Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

438. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)⁰

Washington, September 25, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Caribbean Security Arrangements

At the request of Assistant Secretary Martin I am enclosing a copy of a paper containing suggested courses of action which the countries bordering on the Caribbean could take to demonstrate their determination to work collectively to resist any attempt of direct or indirect aggression by the Castro regime.

This paper has been prepared pursuant to a request made by the President at a meeting with Secretary Rusk and Mr. Martin on September 19.¹ The paper has been discussed with Mr. Sloan of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have raised no substantive objection to the courses of action outlined.

E. S. Little²

Enclosure

CARIBBEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

There are three courses of action which the countries bordering on the Caribbean can take to demonstrate their determination to work collectively to resist any attempts at direct or indirect aggression by the Castro regime. These courses of action are:

1. Establishment of a system of air-sea surveillance around Cuba and along the coasts of the Caribbean countries. This surveillance would serve to inhibit the Castro regime from trying to send clandestine shipments of arms and men to other countries of the area and would strengthen the capabilities of those countries to intercept any such shipments. We would assume primary responsibility for the Cuban patrol, while the other countries would join with us in coverage of their own coasts. Our conducting the Cuban patrol would not rule out, however, contributions by other Caribbean countries. These contributions would probably take the form of naval units or support facilities for such units (e.g., refueling and provisioning facilities in the Dominican Republic for Venezuelan or Colombian frigates).

2. Intensification of efforts to counter Castro-communist subversion. This would include control of travel to and from Cuba, shipment of subversive propaganda material from Cuba, and transfer of funds from Cuban sources for subversive purposes. The governments could also agree on a system for exchanging information on Castro-communist subversive activities. This exchange would probably best be handled through bilateral channels, although consideration might be given to establishing a centralized system.

3. Issuance by governments of the Caribbean area, including the United States, of a joint declaration that the extension by the Castro regime of its Marxist-Leninist system by force or threat of force to any part of the Caribbean area or the creation or use of a Soviet-supported offensive military capability endangering the security of any country in the area, will call for the taking of any necessary measures to protect the security of the countries concerned. This declaration would be accompanied by an announcement that discussions will be held at a military level to plan for defensive measures for meeting these contingencies.

With regard to the timing and forum for adopting these courses of action, the following steps are recommended:

1. At the informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers we would seek to have several of the Caribbean countries propose inclusion in the final communique of a paragraph recognizing that the Caribbean is the area most immediately vulnerable to aggression or subversion from Cuba and that consequently governments of the area, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution II of the Eighth MFM,³ have a special interest in adopting defensive measures to prevent the clandestine shipment of men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes. Such a paragraph would give a hemispheric blessing to the Caribbean countries taking special defense measures and thus serve to minimize criticism that the Rio Treaty is being bypassed, or that the inter-American system is being fractionized.

2. Based on this paragraph, we would seek to have President Betancourt (President Valencia or President Orlich are other possibilities) invite the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the Caribbean countries to a meeting during the second or third week of October to consider the special measures which should be taken. The courses of action outlined above could constitute the program to be approved. The inclusion of Interior Ministers (which in Latin America generally have jurisdiction over police and intelligence forces) would emphasize that the problem of dealing with the Castro-communist threat is not purely external, but one in which internal measures are equally important.

The foregoing plan presents certain problems. One is the participation of Haiti and Mexico, which for different reasons may refuse to join in the action contemplated. Another is that the agreement on patrol activities will probably give rise to requests for assistance in servicing the surface craft used in the Cuban patrol, and in those cases where a country does not have any, or inadequate, capabilities to patrol its own coast, we can expect requests to furnish patrol boats. Neither of these problems is believed to present insurmountable difficulties.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2562. Confidential. Drafted in ARA/RPA by W. G. Bowdler. Also sent to Ralph Dungan. Sent through McGeorge Bundy.
1. The President met off-the-record with Rusk, Martin, Hurwitch, and McGeorge Bundy at 6:03 p.m. on September 19. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book)
2. Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeckʼs typed signature.

3. In paragraph 3 of Resolution II adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Punta del Este on January 31, 1962, the Ministers resolved:

   “3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 323)