Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations⁰

Washington, December 11, 1962, 7:59 p.m.

1593. Eyes Only Stevenson and McCloy.

1. We have carefully studied report of your meeting with Kuznetsov Dec. 6 (urtel 2178),¹ text suggested Soviet draft declaration and resolution (urtel 2179),² and your suggestions in urtel 2189.³

2. You are authorized to seek the agreement of Kuznetsov to the following text of a joint report to be made to the SYG:

“As a result of the exchange of communications between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the USSR Councilof Ministers on October 27-28 arising out of the recent Cuban crisis, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union wish to make the following report to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

The Soviet Union has stated that it has dismantled all missiles in Cuba which it caused to be erected or was in the course of erecting for the purpose of launching nuclear missiles from Cuba and has removed from Cuba all such missiles which it introduced into Cuba, as well as all the components of such missiles and their launching apparatus. The Soviet Union, in cooperation with the United States, arranged a procedure whereby substantial verification was afforded the United States of the fact that 42 missiles, which the Soviet Union declared was the total number of such missiles introduced into Cuba, have in fact been removed from that island.

The Soviet Union likewise has stated that it has removed 42 IL-28 bombers from Cuba, that being the total of such bombers which the Soviet Union states it introduced into Cuba, and the Soviet Union has made possible a similar means of identification by the United States of the fact that 42 such bombers were in fact removed.

The Soviet Union has also stated that it has removed all nuclear weapons which it previously introduced into Cuba, as well as the components of such weapons.

In connection with the removal of the above-mentioned missiles, bombers, and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has stated that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those or other weapons systems of a similar or comparable offensive character. The United States has, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine which it imposed around the island of Cuba on October 24, 1962. This has been done upon the basis of the statements and acts of the Soviet Union above referred to.⁴

It was contemplated by the above mentioned exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman that there would be created an effective system of international inspection on the island of Cuba so as to verify the dismantling of the sites and the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, as well as to provide safeguards against the further maintenance and introduction of such weapons in Cuba. Apart from the verification procedures above mentioned, it has not been possible thus far to effect an international verification system on the ground, particularly one such as would provide the safeguards against the future maintenance and introduction of such weapons in the island of Cuba.

The President of the United States has stated in his press conference of November 20 that it was not the intention of the United States to invade Cuba provided all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in future, and provided Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The President of the United States reaffirms his previous statement in this regard and repeats his assurances that the United States has no intention either to invade or support an invasion of Cuba on the above conditions. In reaffirming the President’s statement and the assurances referred to above, the United States wishes to make it clear, however, that, pending the installation of an adequate system of international or other effective verification on the island of Cuba to insure against the maintenance and reintroduction of such weapons and weapons systems into Cuba, it intends to employ all necessary means of observation and verification of its own in order to insure against this eventuality.

The Soviet Union, believing that it has substantially complied with the spirit of the exchange of communications between the President and the Chairman above referred to, believes that any further inspection, observation or verification is unnecessary and unjustified, but with this position the United States cannot agree.

Nothing herein contained in any way affects the rights and obligations of any treaty or existing agreements to which either the United States of America or the Soviet Union is a party.

The President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union express the hope that the action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union following the above mentioned exchange of communications to avert the threat of war arising from the Cuban situation will lead to further constructive negotiations between the two countries to adjust the differences existing between them and generally to lessen the tensions which might induce further danger of war.”

3. It is hoped that, in negotiating this, it would be possible for you to obtain affirmation, even though not expressed in the above text, of the Soviet intention to remove all Soviet military units from Cuba.

4. This supersedes draft instructions contained Deptel 1580.⁵

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by McGeorge Bundy.
1. Document 233.
2. Document 234.
3. Document 237.
4. In telegram 2291 from USUN, December 12, the Mission reported it made several drafting changes in the preceding paragraphs in the interests of shortening the text before submitting it to Kuznetsov. The changes did not affect the substance. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1262) See the Supplement.
5. Telegram 1580 to USUN not seen by the President, authorized Stevenson and McCloy, as a negotiating tactic, to discuss the Soviet proposal for unagreed statements incorporated into a single document with equal status. It informed the mission the United States could not agree to a Security Council resolution and would prefer to avoid a consensus statement, and that Stevenson and McCloy should not agree to a consensus statement without further instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662)