Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

378. Memorandum of Meeting⁰

Washington, August 16, 1962.

MEMORANDUM ON MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP, AUGMENTED, TO DISCUSS MONGOOSE—16 AUGUST 1962

1. General Lansdale presented his paper of 15 August¹ expressing the caveats that the program (a) did not place us in a position to take advantage of internal uprisings and (b) the program made no reference to the use of third country assets. The paper was approved subject to the submission by General Lansdale of detailed actions.

2. The meeting was generally unsatisfactory from my standpoint. In the first place, the reservations of General Lansdale seem to indicate a difference between Lansdale and CIA growing out of the position that I took on his Plan B Augmented. Secondly, the policy implications were not acted upon: strong opposition to utilization of Guantanamo was expressed by Lemnitzer, and McCone stated that he too was concerned about the use of Guantanamo and he felt that the operation should be planned so that Guantanamo would not be used. Bundy expressed strong reservations concerning use of Navy submarines and some reservations concerning overflights. Alexis Johnson questioned the level of sabotage operations, Taylor favoring approval by the Group of each important sabotage action and Johnson favoring modest rather than violent acts of sabotage. McCone stated that proposal involved substantial sabotage actions and that the Lansdale Task Force should be permitted to proceed without further reference to the Special Group. DCI stated he did not feel we could sit in judgment on each sabotage operation and expect Lansdale with his supporting staff of 500 or 1,000 people to work effectively. Bundy brought up the question of the “noise level”. McCone stated that operations anticipated would raise the noise level very substantially and there would be a very considerable attribution. In general the meeting was unsatisfactory, lacked both purpose and direction and left me with a feeling that very considerable reservation exists as to just where we are going with Operation Mongoose.

Action: A detailed plan of operation specifying the acts of sabotage, planned infiltrations, propaganda effort, etc., should be presented by Lansdale at the earliest moment. Any differences between Lansdale and CIA should be straightened out by Harvey with the assistance of Helms or others. McCone should discuss this subject privately with the Attorney General.

3. The attached memorandum to the President and the guidelines on Phase II, dated August 16th,² was approved with only modest modification.

John A. McCone³
Director

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.
1. Reference is to the memorandum Lansdale circulated to the Special Group (Augmented) on August 14, Document 374.
2. The memorandum and guidelines were sent to the President on August 17; see Document 380.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.