Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

281. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)⁰

Washington, December 7, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR

General Taylor

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

SUBJECT

• Cuba

This is to inform you, as the NSC 5412 group, of activities to date on the Cuba project, within the strict security requirements of the project directed by the President.

Policy. The Presidentʼs memorandum of 30 November 1961,¹ which was read to the Special Group at its last meeting, stated that it had been decided that the United States will use all available assets in a project to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime.

Concept. The decision stated above was made after consideration of a concept of how to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime. The regime is to be overthrown by a popular movement of Cubans from within Cuba. The movement is to have the end objective of establishing a free Cuba, of, by, and for Cubans, with the overthrow of the Communist regime a necessary step towards this end. The U.S. will help establish a Cuban nucleus within Cuba, which will work for activating a genuine popular movement to overthrow the regime, and the U.S. will help generate supporting actions for the growth of the movement, particularly in encouraging other nations of the Western Hemisphere to do likewise.

Actions. A working group has been formed by the projectʼs Chief of Operations, with the personal representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as a selected staff. The Chief of Operations is representing the Secretary of Defense, pro tem. It is planned to employ personal representatives of the Directors of the FBI and USIA, when required. The initial work of the group has been to sharply re-orient the U.S. effort, from being simply an unintegrated series of harassment activities to become a program designed to help Cubans build a popular movement within Cuba, which can (with outside help) take effective actions deposing the Communist regime.

CIA. CIA was found to have important contacts and operational capabilities for use in achieving the policy goal set by the President. It is noted, also, that there is an impressive potential for increasing the CIAʼs capability. The orientation of planning and programming, however, was definitely out of phase with the objective of establishing a popular movement from within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Communist regime. In the main, CIA thinking has been to apply militant force covertly (such as action teams for “smash and grab” raids on up to armed resistance groups), in the hope that a popular uprising would possibly harass the regime. The early task, then, has been to re-orient this 180#, with militant (sabotage, etc.) actions to be considered as part of the support of the popular movement we are generating. The basic strategy of building our action upon a genuine internal popular movement is underlined; this will apply the major lesson to be learned from earlier operations in Indonesia and Cuba.

The tasks assigned to the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence are:

a. The CIA organization directed towards Cuba is to be tightened and re-oriented with a hard look at operational effectiveness, especially the management and programs of the field station in Florida.

b. A nucleus for a popular Cuban movement will be formed and positioned within Cuba. This will include the development of a team from Cubans in the U.S., and the development of similar teams under local auspices from Caribbean countries.

c. A program for this Cuban nucleus to use will be developed. Basic intelligence concerning several initial operational points has been requested. There will be a sharp definition of incentives and of a platform for political polarization, for use with the Cuban nucleus. Further, ideas will be developed for local actions that will help generate the national movement required to force the regime out.

d. Special support projects will be readied for use on call. These projects (such as operations to scuttle shipping and otherwise hamper the regime) will be timed to support actions by the movement and to permit the movement to take credit for them. Support in terms of psychological warfare materiel (such as clandestine broadcast transmitters inside Cuba) are to be brought to a practical stand-by capability.

At the same time, the special project team is working on bold new actions to help the popular movement for CIA executive follow through. These include:

1. Enlisting the cooperation of the Church to bring the women of Cuba into actions which will undermine the Communist control system, harass the regimeʼs economic program, and encourage a wave of non-cooperation in all segments of the population.

2. Exploiting the potential of the underworld in Cuban cities to harass and bleed the Communist control apparatus. This effort may, on a very sensitive basis, enlist the assistance of American links to the Cuban underworld. While this would be a CIA project, close cooperation of the FBI is imperative.

3. Labor, students, and other special groups are being considered for practical operational capabilities, for operations which must be mounted quite outside the framework of the existing U.S. programs which aim to match the activities of Communist fronts. This effort is to come mainly from activities in other OAS countries, and suitable Latin American case officers to undertake such positive actions are being considered on a priority basis.

4. Powerful Cuban personalities, with existing capabilities for action within Cuba and who propose a military-type of overthrow, are being assessed for a role in actions which would help generate the popular, anti-regime movement.

State. The Department of Stateʼs actions have been essentially at the formal diplomatic level, and thus quite passive or reactive. State must develop and use its dynamic possibilities in political and economic warfare which will be crucial for the success of a popular movement within Cuba.

The representative of the Secretary of State has been tasked with:

a. The possibilities for strong and effective OAS encouragement of the Cuban people in a popular movement will be exploited, particularly noting the Presidentʼs forthcoming visit to Latin America and the Secretary of Stateʼs actions with the OAS in January.

b. State will help with the nucleus for a popular Cuban movement, particularly in the development of a political platform and in the continuing development and public support of leadership (noting necessary consideration of existing Cuban emigre groups and their future cooperation with the internal Cuban movement).

c. Certain supporting actions will be undertaken by State, notably:

1). Appropriately enlisting the initiative of Latin American countries separately in action programs which encourage the popular movement within Cuba. This is being closely coordinated with a similar task assigned to CIA.

2). Making available the names of American returnees from Cuba, for screening in conjunction with CIA for possible leads to operational contacts.

d. Develop, in consultation with top State officials, a practical plan for economic warfare which fully applies the U.S. capability to frustrate the Communist economic program for Cuba. Definite and decisive actions by other U.S. organizations (including Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture) are to be enlisted under the direction of the Department of State.

Defense. The main Department of Defense role is indicated as one of contingency support in later phases of the popular movementʼs development. To this end, improved arrangements for training, personnel, and military hardware support of covert operations is under active study. However, immediate support of State and CIA actions is being activated, particularly in the field of intelligence and in consideration of maritime and air needs in readiness for the time when CIA operations require such support. Planning for overt U.S. military operations is not envisioned under this policy.

USIA. The U.S. Information Agencyʼs role in providing open support for developing the popular movement within Cuba is an important one, but must be correctly timed with the actual commencement of the movement. The U.S. will be identified as being in sympathy with the just and true aspirations of the Cuban people, aspirations which are being killed by a Communist dictatorship. Discussion with a designated USIA representative is being scheduled.

Justice. Support from the Department of Justice, particularly the security and investigative capabilities of the FBI and the INS, is being planned through a special representative of the Attorney General.

HEW, Other U.S. Agencies. The support capabilities of other U.S. organizations are being considered and will be brought into the project as appears most practical.

EG Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
1. Document 278.