Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

274. Inter-Agency Staff Study⁰

Washington, undated.

PLAN FOR CUBA

This study has as its purpose to determine the courses of action which the U.S. would follow with reference to Cuba in the event of Fidel Castroʼs death in order to insure the replacement of the Castro regime with a friendly government.

A. Background of Present Situation in Cuba.

Castro Cuba, dominated by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, poses a serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Within Cuba, the Castro regime is encountering currently serious economic difficulties . If the regime maintains its present firm political control of the island, however, and if there is a continued high level of Bloc assistance, conditions could begin to improve after 1962. (See Annex A.)

Nine Latin American nations no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. The more important Latin American nations, however, maintain relations and are for a variety of reasons still reluctant to break relations with or join in collective action against Cuba. (See Annex B.)

Destruction of the Castro regime and of the Communist apparatus is in the U.S. national interest.

Sino-Soviet Bloc provides political and economic and military support to the Castro regime to promote Bloc objectives in Latin America. We do not believe the Sino-Soviet Bloc would defend Cuba militarily, although they have the capability to do so.

Asian and African neutrals are generally split on the Castro issue while NATO and SEATO allies share U.S. evaluation of the problem but regard it as a U.S. responsibility.

B. Contingency: The Death of Fidel Castro or Other Elimination of Castro, and the Existence of Certain Minimum Military-Political Conditions.

1. Assumptions:

The courses of action which follow are based upon the assumption that in the event of Castroʼs death the Communist Party in Cuba would maintain control. Dorticos would probably continue as President and Raul Castro would probably assume the Premiership. The Cuban militia, the largest and most effective armed force in Cuba, would respond promptly to Raulʼs orders and would exterminate whatever scattered outbreaks of resistance may have occurred. The subsequent reign of terror would quickly establish the successor regime in control and would crush any hope of effective U.S. intervention short of a massive assault. The defense of Cuba under Raul would probably be ruthless and pushed to even greater extremes than under Fidel. The successor regime would, regardless of U.S. action, blame the U.S. for Castroʼs death and would launch a violent anti-U.S. propaganda campaign. There would not be an attack against Guantanamo. (See Annex C.)

Latin American Governments and public opinion would generally believe that the U.S. was responsible for Castroʼs death. Latin American Governments and important sectors of the population would nevertheless not publicly challenge our statement of innocence. Communist and pro-Communist elements as well as extreme nationalists and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would undoubtedly launch anti-American campaigns, with anti-Government overtones. These campaigns would probably include demonstrations and attacks against U.S. official installations. There would be no significant changes in the number of nations which do not maintain relations with Cuba. (See Annex D.)

Meanwhile in the U.S. the popular desire for vigorous action against Cuba would increase as a result of the Cuban regimeʼs likely actions following Castroʼs death. The Sino-Soviet Bloc would increase the propaganda campaign against the U.S. possibly including threats of military support which the Bloc would not supply. Insofar as the rest of the world is concerned the Communist inspired propaganda campaign would probably be echoed by a majority of neutralist nations. The U.S. would be widely blamed for Castroʼs death.

2. Courses of Action:

The courses of action which we would pursue fall into four principal categories:

1. Upon news of the death or other elimination of Castro from Cuban scene we would order that the U.S. armed forces prepare immediately for armed intervention in Cuba in a manner that these preparations are kept from public knowledge and are subject to immediate halt.

2. Before intervening in Cuba we would determine on the basis of reliable intelligence whether the minimum desirable political conditions in Cuba exist, namely:

(a) that events stemming from Castroʼs death have created a chaotic situation where (1) the successor government would perpetrate widespread atrocities against its own people; (2) resistance would be open and widespread; (3) dissidents would take and appear in a position to hold for several days some Cuban territory; and (4) a substantial group of dissidents would call for outside assist-ance.

(b) that Latin American Governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both domestic and/or in the OAS.

(c) that the Sino-Soviet Bloc, according to the best intelligence estimates at the time, would not engage in major military action.

(d) that remaining friendly governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both domestic and/or in the U.N.

(e) that U.S. Congressional and public opinion would generally support the Presidentʼs action. The armed forces would have five days notice before being ordered to intervene in order to assemble the requisite forces to accomplish its mission.

