Office of the Historian

268. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Parrott) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, October 20, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Special Group meeting, Friday, October 20, 1961

The following are things that you will want to follow up on as a result of todayʼs Special Group meeting:

[Here follows consideration of topics unrelated to Cuba.]

[Page 664]

5. Cuba: Summary of Covert Program. After you left, it developed that there was some difference of opinion between ARA in State and the Agency on the most desirable US posture toward Dr. Miro Cardona. This came as a surprise to Johnson, Dulles and myself. It was agreed that the presentation of this summary to Higher Authority should be deferred until there is agreement. It was felt that, if agreement can be reached, then there might be some usefulness in Mr. Dulles and Mr. Johnson going along with you at some appropriate time so as to get this matter straightened out. (In case this is more than usually obscure, see the last three paragraphs of the attached summary.)1

Suggested Action: None, until State and CIA are ready to move. One or the other will be in touch with you at that time.

T.A.P.2
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group l Group meeting:↩

  2. The attached summary is entitled “Cuban Covert Program Report,” October 13. It summarizes an October 12 memorandum for the Special Group entitled “Cuban Program Report.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961) See the Supplement. The first part of the summary deals with operational details. The final three paragraphs read as follows:

    “The position of Dr. Miro Cardona presents something of a problem. His organization—the Cuban Revolutionary Council—and portions of the Frente now allied with the CRC, are being subsidized at about $90,000 per month. Miro expects this to continue at least until 29 June 1962.

    “Some, but very little, operational benefit is realized. Miro has used the funds to support individuals of his choosing and has not devoted attention to strengthening internal Cuban opposition. Other exile leaders interpret this support as evidence of U.S. selection of Miro as leader of a post-Castro government.

    “Since this situation is inconsistent with present U.S. policy, possible solutions are being sought under the leadership of the State Department.”

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