Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

415. Memorandum for the Files⁰

Washington, September 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin—#2

In response to his repeated telephone requests, I saw Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the Embassy today from 12:30 to 1:00 P.M. He told me that he had sent a report of our “informal conversation” on August 23¹ to Moscow and that (somewhat to his own surprise, I gathered) he had received a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev directing him to make known directly to me the following:

1. First, “nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in the relations between our two countries. We shall follow this course, provided there are no actions taken on the other side which would change the situation. This includes a German peace settlement and West Berlin.” (The quotation is approximately, although not precisely, correct, inasmuch as the Ambassador urged me to take notes as he read from his own message.)

2. Chairman Khrushchev is definitely not coming to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. “If the necessity arises for him to speak” this would be possible “only in the second half of November” and therefore not before the election. The Chairman does not wish to become involved in our internal political affairs.

I told the Ambassador that I appreciate his conveying the message to us; but that he should understand the Presidentʼs feeling that the recent Soviet actions in Cuba had already caused considerable political turmoil—that this was a far more difficult problem for the administration politically because of the frustration felt by many Americans over the Cuban situation—and that the Chairmanʼs message therefore seemed both hollow and tardy. (Dobrynin demurred at this point that he had tried to reach me with the message a week ago, before the Cuban issue became so hot.) The President, I said, had understood that the Chairman would not want to offer any grounds for attack to our political opponents—he regarded the Cuban action, therefore, as something of a deliberate and personal affront—and, given the current situation in Berlin and elsewhere, the President could hardly be expected to take a very accommodating attitude in the months ahead. (I also mentioned the Presidentʼs indignation over the nasty comment on the U-2 note, with which the President had taken special pains to demonstrate candor, good faith and conciliation. Dobrynin said that he had seen no report—that at most there had been only an editorial in a Soviet newspaper, and we all know how the press is—and that judgment should be reserved until there was an official reply.)

With respect to Cuba, Dobrynin said that he would report this conversation in full to the Chairman and that he was aware himself of the political and press excitement regarding this matter. He repeated several times, however, that they had done nothing new or extraordinary in Cuba—that the events causing all the excitement had been taking place somewhat gradually and quietly over a long period of time—and that he stood by his assurances that all of these steps were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to the security of the United States. He neither contradicted nor confirmed my reference to large numbers of Soviet military personnel, electronic equipment and missile preparations.

[Here follows discussion on outer space.]

Theodore C. Sorensen²
Special Counsel to the President

0. Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Theodore C. Sorensen, Classified Subject Files, 1961-64, Cuba, General, 1962. Drafted by Sorensen who sent copies to Bundy and Tyler.
1. Sorensen lunched with Dobrynin on August 23 at Dobryninʼs invitation. In a memorandum for the record concerning the lunch, which he prepared that day, Sorensen described the conversation with Dobrynin as “largely general,” representing more of a “get acquainted” session than a significant exchange of views. The issue of Cuba did not come up in the discussion, and Sorensen noted that Dobrynin did not discuss current U.S.-Soviet problems to any extent. Sorensen added, however, that the Soviet Ambassador indicated “agreement and understanding” when Sorensen made the point that President Kennedy “could not possibly lay himself open to Republican charges of appeasement in his response to any buildup in Berlin pressures between now and November 6.” (Ibid.)
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.