14. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs (Martin) to the
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)0
Washington, October 12,
1962.
SUBJECT
The following is the pertinent portion of Mr. Rostow’s paper:1
“I believe we should consider the possibility of a Two-Track covert
operation.
“Track One would consist of a heightened effort to move along the present
Mongoose lines. The minimum objective here would be harassment: the maximum
objective would be the triggering of a situation where there might be
conflict at the top of the Cuban regime leading, hopefully, to its change or
overthrow by some group within Cuba commanding arms.
“Track Two would consist of an effort to engage Cubans more deeply, both
within Cuba and abroad, in efforts of their own liberation. This requires an
operation with the following characteristics:
- “a. Authentic Cuban leadership with a considerable range of
freedom to implement ideas and to assume risk.
- “b. Minimal U.S. direct participation: ideally, one truly wise
U.S. adviser—available, but laying back; equipped to provide
finance, but not monitoring every move; capable of earning their
respect rather than commanding it by his control over money or
equipment.
- “c. Basing outside the United States.
- “d. A link-up with the scattered and sporadic groups and
operations now going forward of their own momentum in Cuba.
- “e. A plan of operation which aims at the overthrow of
Castro primarily from within rather than by
invasion from without.
- “f. A long enough time horizon to build the operation carefully
and soundly.
“In suggesting that Track Two be studied—and sharply distinguished from Track
One—I am, of course, wholly conscious of our failure of last year. But, as I
read that failure in retrospect, its root lay in: U.S. bureaucratic
domination; the lack of a Cuban political and organizational base; and a
plan of operation that hinged on a type of overt invasion by a fixed date
rather than the patient build-up of a true movement
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of national liberation. I’m sure it would be easy to
argue that such a movement could not be generated against a Communist
control system; that the Cuban refugees lack the capacity to play their part
in such an enterprise with skill and minimal security; etc. And I am in no
position to reply with confidence to such argument. On the other hand, Cuba
is not located in Eastern Europe; and, presumably, some Cubans have learned
something from last year’s failure, too.
“On the balance, I am prepared to recommend that Track Two be sympathetically
studied and that General Lansdale be
asked to formulate a design for it.”
The underlying philosophy is one which we have felt for some time merited
exploration.
There is attached (Tab A) as you have requested, a paper describing the more
important policy considerations bearing on this course of action.
Also attached (Tab B)2 is the ARA memorandum,
previously forwarded to you, describing some of the political thinking which
leads us to the conclusion that we should experiment with this course of
action.
Tab A
TRACK TWO
A program of “giving the Cubans their heads” in an effort to effect the
downfall of the Castro regime from within involves
embarking upon uncharted waters as far as the U.S. is concerned.
Grandiose U.S. plans based upon a substantially unified exile community
would be unrealistic. Nearly all Cuban exile leaders, of whatever
political persuasion, are convinced that only overt U.S. military action
can remove the Castro regime. While we could
probably force a semblance of unity based upon the “downfall from
within” thesis, despite the sharp political rivalry among the exile
leaders, our purposes would not be served. While “accepting” our thesis,
most of the waking hours of these exiles would be devoted to devising
ways of involving the U.S. militarily, rather than building the internal
base of opposition we seek. We could thereby lose initiative and control
over the situation and find ourselves in an untenable position from the
international, and, perhaps, domestic, standpoint.
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If the above judgment is accepted, two alternatives are available. We
could cooperate with all anti-Castro-Batista exile
groups which we have reason to believe have following inside Cuba, or we
could, on an experimental basis work with one such group. By cooperating
with all such groups we run the serious risk of accentuating rivalries
among the exile leaders which would be inevitably reflected within Cuba.
Rather than achieving a broad base of political opposition within Cuba,
we may only be instrumental in fomenting splinter groups. In attempting
to administer such a program, the U.S. would probably find itself in the
midst of the crossfire of exile politics, very likely satisfying no one
inside or outside Cuba.
Working with one group, on an experimental basis, would provide us with
experience which could guide our future thinking and at the same time
probably prevent problems of unmanageable proportions. Selection of the
right group is of paramount importance. Even then, if we saw no progress
in Cuba, we could not be certain that the thesis was impractical or the
selection of the group erroneous.
Of all the exile groups the only one which has publicly adopted the
thesis of “downfall from within” is that known as JURE, formed in September 1962 by Manolo
Ray and based in Puerto Rico. (Since Ray has some friends within the
U.S. Government and is presently employed by the Puerto Rican
Government, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the recent official
interest in the “downfall from within” thesis has been generated by
him.) Ray was former Minister of Public Works under
Castro, broke with Castro
and formed an important underground movement which has since been badly
smashed by Castro. Ray is a nationalist and left of
center. The political program of JURE
is one with which the U.S. can live.
The other feasible possibility is the CRC
withwhich we have had a long standing relationship. Apart from Dr.
Miro and some of the
organizations that form an integral part of the Council, the CRC is not a very effective organization
for what we have in mind. Its background is associated with the Bay of
Pigs and its outlook is essentially one of military action.
Advantages of working with JURE would
appear to be:
- 1.
- A new organization which, as such, has no past relationship
with the U.S.
- 2.
- Commitment to the “downfall from within” thesis.
- 3.
- Base outside the U.S.
- 4.
- Political ideology which may be attuned to the desires of the
Cuban people.
- 5.
- Ray is experienced in underground activities and an
independ-ent thinker.
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Disadvantages of working with JURE are:
- 1.
- Little, if any, assets known within Cuba today.
- 2.
- Opposed by most of the established exile groups, particularly
Dr. Miro.
- 3.
- Ray is a complex personality, sometimes difficult to
handle.
On balance it is worth trying. Although we would try to maintain
security, Dr. Miro may discover
our assistance to Ray and resign. The CRC is useful to us, but its disappearance would be
bearable.
If we embark upon these unchartered waters, and it is recommended that we
do so, we must be prepared for increased noise level and press inquiry.
We must be prepared for a comparatively high rate of loss, failures and
cries of anguish from JURE for
assistance we may not be able to give it. It is essential that we
recognize this and not be permitted to be stampeded into regrettable
public postures or actions. A further important consideration is that
Track Two operations may compromise Track One operations. Coordination
would be essential.
Another conflict arises from the President’s desire that a Cuban Brigade
be formed. While this would not necessarily be a serious conflict with
the program envisaged, for there are probably enough exiles for both
programs, it should be recognized that a number of young men qualified
for infiltration activities will probably join the Brigade.
If we attempt our program on a large scale, or with more than one group,
the immediately above-mentioned problems would multiply.
The program we would visualize is one of providing the selected exile
group with funds, arms, sabotage equipment, transport and communications
equipment for infiltration operations in order to build a political base
of opposition inside Cuba. We would provide the best technical advice we
could. Our role would essentially be that of advisors and purveyors of
material goods—it would be the exile group’s show. We would insist that
hit and run raids or similar harassing activities that clearly originate
from outside Cuba and do not reflect internal activity not be engaged
in.
In sum, we should be cautious about grandiose schemes, a “major” U.S.
effort, and deep commitments to the exiles. We should experiment in this
new venture on a small scale with patience and tolerance for high noise
levels and mistakes.
