Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

214. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, May 9, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the DD/P re Cuban Operations

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.—DD/P
• Mr. C. Tracy Barnes—A/DDP/A
• Col. J. C. King—C/WHD
• [name not declassified]—AC/WH/4
• Mr. G. Droller—C/WH/4 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
• [name not declassified]

1. Mr. Bissell stated that the President is anxious that family allotments to strike force dependents should continue and that they should not be halted without first consulting with the President. Mr. Bissell said the payments must continue through June at which time we should make appropriate recommendations as to their continuation. He said the concept we used would call for continuation in case of families of prisoners. It is understood that the allotments to families of returnees would be paid through May. It was agreed that the 170 recruits who had never left the country and who were now clamoring for their “bonus” should be paid the “across the board” bonus of $250 inasmuch as most of them had given up their jobs to join the brigade.

2. Mr. Bissell then stated that there has been a round of policymaking sessions—externally with NSC and Mr. Goodwin of the White House—and internally. He said that there is an urgent need to decide what we are going to do next—what people and facilities we are going to use. He asked if there was general agreement (there was) that we start building up our internal assets—FI first; plus planning and carrying out sabotage operations which would call for the use of a minimum number of people; that we should start commo training promptly; also think of training programs for resistance and underground types. He said he had read the papers¹ prepared by Messrs. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and had found them of interest, but he agreed with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] comment that it was perhaps too elaborate a plan for current policy restrictions and the idea of setting up another headquarters of “agency” in Miami was not practical. Mr. Bissell commissioned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], with the assist-ance of Mr. Reichhardt, to come up within a weekʼs time, if possible, with an outline proposal for covert action. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] suggested that the best place to start would be with the old operational plan which could be reviewed, updated and “sprinkled with the experience” which we have gained to date. Mr. Barnes promised to provide a copy of a paper² which was recently prepared on this subject. Mr. Barnes, in response to a statement by Mr. Droller that he understood from Dr. Miro that the President was opposed to sabotage operations, said that the White House is expecting a paper from us as to what we propose to do—recommendations for action, unilateral or otherwise, and on the basis of this we could expect to get some policy approval. That sabotage is still open whenever it seems appropriate. Mr. Bissell said we will want to take the paper to the President and also to State and Defense. We will also need the operational outline for our own internal purposes. He asked if there was general agreement to this approach and Col. King said he would like to see included in the plan the use of B-26 aircraft against refineries and other targets but that we could leave the timing open.

3. Mr. Bissell then discussed our position vis-a-vis Dr. Miro and the Revolutionary Council. He said we need a clear affirmation of policy position re relations with the Cubans. He said we are looking to Dr. Miro as the senior official of the opposition and that we must not deal with independent groups without Miroʼs approval. He felt it was important that the Council be strengthened and proposed that Mr. Droller see Dr. Miro to discuss with him the opening of appropriate offices, acquiring a small staff, taking over the welfare and perhaps other functions of the FRD, etc. He said either he or Mr. Barnes would try to check this out first with Mr. Berle but nonetheless Mr. Droller should proceed to make this contact. Mr. Barnes said we would have to come up with our recommendations for Mr. Goodwin re our contacts with the Council. He said that it was not practicable for State to try to handle the day to day problems. Mr. Barnes asked Mr. Droller to work with him on preparation of our recommendations for Mr. Goodwin. He remarked that Mr. Goodwin had suggested that we might lend State an Agency man who could handle the Council for State. Mr. Bissell said it is important that we draw lines as to when they go to State and when they come to us. Mr. Droller presented his ideas with respect to creating a Cuban operations panel.

4. The question of supporting operations proposed by Manuel Ray was discussed. All agreed that we should have no dealings with Ray or any other independent group unless it has the approval of Dr. Miro. Mr. Bissell said that we should be prepared to work with Ray or any other group, provided Miro agrees, with these provisos:

A. They have the necessary assets.

B. They employ secure commo.

C. They keep us informed of what they are doing.

Mr. Barnes said that Mr. Ray had indicated a willingness to carry out his activities under the aegis of the Council although he naturally will not want to identify precisely his assets, etc. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the problem might be simplified if Dr. Miro would re-affirm Mr. Ray as “minister in charge of clandestine activities” or some such designation. Mr. Bissell questioned whether Ray would be able to pull all the groups together in view of his somewhat controversial position. At any rate it was agreed that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should meet with Ray for the purpose of drawing up a prospectus. Once this has been done and we have had an opportunity to study it, etc., and if we decided to support it, we would then see that Dr. Miro was apprised of the plan and we would not go ahead with it unless and until he gave it his approval.

5. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] brought up the problems created for the Branch by the multitudinous requests received from Congressmen, newspaper people, etc., for information and briefings, etc., and wondered if a good part of this couldnʼt be diverted to the State Department so that this pressure could be taken off the Branch. Mr. Bissell agreed that something must be done to relieve the Branch of this burden and maybe the flow could be diverted to State or some of it to the Council office once it is established.

[name not declassified]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. IV (6). Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency.
1. Not found.
2. Not found.