Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

267. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)⁰

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Relations with the Cuban Revolutionary Council

Problem

To determine the desirability of obtaining compliance with the recent inter-agency and White House agreement, pursuant to an NSC decision of May 5, 1961, regarding the means of improving and making more open U.S. relations with the CRC, headed by Dr. Miro Cardona.

Discussion

1. The Cuban Exile Community Situation.

A power struggle has developed between Miro Cardona and ex-President Prio Socorras. Miro is generally regarded by Cubans as: anti-Batista, anti-Prio, anti-Communist, having been briefly associated with the Castro regime, and personally a man of honor. Prio is generally regarded by Cubans as: anti-Batista, anti-Communist, having remained in Cuba under Castro an inexplicably long time, as having headed a corrupt regime and therefore a symbol of Cubaʼs past ills which led to Batista and in turn Castro, and opportunistic. Dr. Miro is known in the exile community to have the confidence of the White House. Dr. Prio (who is wealthy) has undertaken a campaign to discredit Miro and to gain the ascendancy in the community. The key organized groups in the community (students, labor, women, legal profession, among others) hold the balance of power, and are financed directly by CIA. As long as this method of financing pertains, these groups will probably remain independent of both Miro and Prio control, although there is clear indication that part of one group (the magistrates) has already been seduced by Prio.

If this situation is permitted to continue, Prio may emerge as the principal spokesman of Cubans in exile. To limit this possibility Miro has repeatedly expressed the desire that these key organized groups be financed by CIA through the CRC as the major means of enhancing his own power position in the community.

ARA believes that if Miroʼs desire in this were granted, most of the members of these key organized groups would join the CRC.

2. The Underground Attitude Toward the Exile Community.

The Ambassador of Italy at Habana, who of the friendly diplomats is widely regarded as a keen and most knowledgeable observer of the Cuban scene, personally gave ARA the following assessment two days ago:

Although the underground is disdainful of Cubans who live in the security of the U.S., it recognizes the necessity for an exile organization. Miro is the only prominent exile acceptable to the underground. Prio is entirely unacceptable.

The underground expects to have the principal say in any post-Castro government.

The foregoing supports ARAʼs assessment obtained from a variety of other sources.

3. U.S. Relations with Miro.

Several months ago the White House asked Miro to broaden the CRC base. (As indicated above, CIA direct financial support of the key organized exile groups makes Miroʼs task in this regard virtually impossible.)

During the first half of September, the White House reaffirmed its confidence in Miroʼs leadership. He was, however, informed that his requests for a U.S. commitment to invade Cuba and for CRC exclusive jurisdiction over all underground groups were denied. He was at the same time offered the following working arrangement which he accepted:

1. a basic administrative budget of approximately one million dollars per year

2. provision for supplementary budget on a case basis

3. expansion of CRC base

4. underground groups willing to work with Miro to be dealt with through Miro

5. maintenance of secrecy

In addition, he was assured that his additional requests (which the White House considered of secondary importance), including financing of the key organized exile groups through the CRC, would not present insurmountable problems.

The President, to prevent Miroʼs resignation taking effect, addressed a letter to Dr. Miro¹ confirming his confidence in Miroʼs leadership. This letter was delivered by the Department with oral confirmation of all the above points.

Little of the working arrangement has been put into practice, nor is that little functioning satisfactorily. None of Miroʼs secondary requests have been granted. Miro is consequently seriously dispirited and the Departmentʼs relations with him may become precarious. He plans to arrive in the Department today. Unless ARA can offer him something concrete, he will probably ask for a White House appointment. If the White House is unable to reassure him, he will probably resign. Under the emotional strain of the imprisonment of his son in Cuba combined with the six months (since April 17) of delay by the United States in fully clarifying his position, he may feel forced to break his word and make the Presidentʼs letter public.

Recommendation:²

1. That you request as soon as possible a report from CIA on its implementation of our commitments to Miro.

2. That, through the Special Group or otherwise, you obtain an agreed line of action by all interested agencies to implement our commitments to Miro in line with our basic objective of seeking the most effective methods of contributing to Castroʼs downfall.

0. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on October 18 and cleared by Wollam on October 19. Sent through Wells in INR/DDC.
1. Document 262.
2. The source text is not marked to indicate Johnsonʼs response to the recommendations. On November 13, Joseph Scott of INR/DDC sent a memorandum to Johnson to inform him that “in accordance with the Presidentʼs wish and your instructions” Miro Cardona had been dissuaded from resigning as President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961-)