402. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kaysen)
to the Presidentʼs Military Aide (Clifton)0
Washington, September 1,
1962.
Ted: Here is some stuff that Secretary Gilpatric had prepared specially. The Joint
Chiefs responded directly to a Presidential request as transmitted through
Secretary Gilpatric.1 In
my judgment, there is no urgency in showing the President this; however, he
may ask for it, and I am accordingly sending it to you.
Attachment2
Item 1
[17 paragraphs (3-1/2 pages of source
text) not declassified]
Item 6
“Advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that
the U.S. would not tolerate establishment of military forces (missile or
air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the
U.S.”
- 1.
- It should first be noted that the character of Soviet military aid
to Cuba thus far does not indicate the building of Cuban military
capabilities designed for attack on the U.S. The nature of arms and
equipment being furnished to Cuba, so far as known at present, seems
primarily aimed at improving defensive—particularly air
defense—capabilities. The main line of propaganda accompanying
Soviet Bloc military aid, to the extent that a definite line is
discernible, focuses on Cubaʼs right to defend itself against
“aggression” from an “imperialist” USA. With respect to nuclear weapons, it would mark a
very significant change in
[Page 1008]
Soviet policy to date if nuclear weapons were to be turned over
to the Cubans, or even deployed to Cuba under Soviet custody.
- 2.
- At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that Soviet policy may
shift, and that the creation of a nuclear threat on the U.S.
“doorstep” might appeal to the Soviets as an appropriate counter to
U.S. deployment of an alleged nuclear threat close to the Bloc
periphery.
- 3.
- Final judgment on a proposed warning statement by the U.S. would
seem to call for better evidence than presently available that a
recognizable nuclear threat to the U.S. is being fashioned in Cuba.
Pending evidence that elements of such a threat are coming into
being, the pros and cons of a warning statement are discussed
below.
- 4.
- Advantages
- a.
- A strong U.S. statement warning against the establishment
of nuclear-capable forces in Cuba would serve clear notice
to the Soviets that we are reaching the limits of patience
on their military intervention in the Western Hemisphere. To
the extent that the Soviets are probing to see how far they
can go, a firm commitment of U.S. prestige to stopping the
build-up of a nuclear military threat in Cuba could cause
the Soviets to weigh the risks of provoking us into action
in a part of the world where we hold all the geographic
advantages.
- b.
- A U.S. declaration would pave the way for taking firmer
sanctions. If the Soviets continued to support a Cuban
buildup, we could take the position that their actions
threatened the security of the U.S. and of the hemisphere,
and that we therefore considered ourselves justified in
taking necessary measures to cut off the flow of arms, such
as interception and turning back of Bloc shipping. (The
critical point would be to establish the “nuclear threat”
aspects of the Cuban buildup. There might be no clear-cut
proof, in which case we would have to establish the threat
by our own definition.) Needless to say if we intend to make
declaratory statements at all, we will have to be prepared
to back them with some sort of action or take a damaging
prestige setback.
- c.
- In many parts of the world the U.S. image would be
improved by statements and action showing determination of
purpose and a clear concept of vital national interest. In
Latin America, reactions would probably be mixed. There
would be propaganda charges by Communist and left wing
extremists that the U.S. was preparing to intervene by force
in Cuba. This would probably be echoed to some extent by
non-Communist liberal elements, particularly in Uruguay.
However, in the key countries of Brazil, Chile, Venezuela,
and Colombia the statement should tend to hearten
anti-Communist and pro-U.S. sectors of opinion. This is
especially important in Brazil, where these elements are
being hard pressed by pro-Communist supporters of President
Goulart; in Venezuela, where the
extreme left has recently made two unsuccessful attempts to
overthrow President Betancourtʼs Government by force and in
Chile,
[Page 1009]
where a
left wing popular front movement is being formed for the
next elections. On balance, although there would be
criticism, it should be offset by the psychological lift
which the opponents of Communism and of Castro could be expected to
derive from the U.S. position.
- d.
- A warning statement keyed to the nuclear threat would have
the advantage also in some quarters of underscoring U.S.
tolerance and patience, even to the point of permitting a
Communist state on the very doorstep of the U.S. until the
unacceptable condition of a nuclear threat from that state
came into the picture.
- 5.
- Disadvantages
- a.
- If it is granted that the unequivocal existence of
Cuban-based nuclear weapons would be unacceptable from the
standpoint of U.S. security—and that we would therefore take
action to neutralize the threat—then consideration of
disadvantages from a declaratory warning hinges mainly on
the effects accruing from a warning made in advance of clear
establishment of a nuclear threat.
- b.
- An advance warning confined to the nuclear threat would
have the disadvantage of casting U.S. policy in a rigid
mold. It could be inferred that the U.S. intended to do
nothing unless Cuba actually established a nuclear
capability, which would tend to increase Castroʼs freedom of
action in other matters and lower the morale of Cuban
resistance elements. Unless accompanied by supporting
indications of U.S. firmness and unanimity, an advance
declaration would probably have a questionable deterrent
effect on Soviet efforts to enlarge a military foothold in
Cuba.
- c.
- An advance declaration would give the Soviets legalistic
propaganda leverage to argue that in view of U.S.-controlled
nuclear bases ringing the Bloc, the U.S. was in no moral or
political position to proscribe the establishment of a
modest nuclear counter-force on the periphery of North
America. Thus, a statement might very well have a reverse
effect and help provide the justification for establishment
of a nuclear capability in Cuba.
- d.
- In the case of either an advance declaration or one made
while indications of a nuclear capability were still highly
uncertain, the U.S. would be vulnerable to a large-scale
propaganda counter from the Communist side to the effect
that Soviet aid to Cuba was only for purposes of defense
against American aggression and interference in the affairs
of a free and independent country.
- 6.
- Conclusions
- a.
- The disadvantages of an advance declaration concerned with
a nuclear threat only would appear to outweigh the
advantages.
- b.
- A declaration made after the existence of nuclear forces
had been determined would be useful to the extent that it
was followed up by action to eliminate the threat.
- c.
- Making introduction of a nuclear capability the criterion
for U.S. action has the inherent disadvantage that it allows
time for further strengthening of Cuban armed forces, air
defense capability, naval installations and possibly bases
for submarines, so that any eventual military operations
that might prove necessary against Cuba would become more
difficult and costly.
- d.
- The final conclusion which emerges is that any declaratory
warning issued by the U.S. should not be confined only to
the nuclear aspect of a Cuban military buildup, and should
not be made at all unless the U.S. is prepared to take
action to thwart the buildup.