3. If it is determined that the minimum desirable political conditions exist in Cuba as above enumerated we would review the international situation and determine whether the danger posed by the Castro regime to the U.S. national security is of such an order of magnitude as to justify intervention in Cuba of U.S. forces, which would be contrary to international law including the UN Charter and OAS commitments.

4. If after reviewing the international situation we determine that armed intervention in Cuba is in the overall national interest we would order intervention in Cuba with the use of U.S. armed forces.

C. Conclusions.

1. Reaction to U.S. Invasion:

In the event of the invasion of Cuba by the U.S. we have concluded the successor regime would mobilize all its forces and would attempt to rally public support. Most of the people would passively wait to see what happens. Many persons would defect from the Castro forces and the underground would become more active. The elements committed to the regime would fight and numerous individuals and groups would resist until physically eliminated.

Although many Latin American Governments and important segments of the population would privately welcome the elimination of communism from Cuba, they would publicly decry U.S. military action as intervention and consequently a flagrant violation of U.S. commitments in the OAS (for these commitments, see Annex E). The Communist and pro-Castro elements, as well as extreme nationalist and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would intensify their anti-American campaigns and would succeed to the extent of seriously threatening the stability of some governments and/or obtaining public denunciation of the U.S. followed in some instances by measures against U.S. national interests in those countries, including private American investments and the Alliance for Progress program. One or more Latin American nations might propose OAS action adverse to U.S. interests, which the U.S. could probably delay.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc would not use military force in Cuba but might apply pressure in other areas. Communist propaganda apparatus would attack U.S. on world-wide basis. The Bloc would introduce or support in the UN a resolution condemning the U.S.

A majority of the neutral nations as well as important sectors of the population would publicly condemn the U.S. Most of the neutrals would support a Bloc-inspired UN resolution charging the U.S. with having violated its commitments to the UN. (For these commitments, see Annex F.)

The political penalties which the U.S. will suffer as a result of having invaded Cuba in violation of U.S. international commitments, including those to the UN and OAS, are severe, but can be borne. The serious criticism of the U.S. which will be aroused by this illegal and interventionist act will be offset by the reservoir of good will which the U.S. enjoys throughout the Free World. Although the U.S. cannot defend this action as justified under international law, we can stress the morality of the action on the basis that a chaotic, near civil war situation exists off our shores where millions of Cubans are seeking freedom by throwing off the Communist yoke and have requested our assistance.

The disappearance of Castro from the Cuban political scene under widely-known conditions of chaos and open resistance to his regime will help destroy the Castro myth and the appeal his regime has had for the peoples of many underdeveloped nations.

The destruction of a Communist regime and its replacement by a friendly government will remove a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere and will weaken the belief that the Communist Bloc is the eventual winner of the world struggle and should therefore be placated rather than opposed.

Our relations with friendly nations will remain good, after perhaps a slight deterioration in certain instances. American investments will suffer less in the long run than they would if Castro-Communism continued and spread throughout the hemisphere. The Alliance for Progress program will not encounter serious obstacles as a result of this action. If the operation is quickly and successfully accomplished, the political damage will be correspondingly reduced.

Widespread organized Communist disturbances will occur immediately but the more quickly the Castro regime is crushed the greater the difficulty the Communists will encounter in maintaining existing disturbances and in mounting further disturbances. A successful invasion may strengthen the will of Latin American Governments to destroy the Communist menace in their own countries.

The Congress and the people of the U.S. will applaud the action.

2. Suitability and Feasibility of Plan:

The U.S. steps proposed above are suitable for the quick eradication of the Castro regime and its replacement by a friendly government. We can foresee no way other than invasion to accomplish the objective as stated in the problem.

The proposed steps are feasible. The logistics problem is simplified because of the proximity of Cuba to the U.S. and its great distance from the Bloc. We have the preponderance of military and economic power to carry out the task quickly.

Cuba is not believed to be important enough to the Soviet Union to justify the risk of a major war. Moreover, the USSR cannot supply a significant force over long sea distances against the hostile navy. Therefore, the USSR will not intervene militarily. The USSR may increase its pressure in Berlin, Laos or other parts of the world, but will stop short of a direct major confrontation with the U.S.

