Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

187. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 28, 1961.

[Here follows testimony from some of the participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion.]

Admiral Dennison

Statement: My first knowledge that something might happen with regard to Cuba goes back to April 1960, when we helped construct facilities on Swan Island. The next indication I had was when the commander of my amphibious force advised me that he had the task of sanitizing some landing craft, as well as transporting these craft in an LSD to Puerto Rico. At this point, I consulted with General Lemnitzer and asked him if the JCS was aware of these activities. General Lemnitzer told me that he knew something of the activities. At that time he called General Cabell and requested that I be informed of the operation. Consequently, a CIA representative came down and briefed me on a portion of the plan. He explained that the planning for the operation was compartmentalized and that no one group knew all about the operation.

Statement: On the 9th of February I had the privilege of talking with the President. I asked him if I would be engaged in any possible bail-out operations. He responded definitely no, that if anything went wrong the force would fade into the hinterland. The JCS Directive of 7 April¹ set forth the nature of the naval operation that would be required and directed the mission be executed in such manner that the United States could plausibly deny that we had any part in the operation. On 1 April 1961 I issued my own operation order which set up, among other things, the rules of engagement for surface ships and for the air patrol. (Tab B)² On 1 April I received JSM-365-61,³ which gave me my basic orders and also indicated that the CIA was responsible for the planning and implementation of the operation with the DOD in a support role.

Statement: As of this date, I have never seen a copy of the Cuban Invasion Plan.⁴ As things turned out, it would have been most helpful if I had. For example, when we observed the Perka we thought it was a ship that had been taken over by the refugees. We had no knowledge of the men aboard the Perka. Furthermore, when we were called upon to start the rescue operation, we didnʼt know how many men were in there, what particular beaches theyʼd be landing on, where they were likely to be, or any information of this sort. I understand that the reason we probably were not informed of the details of the plan was because it was felt that we had no need for it. But as I say, as it turned out, we certainly did have. On the 5th of April I received a dispatch from the JCS⁵ which postponed D-Day from 10 April by at least 48 and probably 98 hours. (Tab B) In the dispatch which informed me of the new D-Day of 17 April, I was also informed of a change in the concept of the support that I was to provide.⁶ Essentially, this change consisted of the fact that instead of convoying the invasion fleet my forces would be called on to provide area coverage.

Statement: We had a very difficult time communicating with the Cuban invasion force ships. We didnʼt know the communications circuits of the ships, nor did we have other adequate means of communication. If the invasion force had been attacked, weʼd have had a very difficult time communicationwise. At the same time that I received the change in the concept of the support I was to provide, I also received the first major changes in the rules of engagement.⁷ (Tab B)

Question: Who made the decision to change the rules of engagement?

After some discussion of this question, it was decided that the JCS memo of record on the change on the rules of engagement7 should be secured.

Statement: We were also informed that it was desired that the chance of aborting the mission be minimized. I was informed that the Cuban invasion force was prepared to take risks to prevent the possibility of aborting the mission by overly anxious intervention.

Statement: I wanted then, and I still want, more comprehensive, current intelligence on Cuba, particularly photographs. I am particularly concerned about Guantanamo. What Castroʼs reaction may be in this connection is a great concern to me.

Statement: I am opposed to the use of DOD personnel in a covert operation. I believe that when U.S. forces go into an operation, they should go in under the cover of their U.S. uniform.

Statement: In view of the extent to which we became involved in the Cuban operation, I believe that it should have been conducted by me, through a special task force. I believe that in an operation of this sort the control has to be centralized, and the control should be military. Even in this covert operation, at some stage it should have been handled by the regular military staff rather than a group restricted in size by security considerations.

It was agreed that Admiral Dennison would forward to the Study Group a copy of his record of the operation.⁸

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated, but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the fifth in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and took place at the Pentagon. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, included Admiral Dennison, Captain Ferguson, Commander McCauley, King, Mitchell, and Tarwater.
1. Document 85.
2. Tab B was not found attached.
3. Not printed, but see Document 76.
4. Not found.
5. JCS telegram 993422 to CINCLANT, April 5. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)
6. Reference is to CM-179-61, April 7, Document 85.
7. Reference is to CM-179-61, April 7, Document 85.
8. A copy of the chronology of the Bumpy Road Operation maintained by CINCLANT, which was provided to the Cuba Study Group, is in the Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.