Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

222. Summary Record of the 32d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, December 3, 1962, 10 a.m.

[Here follows 2 pages of discussion of India and Pakistan.]

Ambassador Stevenson and Under Secretary Ball reported on the current status of the Cuban negotiations in New York. Kuznetsov and McCloy are to meet again at 11:00 AM¹ when it is expected that a Soviet paper will be presented to us. Involved in the negotiations are the way we express our intention to continue overflights, our insistence on the preservation of peace in the Caribbean and the no-invasion undertaking or “intention.” The anxiety to conclude the negotiations is Russian rather than ours. We can go slow now because the pressure is on them.

The President agreed. He noted that Khrushchev had taken a very belligerent position with Canadian [British] Ambassador Roberts on Berlin. The statement on overflights can either be in or out. The reference to the Rio Pact can be in or out because the keys to the present negotiation are the no-invasion assurance and the peace and security of the Caribbean reference.

Ambassador Stevenson said present thinking was that there would now be no U.S. statement made before a Security Council meeting. The Secretary General could circulate a Russian statement and a U.S. statement to the UN members. We could thus reduce the elements of disagreement because two papers would be filed.

The President said we were not going to rat on an agreement with the Russians, but we were not going to tie on to a no-invasion pledge in a way which allowed Castro to operate from an invulnerable base.

Ambassador Stevenson said that as soon as the Cuban problem was settled, the Russians could heat up the Berlin situation. We would keep the Cuban problem in the UN as long as we possibly could.²

[Here follows 1 paragraph of discussion on India.]

Bromley Smith³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith.
1. See Document 223.
2. In the record of action of this meeting, December 4, McGeorge Bundy noted that Stevenson and Ball reported on the current status of Cuban negotiations in New York. Bundy continued, “the President accepted in general recommendations covering the future of these negotiations with the Russians.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.