3. Acceptability as to Cost:

Castroʼs armed forces now have the ability to inflict significant losses upon an invading force. We believe, however, that losses would be acceptable given the size and power of the forces we plan to bring against Cuba. Our forces in other parts of the world must be prepared to handle increased brush-fire actions generated by the Soviet Bloc.

The Nationʼs economy can sustain any armed intervention in Cuba and the subsequent program of rehabilitation in Cuba.

D. Contingency Check List.

1. U.S. Resources to Accomplish Objective of Replacing Castro Regime with Friendly Government:

(a) U.S. military

(b) Cuban exiles

(c) Cuban underground

(d) Diplomatic influence

(e) Economic resources to assist friendly government

(f) Psychological warfare

(g) Favorable minority of Latin American countries

(h) Favorable minority in rest of world

(i) Possible but improbable token military support from L.A.

2. Resources of Cuba and Sino-Soviet Bloc to Prevent Accomplishment of Objective:

(a) Cuban forces, Cuban Communist apparatus, and partial public support

(b) Communist international apparatus (apart from military intervention in Cuba)

(c) Possible world-wide military and paramilitary pressure

(d) Denunciation in international organizations of U.S. intervention

(e) Communist-inspired demonstrations in Latin America against Americans and against anti-Communist governments

3. U.S. Steps to Accomplish Objective:

• Pre-Invasion

  (a) Create the above-described minimum desirable conditions in Cuba (see 2(c), page 5 above)

  Action: CIA, DOD, State-USIA

  (b) Make known world-wide the creation of the minimum desirable conditions as they occur, as well as progress toward them.

  Action: State-USIA, CIA

  (c) Sound out the Chiefs of State of two countries regarding possible use of token forces with due regard for security. (Annex G)

  Action: State

  (d) Evaluate and designate among Cuban exiles and underground groups those individuals who could best participate in the formation of an initial Cuban national, provincial, and municipal government.

  Action: State (exiles), CIA (underground)

  (e) Review and improve as necessary existing structure for liaison and coordination within the Executive Department to insure that CINC-LANT is kept aware of all aspects of the political and military situation. Augment CINCLANTʼs staff, as necessary.

  Action: State, Defense, CIA

  (f) Lay groundwork for psychological warfare and press information programs for invasion support.

  Action: State-USIA

  (g) Keep key members of Congress progressively informed regarding general situation in Cuba.

  Action: State

• Invasion Period

  (a) Invade Cuba with U.S. forces under CINCLANT.

  Action: DOD

  (b) Inform L.A. Governments that invasion is underway and warn them they can shortly expect Communist-directed violence in their countries. Invite their support and offer them assistance.

  Action: State

  (c) Organize participation of anti-Castro forces and coordinate their activities with CINCLANT.

  Action: DOD, CIA, State

  (d) Launch all-out psychological warfare and propaganda campaign for all sectors, stressing the morality of the intervention.

  Action: State-USIA, CIA and DOD

  (e) Use diplomatic action to reduce criticism of U.S. action insofar as possible.

  Action: State

  (f) Organize civil government with participation of designated Cubans.

  Action: DOD, State, CIA

  (g) Provide program for immediate emergency assistance to civil populace.

  Action: DOD, State

  (h) Arrange for participation and support by other L.A. forces which may be induced to join.

  Action: DOD, State

• Post Invasion Phase

  (a) Seek out and eliminate pro-Communist resistance.

  Action: DOD, CIA

  (b) Continue occupation in force and replace, as feasible, military government installed during invasion with provisional Cuban government.

  Action: State, CIA, DOD

  (c) Provide plan for long-range economic assistance. (See Annex K)

  Action: State, AID

  (d) Take measures to control entry into Cuba.

  Action: State

  (e) Re-establish a U.S. Country Team in Habana.

  Action: State

0. Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is undated, but a draft of the study, found in the same file, is dated November 9. No additional drafting information is given on the source text, but Robert Hurwitch of ARA/CMA is listed as the drafter on the preliminary draft, and the other agencies listed to receive copies, and presumably to comment, were Defense and CIA. The study was apparently prepared in conjunction with the planning exercise initiated with the establishment of Operation Mongoose on November 3. The annexes cited in the study were not found attached to the source text.