Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

62. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, March 15, 1961.

JCSM-166-61

SUBJECT

• Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of three alternate concepts for the CIA Para-Military plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro Government. The military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-57-61, subject: “Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba”, dated 3 February 1961,¹ and the evaluation of the proposed supplementary phase to the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-149-61, subject: “Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba”, dated 10 March 1961.²

2. The following CIA alternate concepts of operations were evaluated:

a. Alternative I—Original para-military plan, except main landings at night, without benefit of airborne landing or air strikes. See Appendix A hereto for details and evaluation.

b. Alternative II—At an objective area on NE coast, employment of airborne company at evening nautical twilight to seize key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into objective area to isolate same; this followed by night debarkation of remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from airstrip within objective area following day. See Appendix B hereto for details and evaluation.

c. Alternative III—At an objective area on the southern coast, amphibious landing of two infantry companies after dark to seize key areas; during the night, land remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from the airstrips the following day. See Appendix C hereto for details and evaluation.

3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows:

a. Alternative I—Without the psychological impact of the original concept, together with the difficulties of landing at night in this area and the lack of ability to initiate air operations, the ultimate success of Alternative I is doubtful.

b. Alternative II—Even though the Cuban Volunteer Force could be landed and sustained for a minimum of 3 days, the distance from the seat of government, together with the problem of continuous resupply over long distances, causes this course of action to be least likely to accomplish the objective.

c. Alternative III has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace.

d. Of the alternative concepts, Alternative III is considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective.

e. None of the alternative concepts are considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the basic para-military plan.

4. It is recommended that:

a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions.

b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the Appendices hereto, for his information and consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer³
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix A

Evaluation of the Military Aspects of the Original CIA Paramilitary Plan for Cuba: With the Changes That the Amphibious Landing Will Be Made at Night, Without Benefit of the Airborne Assault, or Air Strikes

1. The concept of the plan is as follows: Following a deception landing on the night of D-1 the Task Force, accompanied by provisional government representation, will invade at night by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. The force will immediately move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the objective area. At dawn control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominates entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in the general area of operations. The small airstrip will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase the force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. The force will establish control within the beachhead area and if driven therefrom, will be prepared to withdraw and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities.

2. The enemy forces, terrain, beaches, man-made installations and populace, remain the same as set forth in the original plan; the time and space factors remain the same with the exceptions that:

a. The amphibious landing will be made at night;

b. Immediately upon landing, the force will move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the city. Then at dawn they will move out to seize and organize the strong points on key terrain as originally planned;

c. The airborne assault and the air strikes will not be conducted.

3. a. Advantages

(1) The force will move ashore at night, increasing the possibility of achieving tactical surprise.

(2) The landing will be near a mountainous region in the event the force is unable to maintain its lodgement, and it becomes necessary to move out of the beachhead area and conduct guerrilla operations.

(3) The landing area is relatively near the seat of government, thereby making it potentially possible to move upon the ultimate objective area in a relatively short period of time.

(4) Large numbers of the populace in the landing area are believed to be antagonistic to Castroʼs regime.

(5) The beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the Task Force mission.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) The airstrip is inadequate for B-26 operations.

(2) Without benefit of air operations, elements of Castroʼs Air Force would be available for use against the force. These aircraft could make it impossible for the force to hold a lodgement in the beachhead area, or virtually any fixed or exposed position, thereby forcing the volunteers to move into the mountains as a guerrilla force almost immediately.

(3) It will be difficult for a force inexperienced in amphibious operations to locate and use the narrow landing beaches at night.

4. Conclusions:

a. Despite the disadvantages enumerated above, this concept would provide a fair chance of success in landing and seizing initial objectives.

b. The lack of air support and the difficulties of supply at night, or under possible air attack if attempted in daylight, indicate small chance of ultimate success for this concept.

Appendix B

Concept of Operation for an Alternate Proposal To Land on the Eastern End of the Island To Accomplish Objectives of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The concept of operation for landing on the Eastern end of the Island envisages the employment of an airborne company to land during the hours of darkness on D-Day to seize a landing pier in the area together with key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into the area. During the night of D-Day, ships transporting the remainder of the Cuban Volunteer Task Force will dock alongside the landing pier, discharge the personnel and supplies and depart the area prior to daylight. Units of the Task Force will proceed inland, seize an airfield, other strategic terrain features, and establish contact with the Airborne Company to assure protection of the lodgement area.

2. One company of the Cuban military forces is located in the objective area and probably patrols the area. The closest known Cuban Army units which could be used as reinforcements are, one Infantry Battalion and one Field Artillery Battalion located 35 miles away. These units probably could not be assembled and moved to the area in less than 24 hours due to limited transportation available and condition of the roads over which they must travel.

3. The objective area consists of rolling terrain adjacent to the shoreline and backed by swamp lands which extend inland. The terrain features and vegetation can provide adequate protection and concealment for the landing force. Water approaches to the landing pier are protected from the open sea by extensions of land on either side and depth of water will accept all shipping available to the Task Force. However, negotiation of the channels at night will be difficult.

a. There are two improved roads leading into the area; however, connection between them consists of unimproved roads and trails. Absence of a well developed road net combined with the swampy terrain will hamper movement of large military forces.

b. An airfield is located 1.5 miles Southeast of the proposed landing area. Its description is as follows:

• Runway dimensions 4000ʼx120ʼ
• Surface construction is asphalt and oiled sand
• The field will accept C-47 type aircraft
• Runway extensibility, 11,000 ft.
• Operations capabilities are negligible and the field can only be classified as a good all-weather emergency strip.

c. Adjacent to the landing pier is a village with approximate population of 18,000. The rural area adjacent thereto is underdeveloped and sparsely populated. Attitude of the local populace toward the Castro Government is not known, however, due to the remoteness of the area it may be assumed that a neutral attitude would prevail during the initial phases of the operation.

