278. Memorandum for the Record0
On February 5, DCI met with Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Ball to discuss the COMOR proposal for low-level overflights. There was a lack of agreement. Secretary McNamara explained the plan for seven sorties (utilizing 14 planes) to cover all of the targets. This was exclusive of the COMOR recommendations for covering the unloading of ships by day and night. McNamara did not advocate the program but merely explained it. DCI advocated the program;Rusk stated he did not advocate it but did agree to the mission over Cayo Francis.
McCone stated he felt the situation in Cuba was more ominous than thought by many in the Administration.1 He felt that if the Soviets wished merely to control Castro and to maintain Cuba as a base for infiltrating Latin America, they could do so at much less cost and with much less provocation than the present program. He therefore warned that in his opinion we could expect a more ominous situation relative to Cuba—perhaps the introduction of offensive weapons again. DCI said that Khrushchev had taken one step backward, we could expect him to take two steps forward surreptitiously.
At 11:30 DCI met with the President and Mr. Bundy. The discussion revolved around conditions in Cuba and the presentation to be made to the Executive Committee later in the afternoon.2 McCone repeated his concern about the situation in Cuba, also the danger of either threatening to halt or actually halting our U-2 reconnaissance. The President said that would bring a new confrontation and that as far as he was concerned would require action. McCone said he felt that both Rusk and McNamara did not share this determination. It was agreed that the DCI should make a public statement on the situation in Cuba, and the President ordered a statement prepared.3
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- At the White House daily staff meeting on February 7, Bundy noted that McCone “was something between concerned and angry because some of Secretary McNamara’s statements did not agree with some of his (McCone’s) statements already on record.”Bundy appeared worried that this could result “in the first big, internal, high-level personality clash of this administration.”Bundy himself said the difference in their views “was a simple reflection that McCone is afraid of the military situation in Cuba while McNamara is not.” (Memorandum for the record by Lawrence Legere, February 7; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, February 1963)↩
- See Document 276.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 276.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