401. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)
to President Kennedy0
Washington, August 31,
1962.
SUBJECT
I attach at Tab A a first element in the reports on Cuba which will be coming
in first thing next week. I have also started Walt Rostow on an intensive personal review of the problem
and his thoughts will be available on Tuesday.1 What Rostow
and I both think as a first reaction is that we have two problems here which
should be kept separate. The first is our reaction to the current step, and
the second is our preparations to react against something which would
require or make possible a major military operation against Cuba. The
present actions in Cuba do not justify such action.
[Page 1003]
If this distinction is correct, we probably should make it plain during next
week that while the activities in Cuba are further evidence of Castroʼs
sell-out to the Soviets, they do not pose any new active threat to us or to
the hemisphere. We should distinguish these activities from any form of
aggressive action, or any activity which could aggressively threaten us or
any other American state. We should make it plain that we know exactly what
is going on and will continue to be able to watch it from inside and outside
Cuba. We might also indicate that we expect the Cuban people to show their
own opinion of this Soviet intrusion—and Walt suggests that Lansdaleʼs operation might well be enlarged to include
harassing actions by Cubans against bloc personnel.
Meanwhile, we should of course do what we can to intensify Castroʼs isolation
from our allies. There is not a great deal to be done here, because trade is
already very small and is limited mainly by Castroʼs own shortage of foreign
exchange. Shipping is very hard to control because of the number of
different flags under which there is excess cargo capacity, mainly managed
by owners who would trade with anybody and passionately resist political
guidance.
In the longer run, we need to clarify both here and abroad the grounds on
which aggressive action or offensive capability would call us into
action.
This is less a matter of the Monroe Doctrine than one of elemental national
security. It is not the same as missiles in Turkey. It is like the Soviet
attitude toward the Black Sea or the Baltic states. In domestic politics,
again, we need to draw this same sharp distinction between what is now going
on and what we would not tolerate. This will require a careful exposition
from you, and it is the only reason for thinking that a press conference
toward the end of next week may be important. I myself believe that if we
make it clear that short of war we have done everything we can and that war
is not justified by antiaircraft installations, we shall be on fairly solid
ground.
[Page 1004]
Tab A
Probable military, political, and psychological impact of
the establishment in Cuba of surface-to-air missiles or
surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S.
1. Soviet missile possibilities in
Cuba
The most probable present Soviet missile activity would be the
introduction of SA-2 missiles. Preliminary but highly indicative
photographic interpretation shows 7 sites which have all the earmarks of
such installations in the early stages of construction. The SA-2 is a
modern first-line antiaircraft missile, with an engagement range of 30
miles and a high reliability at altitudes from 2500 to 60,000 feet, and
with limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. Missiles of this sort have
been introduced in Indonesia and are on order by the UAR and Iraq.
The SA-2 is probably capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there is
no evidence that the Soviet government has ever provided nuclear
warheads to any other state, on any terms. It seems unlikely that such a
move is currently planned—but there is also little reason to suppose
that the Soviets would refuse to introduce such weapons if the move
could be controlled in the Soviet interest.
Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are
surface-to-surface missiles of ranges varying from 150 miles to the
2,000 miles of the Soviet MRBM; such
missiles would be of little value without nuclear warheads. Longer-range
surface-to-surface missiles would require relatively substantial
installations; shorter-range missiles of this sort could be introduced
very quickly and mounted without elaborate construction.
As missile capabilities increase in the remainder of the 1960ʼs, it will
become progressively easier for the Soviet Union to install in Cuba
lightweight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive power
against aircraft and against targets in the U.S.
2. Military impact of the introduction
of Soviet missiles in Cuba
- A.
-
Surface-to-air missiles
If surface-to-air missiles are introduced in Cuba they will
substantially increase Communist defensive capabilities there.
