437. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)0
SUBJECT
- Cuban Documents
On reflection, I began to think less well of Memorandum #2 (Caribbean Security Arrangements).1 This memorandum calls for (1) the establishment of a system of air-sea surveillance around Cuba; (2) control of travel, funds and propaganda to and from Cuba; and (3) issuance of a joint declaration by governments of the Caribbean area to take all necessary measures to prevent both Cuban aggression and the development of a military capability to endanger Caribbean security.
The first obvious point is that these measures are addressed to the threat of aggressive action by Castro in the Caribbean. Since this is a [Page 1085] remote threat, unless the Cubans take leave of their senses, and since Castro has engaged in very little aggressive action since 1960, the meas-ures proposed (with an exception noted below) are essentially symbolic. The relevant question then is the effects of this symbolism.
Within the United States, the effect will no doubt be excellent. In Latin America it will be mixed—very favorable in Central America (except for Mexico) and northern South America; less favorable perhaps elsewhere. In Europe it will confirm the impression that we are far too excited about Cuba; the predominant view there, as you know, is what are we so scared about and why donʼt we learn to live with Castro as Khrushchev has learned to live with American bases in Turkey. The Soviet Union will doubtless understand that the measures are symbolic and will be unmoved by them, except as they lend themselves to propaganda exploitation.
The exception is the suggestion that the joint declaration should pledge action “to prevent in Cuba the creation … of an externally-supported military capability endangering the security of countries in the area.” Do we really mean this? How do we determine the peril point? Are we prepared to follow through when the peril point is reached? I would think that this provision would require the closest possible consideration before we tie ourselves to it.
There is, however, a substantial point in this memorandum—that is, the effort to distinguish the Caribbean problem from the hemisphere problem and to confer special responsibilities for defense on the states closest to Cuba. In a sense, this will represent a movement toward weakening the OAS. But the OAS has demonstrated its ineffectiveness anyway; and the regional arrangement can certainly be rationalized as a means of strengthening the OAS and giving effect to the Rio Treaty.
My own present recommendation would be along the following lines: an announcement that the MFM, after appropriate citations of the Castro threat and appropriate warnings to Havana and Moscow, proposes the establishment within the OAS of a Caribbean Security Organization composed of all states near the Caribbean which feel themselves menaced by the extra-continental penetration of Cuba. These nations have a special interest in adopting defensive measures to prevent the clandestine shipment of men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes. The other Latin American republics can then hail the Caribbean Security Organization as a legitimate action of self-defense within the Rio Treaty and as a source of strength for the OAS. President Betancourt will invite the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the interested countries to a meeting in Venezuela in mid-October to consider the special measures to be taken.
I would favor a simple and strong statement of this sort, uncluttered by detail about air-sea surveillance, etc. Such detail, beside answering a [Page 1086] threat which does not exist, may unnecessarily alarm all-out anti-interventionists in Latin America, as it will excite a certain amount of derision in Europe. A two-stage approach—i.e., announcement of detail after the October meeting—would suggest a greater degree of Latin American initiative and a steady crystallization of hemisphere purpose.
The question remains: what can be done to stop the real threat involved in Cuba—which is not the threat of aggression against the hemisphere, but the threat of international political defeat involved in the extension of Soviet power (even for defensive purposes) into the western hemisphere.
The answer to this question lies in my judgment in pressures directed against the Soviet Union rather than against Cuba. I continue to think that the Secretary should make a tough and cold statement to the Soviet Ambassador saying that Soviet persistence in the arming of Cuba will (a) cause a surge of indignation in the United States which will color every other issue between ourselves and the USSR and preclude the resolution of any outstanding disagreement, (b) require us to increase our defense budget, and (c) may in the end force us to take action to eliminate Castro and his regime. This having been said, the Soviet Ambassador should be brusquely dismissed.
If NATO shipping constitutes a real, and not a symbolic, problem, similar representations should be made privately to the offending countries.
Let us not deceive ourselves about the measures proposed in the memorandum: they constitute a partial answer to the problem of domestic politics but a most inadequate answer to the real problem.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62. No classification marking.↩
- There is no indication which series of memoranda Schlesinger is referring to. The memorandum on Caribbean Security Arrangements was apparently an advance copy of the memorandum sent to the White House on September 25, under cover of a note from Executive Secretary Brubeck. See Document 438.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