated gravity of such provocative actions against Cuba and Soviet ships. If it correctly estimated gravity of such actions, it would not permit them to take place.

I said I first wished to comment on his oral statement. President’s intention had been to give private reassurance to Chairman Khrushchev as result of doubts President felt Chairman had expressed regarding USG policy towards Cuba. President had also wished express hope that SovGovt might exercise influence to alleviate situation. I said I should certainly report statement to President and assumed this remained a private exchange.

Gromyko said that was correct; for time being Soviets had no intention of giving information on exchange to press.

I said that, since I had no new instructions, I would not reply now to statement but would stand on what I had said before. With regard to L’Gov, I said I wished to call Gromyko’s attention to Lincoln White’s March 19 statement and to President’s March 21 statement,⁷ that exiles who conducted raid had not come from US, that we did not feel these kinds of raids served useful purposes, and that we had not supported this and these men did not have connection with USG. I said these statements were already on record and it was thus appropriate to cite them today.

Gromyko said SovGovt acquainted with these statements, but has to ask itself how we can make such statements and at same time act in direct contradiction to them. SovGovt could not regard State Department statement as satisfactory. Its understanding of State Department statement is that if raids were bigger and more successful, that would be a different thing. As for SovGovt, it categorically condemns all acts of this kind. Can USG really hope to find serious people who can believe that it is not involved, when this exile scum was sitting under US wing? These groups only acted with the knowledge and connivance of USG. He wished to emphasize that USG is not attributing serious significance to these acts. On other hand, SovGovt regretted position taken by US. It was high time more sober approach was taken to such actions.

Gromyko continued, Caribbean crisis had apparently been settled, but he and I, like US and Sov representatives elsewhere, had to keep reverting to it. There was, however, one possibility for settling matter:USG should leave Cuba in peace. In Soviet view, this lies in best interests of US and whole world.

I said I felt I had to comment now because Gromyko’s additional remarks had called into question statement of President. When we make these statements, we do so because they are true. I repeated raiders had not come from US territory. With regard to “scum”, we have different understanding from Soviets of who are scum and who are honest people. As to question of fulfilling terms of Oct. 27-28 agreement, they had never been fulfilled. Provisions for inspection and verification had not been made. What did Soviets want us to do: protect Cuba from such raids? It should be clear to them we are not going to do so. Just as Soviets expect many countries to opt for communism, we expect many countries, including Cuba, to opt for freedom. Perhaps solution was for USSR to leave Cuba alone. I had pointed out to Dobrynin in Washington that this problem was poisoning our relations. If USSR would only leave Cuba alone, this poison would be removed. USG has recognized measures taken by SovGovt to reduce poison. But Oct. 27-28 agreement had never been fully realized, and that must be recognized.

Gromyko, moderating his tone, asked again whether we expected to find people who would believe our statements that USG can do nothing at all about actions of these emigre groups. He fully recognized and appreciated that it did not please US when he pointed out there was no way to reconcile statements of top US officials with facts of provocations. New provocation had occurred only today. SovGovt was expressing hope that USG and President would take more sober approach to such serious provocations and would act in spirit of agreement that had been reached Oct. 27-28. USSR had always and would always act in accord-ance with this agreement. He was sorry to have to protest and would prefer not to do it, but circumstances compelled it.

I said, as was evident from statements I had cited, USG was opposed to these raids and would do everything it could to discourage them. I did, however, want to make it clear to him that USG did not intend to institute blockade of Cuba in order to stop such raids. I assumed Sovs would not like us to do so. However, there is great deal of Soviet activity on island. Perhaps they should stop it, since it was inflaming public opinion in US. Way to solve problem was to remove this element which poisoned US-Soviet relations.

Gromyko said difference in our positions was that USG was threatening Cuba and Cubans were taking steps to protect their frontiers. That was why Sov specialists were in Cuba. Chairman had explained this to President and there was little he could add at this time to that explanation. However, he agreed it would be good to remove poison. As afterthought, Gromyko said he assumed that by “poison” I meant these raids.

I said by “poison” I meant everything involved in Cuban problem: Belligerent statements of Castro, presence of Sov military, and reaction this evokes in US. I agreed that if we could eliminate all this it would be good. I asked whether they intended publish note on L’Gov.

Gromyko said they probably would. (Subsequently, his office called Emb to specify that both L’Gov note and their reply to our Alaska aircraft intrusion note would probably be published.) But, for time being, they regarded exchange of oral statements as private and did not intend publish.

Kohler

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities. Secret; Operational Immediate.
1. Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto.
2. Document 294.
3. In telegram 2321, March 17, Kohler stated to Kuznetsov that the President’s message (see footnote 2 above) was a “purely private communication for the Chairman from the President which would not be published.”Kohler did warn that Khrushchev could “decide to come back hard and publicize. Consequently we should be alert to this possibility.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL Cuba-USSR) See the Supplement.
4. See Document 301.
5. In telegram 2422, March 27, the Soviet Foreign Ministry protested the attack on the Soviet cargo ship L’Gov in the Cuban port of Isabela La Sagua and insisted that the United States take measures to prevent such acts in the future. The Foreign Ministry stated that “Surely [it is] clear, that without material support of US Government and without supplying of American weapons and ships, group of traitors to Cuban people, sheltering on territory USA would not be able undertake these kinds provocation.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities)
6. The Lambda 66 Cuban exile group attacked the Soviet ship Baku when it was loading sugar in the Cuban port of Caibarien. The raiders had a free lance photo journalist aboard. See memoranda from Chase to McGeorge Bundy and Clifton to the President, March 27. (Ibid.) The texts are in the Supplement. On March 30 the Departments of State and Justice issued a statement that they neither supported nor condoned these attacks which were probably counter productive. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1963, pp. 600-601.
7. See footnote 2, Document 298.