4. Conclusions

a. The selected objective area, drop zones and landing piers are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation.

b. The known or expected location of Cuban Military Forces indicates that complete surprise may not be attained.

c. Operational capabilities of the airfield in the area are negligible and can be classified as only a good all weather emergency strip.

d. Given the opportunity to seize its proposed objectives, the Task Force will have the capability to sustain itself without resupply for a minimum of 3 days.

e. A landing in this area would be so far removed from the seat of Government it is doubtful that the desired psychological effect on the Cuban people would be attained.

f. If the Task Force is required to abandon its primary mission, evacuation by sea could probably be accomplished or elements of the force could continue to operate as guerrilla units in the area. The mountainous area approximately 10 miles inland is considered suitable for guerrilla operations.

g. This operation would be difficult to support from a logistic standpoint.

h. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages of this proposed course of action.

Appendix C

Concept of an Alternate Proposal To Land on an Objective Area on the Southern Coast

1. Concept: Under cover of darkness, two companies will land over the two beaches at the head of the bay, rapidly move inland, seize their assigned objectives, and prepare to defend them. A small combat outpost will be landed on the east side of the entrance to the bay to provide warning and block the coast road from the east. A combat outpost will be established to close the road across the swamp to the west of the landing beaches. The remaining four companies will be landed prior to dawn and will proceed to their assigned objectives. All boats will withdraw to sea and be clear of the area prior to daylight. At daylight, B-26 aircraft will land on the seized airfield or airfields and conduct air operations from these locations immediately thereafter.

2. Enemy Forces: There are no known enemy forces in the objective area, although it is probable that militia patrols maintain surveillance over the coast road. The nearest concentration of Cuban Rebel Army forces are located at Managua, near Havana, and at Santa Clara. Rural police posts are located in the villages and towns, but their capability is limited to employment in small groups using small arms. The nearest sizable militia unit is located at Cienfuegos, but there may be smaller militia elements as close as ten miles from the landing beaches.

3. Terrain: The terrain in the objective area is flat, swamp land covered with a dense growth of mangrove, except for a strip east of the landing beaches. This strip rises from 5 to 30 feet above mean sea level and is covered with scrub growth and high savanna grass. Entry into and exit from the area is confined to the established roads and a single track narrow gauge railroad bed. Trafficability off roads is poor except that foot troops may move with difficulty. There are approximately seven possible exits from the area to the north and west.

4. Beaches: The bay has a number of usable beaches located along the east shore, but the best are at the head of the bay. The two beaches selected are each approximately 400 yards long and have easy exits to the coast road which skirts the bay. Seaward approaches are clear and deep water extends to within a few yards of the shore. Beach gradients from available photography appear to be suitable for dry-ramp landings of personnel and light vehicles.

5. Man-Made Installations: There are two airfields in the area, one firmly packed sod strip, carried as approximately 4000 feet long and the other a newly constructed packed coral and sand strip approximately 6000 feet long. Recently it has been reported that the sod strip is being lengthened to over 6000 feet. Both strips are currently in various stages of construction. There has been considerable road building noted in this area in the past year. The coast road has been widened and resurfaced with a concrete surface. A new road has been constructed across the eastern portion of the swamp, but this road has not yet intersected the coast road. There are no roads to the west.

6. Attitude of Populace: The objective area is very sparsely settled with no towns or villages of any size. A few scattered houses, not closely grouped, comprise the only habitations in the area. The attitude of the populace vis-a-vis Castro is unknown.

7. Time and Space Factors: Due to the sparse population, tele-communications in the area are probably poor or non-existent. The area has been an historically suitable guerrilla area. Reaction time for the Cuban Rebel Armed Forces is probably greater than elsewhere on the island due to the distance to be covered, the nature of the terrain, and the relatively poor road net. However, the area is within range of suitable positions for Cuban heavy artillery (122 mm gun). Observation of fire would be restricted to aerial observation by aircraft.

8. Advantages and Disadvantages:

a. Advantages

(1) Two probably usable airfields are in the area.

(2) A remote and inaccessible area making reaction against the invasion force slow and difficult.

(3) No known Cuban armed forces in the area.

(4) Swampy terrain would prevent the use of armor against the invasion force except tank gun fire.

(5) Defectors could join the invasion force, however with difficulty. A small band (approximately 100) of guerrillas are close to the area.

(6) Surprise could probably be achieved if operation was carefully timed.

(7) Relatively close to the seat of government for the resulting psychological effect on the Cuban people.

b. Disadvantages

(1) Resupply, including food, must come from outside Cuba.

(2) Exits from objective area could be sealed off and prevent expansion of operations.

(3) Firm ground in area is within range of suitable heavy artillery positions.

(4) No sizable immediate help could be expected from the local populace.

(5) No civilian hospital facilities available.

(6) All supply must be across the beach.

9. Conclusions:

a. In the absence of significant enemy forces in the area, the invasion force can be landed successfully in the objective area and can be sustained in the area provided resupply of essential items is accomplished.

b. The area meets the requirements imposed including the availability of an airfield, suitability for a clandestine landing, and possibly suitable for extending operations to cause the downfall of Castro.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by General Gray on May 4, Gray briefed the Joint Chiefs for 20 minutes on March 15 on the three concepts outlined in JCSM-166-61. (Ibid.)
1. Document 35.
2. Document 57.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.