Office of the Historian

340. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)0

Washington, May 31, 1962.

[Here follow operational details relating to intelligence, economic pressure, propaganda, and an incident at Guantanamo.]

Fracturing the Regime has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full-time to this specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of 24 desirable defection targets,CIA has found several who seem vulnerable [1 line of source text not declassified].

[Page 823]

Priority Operations Schedule of 21 May,1 seeking some positive actions in behalf of our project during the next several weeks, has brought a very healthy response from CIA and USIA. The CIA determination to meet the challenge has surfaced four policy-type questions which I note for you on behalf of CIA:2

1)
Task 7, “Voice of Free Cuba,” is almost immediately feasible, if the Group will approve CIA arranging with Navy for use of a submarine. CIA has firm plans for worrying the Communist regime through broadcasts which would appear to come from local dissident groups actively planning to harass the regime.
2)
Task 10, CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castroʼs failure to the Cuban population via balloon with a view of increasing instability of the Communist machine. The technique is tested and CIA has plans to operate from a surface ship in international waters. The Group is asked to approve the idea, including Navy support. This could be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary of Castroʼs attack upon government forces at Santiago de Cuba in 1953, for “the revolution” he has now betrayed.
3)
Task 19, CIA believes it can recruit some 20-man teams for possible use in beefing up resistance groups within Cuba. Group approval is asked for Defense support in training, holding, logistics. The “noise level” hazard is noted, but this special project could be almost unnoticed if timed with proposed U.S. military enlistment of Cubans.
4)
[4 lines of source text not declassified]

Other Tasks.

I note here that CIA does not feel it has the operational means to undertake Task No. 22, black-market activities, at this time. Further that Task No. 11, Time magazine dissemination, would require operational facilities not now available. I accept indefinite deferral of Task No. 22 and scrubbing of Task No. 11 on this basis.

The Department of State reaction, to my effort to get the U.S. into priority actions towards our projectʼs goals, has been disappointing to me thus far. Apparently, my schedule of targets for special efforts is accepted only as it may fit into long-range, existing programs already under way. If this is the theory of our project, I believe that the project then becomes only a special reporting device and not a special U.S. effort to win the goal of helping the Cubans recapture their country from a gang of Communists.

  1. Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase I. Top Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone, and one copy was kept by Lansdale.↩
  2. Document 338.↩
  3. This copy of the memorandum, which is marked as Johnsonʼs copy, was annotated by Johnson in the margin as follows: after item 1), relating to Task 7: “OK State”; after item 2), relating to Task 10: “No” and an illegible word; after item 3), relating to Task 19: “further planning” and Johnson wrote in “about 10” in place of the word “some” in the first line of the text; and after item 4), relating to Task 23: “submit plan.”↩