Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

283. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, December 14, 1961.

PRESENT

• Mr. McCone, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Amory, Mr. Helms, Mr. Sheldon, Mr. Kent, Mr. Bross, Mr. Montague, Mr. Earman

1. Mr. McCone stated that the purpose of this meeting was to discuss and make known to those present U.S. policy toward successfully overthrowing the Castro regime. At this point the Director read a memorandum, which had been approved by the President, establishing a group composed of Brig. General Edward Lansdale, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as the Chief of Operations and representatives from State, Defense, and CIA, and USIA and the Department of Justice (FBI) as required, for the purpose of carrying out of the above-stated policy.¹ He commented that the President had discussed Cuba with the Attorney General who in turn had brought Lansdale into the program. The Director said he wanted to make it clear that the basic policy as approved by the President is to assist the Cubans in overthrowing the Communist regime in Cuba. Mr. McCone also noted that the last sentence of the memorandum referred to above provided that only the Secretaries of State and Defense or the Chief of Operations could approve the information contained therein being made available to other than those represented on the group and stated this had been amended to allow the DCI the same authority. The Director said that when he had been approached for comments on the above-mentioned memo, he had indicated that (1) he favored the establishment of the group, (2) it should be responsible to the Special Group (5412), and (3) the internal organization and facilities of the participating agencies should be utilized and there should not be created a separate and outside entity.

2. The Director then read the memorandum from General Lansdale addressed to the members of the 5412 Group outlining activities to date on this project,² and noted his intention of obtaining permission to have copies made and circulated on a strict need-to-know basis. In this connection, the Director said that knowledge of this project must be held to an absolute minimum; however, he did not intend to skip any echelons in the Agency in obtaining advice and support. He said it was perfectly clear from the Lansdale memorandum that the whole action is by and large that of CIA and that the President and the Attorney General had directed him (DCI) to keep in close personal contact with all activities and operations relating to this project. He noted that Lansdale had initially suggested that Mr. Helms be designated as the CIA representative and report only to the DCI. Mr. McCone said he had refused this concept and made it clear that this refusal was not based on any misgivings about Mr. Helmsʼ capabilities but, rather, is based on his policy of obtaining the advice and support of other senior officers also. He remarked that, as he sees it, this is a community project within the strict security limitations imposed by the President, with action, however, at the Helms level. He stated that the Agency will of course provide Lansdale with all support and assistance following the guidelines laid down by the Special Group.

3. The Director noted that in addition to actions taken, he desires that there be provided a continuous evaluation of the probabilities of success and that these evaluations by and large will be carried out by DD/I. In response to a query from the Director, Mr. Amory stated it would not be necessary for more than about five or six people in his area to be knowledgeable of this program, i.e., Messrs. Amory, Kent, Sheldon, Montague, and Brown. The Director again emphasized that while it is his desire to keep knowledge of this program narrow, he does not wish to skip any echelons that might contribute to its success.

4. The Director commented that Lansdale had criticized the April 1961 Cuban operation by stating that CIA had “jumped” at paramilitary operations, sabotage, etc., without creating a political climate within Cuba to accept such activities. The Director also said that Lansdale had made a similar comment about the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operation.

5. Referring back to the Lansdale memorandum, the DCI emphasized the following actions taken and findings to date by the Lansdale group:

[Here follows a summary of General Lansdaleʼs memorandum, Document 281.]

6. With regard to the use of Cubans, the Director said he desires that every possible security check be made and, in connection with current authorized operations directed against Cuba, he desires that each one be examined to ensure that they are within the bounds of the U.S. policy toward Cuba as previously indicated. Mr. Bissell commented that there are certain low-level types of sabotage operations now planned to show that resistance is still in fact alive and that General Lansdale has concurred that they be carried out. He also noted that one of our highest priorities is to build a resistance net and every effort is being made to hold down the natural desire to carry out sabotage actions willy-nilly. Mr. Bissell also said it is necessary to move people in and out of Cuba and he considers this type of activity as falling within the terms of reference of the Presidentʼs policy. Mr. Bissell remarked that in following the doctrine of preparing the proper political climate as outlined by Lansdale, he wanted to point out that it is not easy to start a mass political movement in a police state. This he said was made abundantly clear during the April 1961 operations when the Cubans used the militia and even families for reporting on anyone opposed to Castro. He stated that the mass movement envisaged for Cuba must be developed by political sentiment. Mr. McCone noted this agreement and remarked that this can be accomplished by getting to the dissidents, the mothers, the man on the street and in the field, etc. It was noted that such action can best be accomplished by a small clandestine organization rather than a large group trying to cover the waterfront.

7. Mr. Sheldon asked whether it is planned that the nets now established in Cuba will be assigned to covert intelligence collection and Mr. Bissell advised that this is a first priority.

8. Mr. Amory pointed out that the plan for Cuba as outlined in this discussion in his opinion is a very long-range problem, and commented that no authoritarian regime has been overthrown in the 20th Century by popular uprising from within without some kind of support—war or otherwise.

9. General Cabell commented that we must be careful to keep our records straight and that he too agreed that this is a long-range problem. He pointed out that Lansdale is often inclined to commit and promise that CIA can do more than we are capable. He said we must not allow anyone to commit the Agency to a task it cannot fulfill. The Director commented that he fully agreed and directed that careful memoranda for the record be prepared on all actions directed, taken, or refused.

10. Mr. Amory suggested that a review be made of the question as to whether or not Guantanamo should be used as a base of operations. He said if the answer is in the affirmative and Castro attempts to throw the U.S. out, then the U.S. would be faced with formulating a new policy toward Cuba. Mr. Amory also commented that in connection with infiltration of agents and supplies by sea, he would suggest that DD/P consider getting in touch with the Stevens Brothers who are, in his opinion, the foremost experts on small boat operations. The Director concurred.

11. In connection with the article appearing in the Washington Post of 14 December 1961 regarding Operation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the Director stated it appeared to him that the breakdown was caused by improper and/or inadequate maintenance of equipment. He directed that in future maritime operations, and all others insofar as feasible, a system of checks and double checks be established, and necessary dry runs be made or back-up craft be readied and, where warranted, participate in the actual operation. Mr. Bross commented that the new Chief of Station for the DD/P installation in Florida had been instructed to review all maritime equipment and operations as the first matter of business upon reporting to the Station today.

J.S. Earman
Executive Officer

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5,DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by J.S. Earman, McConeʼs Executive Assistant.
1. Apparent reference to Document 278.
2. Document 281.