Currently the Communist air defense depends largely on MIGʼs which are effective only
against planes of medium speed and medium altitudes; additional
air defense is also provided by antiaircraft artillery of
uncertain effectiveness at low and medium altitudes. Extensive
deployment of SA-2ʼs would make reconnaissance overflight and
other clandestine air operations difficult and dangerous and
would substantially increase the problem
[Page 1005]
of neutralizing air defense
capabilities in the event of open conflict. There is no level of
SA-2 deployment which would be able to withstand a determined
U.S. attack.
SA-2 missiles would not require any significant redeployment of
U.S. forces for defensive purposes, since neither these missiles
nor the MIGʼs under their
protection would carry any increased direct threat to the safety
of the U.S. mainland. Operations at Guantanamo could be
interdicted, except for low approaches and departures, but such
action would be a strong ground for U.S. reprisal.
- B.
-
Surface-to-surface missiles
Surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads would
constitute a very significant military threat to the continental
U.S. Even short-range missiles would be able to reach important
population centers and military installations, and missiles of
longer range would give the Soviets a capability of attacking
substantial numbers of our most important military
installations. Such attacks would have very short warning times,
and this capability would be a particular threat to SAC-manned aircraft which now rely
on BMEWS warning. It appears probable that on military grounds
alone, the establishment of such a capability would be
unacceptable.
Surface-to-surface missiles without nuclear warheads would
constitute no significant military threat to the U.S. On
military grounds, indeed, it may be that the introduction of
nuclear warheads into Cuba is a more significant dividing line
than the introduction of any given class of missiles as such.
But the covert introduction of nuclear warheads would be very
hard to detect.
It is believed that attention should be given also to the
possibility that the Soviets may attempt to establish a
submarine missile base in Cuba. The Soviet submarine fleet is
greatly hindered in its operations near the U.S. by the absence
of forward bases. Cuban-based missile submarines would be most
useful to the Soviets, and the nuclear missiles could be kept
under tight Soviet control. The announcement that Soviet
trawlers will use Cuban ports may mark a precedent-setting step
to this more dangerous use.
3. Political and psychological impact
of Soviet missile establishment in Cuba
There is no technical means of making an exact estimate on this subject.
In the small group which has reviewed this problem in response to NSAM 181, the general opinion was that the
political and psychological impact of any substantial Soviet-provided
missile force will be great: in the United States, in Cuba itself, and
in the rest of the Western hemisphere.
The Soviet Union, in making a decision to supply the Cubans with missiles
of any sort, is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military
[Page 1006]
foothold in the Western
hemisphere. It can be argued that this claim was already staked when
MIGʼs were delivered a year ago, and
it is worth noting that the MIGʼs did
not cause great disturbance to American or hemispheric opinion. But
missiles are something else again, and we cannot expect that the public
mind will serenely distinguish between antiaircraft missiles and a
direct threat of missile attack on the U.S.
Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the
Administrationʼs “softness” on Cuba. This effect can be somewhat
mitigated by words and actions being considered in other responses to
NSAM 181, but it cannot be
prevented while the missiles remain in place.
Nevertheless there will be a distinct difference in impact between
missiles for defensive use against aircraft and missiles capable of use
against the United States. The impact of antiaircraft missiles would be
less in the U.S. and in the hemisphere—and international acceptance of
action against defensive installations would be lower than in the case
of action against missiles posing a direct nuclear threat to the
U.S.
In Latin America the psychological and political effect of missile
installations in Cuba would be substantial, and it would not matter much
which kind of missiles were installed. The missile sites would be seen
as proof of strong Soviet support for Cuba, and in the absence of prompt
and effective U.S. counteraction, it would be judged that Castro is here to stay. In the
Caribbean this would lead to heavy pressure for more effective U.S.
support against Castroʼs subversion; outside the area Latin American
states would be more inclined than ever to accommodate to Cuba as she
is. This divergence of reaction would accentuate existing inter-American
strains.
Summary
In sum, the expectation is that any missiles will have a substantial
political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles
would create a condition of great alarm, even in the absence of proof
that nuclear warheads were arriving with them.
