Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

341. Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented)⁰

Washington, May 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

• US Policy in the Event USSR Establishes a Base(s) in Cuba

1. At the 22 March meeting, Mr. Robert Kennedy asked the Special Group (Augmented)—what would be an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in the event that the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.

2. The Department of Defense is most desirous that a considered response to this question be prepared by each agency concerned, for the establishment of a Soviet military base(s) of any kind in Cuba would increase our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet this threat from the South.¹ At the same time, it is logical to assume that a Soviet military base in Cuba would result in further economic, managerial and technical assistance for Cuba which would virtually assure, for the foreseeable future, the continuation of the Cuban-Communist base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.

3. Since the Special Group (Augmented) has assumed that overt US military force will have to be used to end Communist control of Cuba, Mr. Kennedyʼs question is particularly pertinent. For should the Soviets choose to exercise their option of establishing a military base under a Soviet flag in Cuba, it is possible that this would act to prevent any future US decision to intervene with US military force, just as the Soviets have refrained from applying military force against countries on which US bases are established.

4. Furthermore, establishment of a military base(s) in Cuba would cost the Soviets very little in terms of world public opinion. For example, they could explain that they were simply taking a page from our book, and would remove their base(s) from Cuba if we would remove ours from Berlin, Turkey or Formosa.

5. Consequently, I believe national security considerations require that all participating agencies prepare a written response to Mr. Robert Kennedyʼs question. I recommend that these responses be prepared in time for presentation at our next meeting.

0. Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. No drafting information appears on the source text, but internal evidence suggests that the memorandum was prepared by Lansdale, as Chief of Operations.
1. CIA Information Report no. K-3,216,423, dated May 31, circulated a report of a possible Soviet submarine base being built on the coast of Cuba in Oriente Province. (Ibid.)