Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

273. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, November 8, 1961.

TYPES OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE Castro REGIME

1. Non-Sensitive Activities: A variety of non-sensitive political warfare and propaganda activities are being conducted outside Cuba. These include: (a) working with the Cuban Revolutionary Council and the number of other Cuban groups in Miami in an effort to improve their competence to undertake action on their own and also to minimize the effects of disunity among the Cubans; (b) efforts to induce the defection of prominent Cubans from the Castro regime; (c) black operations with the objective of having Castroʼs diplomats declared PNG or having additional countries break diplomatic relations with Cuba; (d) speaking tours by teachers, student, labor, jurists and womenʼs groups throughout the hemisphere; (e) support of publications and distribution of pamphlets; (f) the support of anti-Castro radio programs on some 60 Latin America stations and 3 stations in Florida; (g) the operation of Radio Swan; (h) the use of a broadcasting ship for intruding radio broadcasts on Cuba t.v. channels. There is believed to be little risk that these activities will give rise to political embarrassment, except for that resulting from the jealousy of various Cuban groups and criticism by one of alleged support to another. The following paragraphs constitute a list of politically more sensitive types of activities in progress or contemplated.

2. Agent Training: There are currently some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cubans already trained or now in training as activists who can be infiltrated to organize the resistance and to develop sabotage activities. In addition there are some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cuban students in training for infiltration to conduct Agit/Prop activities. For the most part the training is being done in Florida. The men are trained in compartmented small groups; the largest single unit, already trained, numbers [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. No subsequent group will be as large. The candidates are of course volunteers and are from a number of the political groups with which we are in contact.

3. Infiltration/Exfiltration: We maintain and employ for training and operational purposes a fleet of some 7 craft. They are used primarily for the infiltration and exfiltration of individuals and, if and when feasible, of arms. Currently, infiltrations are apt to involve no more than 3 to 5 individuals at a time but larger groups (up to 15 or 20) may be infiltrated in the future if and when this becomes feasible. No Americans are allowed on any craft that is going within the 12-mile limit around Cuba. Many infiltration/exfiltration operations involve a meet-at-sea with a Cuban fisherman or a Cuban craft.

4. Building an Intelligence and Resistance Organization: Contact is still maintained, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agents in Cuba. Their present function is restricted to the furnishing of intelligence and in some cases the maintenance of communication with internal resistance leaders. Every effort will be made to infiltrate additional trained agents and communicators as rapidly as possible for the purpose of building an internal resistance organization and establishing effective secure communication with internal resistance leaders. The objective will be to develop one or more nets of dependable sympathizers and the means of communication both among themselves and to the outside. In the first instance such internal assets, to the extent to which they are subject to control from outside, will be used for intelligence collection, further clandestine recruiting, assisting in infil/exfiltration operations, and mounting low risk sabotage operations. They will be deliberately restrained in this phase from exposing themselves by operations involving high risk or the assembly in one operation of any sizeable number of the resistance.

5. Accelerated Resistance Activities: In parallel with the necessarily time consuming effort to build a secure underground organization, it is now planned to support in the next few months larger scale infiltrations of men and arms for sabotage and perhaps ultimately guerrilla activities when well-conceived operations are proposed by reputable opposition leaders now outside the country or are requested by the resistance leadership from within. In most cases the sponsorship and ultimate responsibility for such operations will rest with Cubans and the Agencyʼs role will be that of furnishing support in the form of funds, training, equipment, communications, frequently the facilities to conduct the actual infiltration itself, and resupply following infiltration if required and feasible. These will necessarily be higher risk operations in which some casualties must be anticipated. It will be impossible to conceal U.S. geographical origin but every effort will be made not only possibly to forestall identification of U.S. Government support but also to avoid any appearance of U.S. Government control or ultimate responsibility. What will be impossible to disprove is that the Cubans responsible obtain help in the U.S.

6. Air Operations: If the internal resistance grows, it will be desirable at some point to undertake air resupply missions. These would be conducted by Cuban crews using common types of commercial aircraft. They will be night missions and would be undertaken only if reception parties had been identified and were in possession of agent radio sets and, hopefully, beacons so that resupply could be carried out with reasonable efficiency. Aside from such air activity, proposals have been received for both leaflet drops and bombing raids. One successful leaflet mission was recently conducted by Cubans from Florida entirely on their own after Agency support had been refused. Such operations rather infrequently carried out may have a useful morale effect. Up to the present time it has been felt that air bombing, quite aside from international repercussions, would be contraproductive in its effect on the Cubans.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. This paper was apparently prepared in response to the requirement to examine existing programs and options in conjunction with the establishment of Operation Mongoose.