Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

283. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, February 18, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Report of a Possible Revolt in Cuba on February 20th¹

The discussion at State this afternoon brought out the following points regarding the possibility of a revolt in Cuba on February 20th.

1. Both State and CIA doubt the reliability of the report. CIA noted, however, that if such a thing were about to happen, the report of it would come in just this way.

2. One of the tough questions—what size and type of revolt is worthwhile to support? Do you determine this by the number of people involved? The geographic area it covers? etc. The revolt should have a potential political appeal to a large cross section of Cuban people. For example, a revolt by a number of disgruntled farmers would not meet this criterion.

3. There was some discussion of a possible outline of action. First, there could be a deniable airdrop of supplies by CIA while the U.S. military arm began to wind up. This could be followed by a limited airstrike within about twenty-four hours and a full island air-strike within seventy-two hours. It would take a maximum of eighteen days to mount a full invasion force. Between the full airstrike and the invasion, things could be going on—e.g. special forces dropped in Cuba. A diversionary action should be initiated quickly so that Castro cannot concentrate his forces on the insurgents, leaving us no one to liberate.

4. The presence of Russian troops, of course, presents a very sticky problem. One of the first targets would be the SAM sitesand inevitably Russians would be killed. The effect of this on Khrushchev would have to be weighed.

Perhaps we could tell Khrushchev what we are going to do and advise him to take all Russians off the SAM sites and move them to restricted areas. In this regard we could risk a flight or two over the SAM sites to test whether he has followed our advice.

If the prospects for the removal of the Russian troops in the near future look very good, we may want to dampen the revolt for now—broadcasts by Cuban exiles that Castro is setting a trap.

5. The present Department of Defense off-the-cuff estimate of fighting in Cuba is that there would be four or five days of heavy fighting and another thirty days of less severe fighting. There might or might not be prolonged guerrilla activity. If the campaign is short and sweet, there probably will be less guerrilla fighting afterwards.

6. It was noted that the invasion would violate the Havana Treaty (can respond to calls for help only by recognized governments).²

Sterling Cottrell is zeroed in on this and hopes to have something over here between noon and 1:00 PM on Tuesday.³

GC

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Top Secret.
1. The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared an assessment on February 18 of reports of a possible revolt. The assessment acknowledged the possibility of a small uprising in one or more parts of Cuba, but doubted the likelihood of a large-scale uprising. (Ibid.)
2. The Havana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, signed at Havana on February 28, 1928; see 46 Stat. (Pt. 2) 2749.
3. On Tuesday, February 19, Brubeck sent Bundy a memorandum on the reports of the uprising and an attached “Alternative Course of Action in the Event the Reported Large-scale Uprising Occurs.” The plan of action envisioned recognition of and assistance to the insurgents including air strikes, unconventional warfare, and an invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. The plan recommended no action until the uprising occurred and there was a call for help from the insurgents. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63)