Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

186. Paper Prepared in the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency⁰

Washington, April 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• SNIE 85-61: Outlook for the Castro Regime

The Problem

To assess the internal strengths and weaknesses of the Castro regime in Cuba and to estimate its prospects for survival, over the next six months and over the longer term, assuming that the US continues to encourage opposition to Castro but takes no overt military action against him.

Working Outline

I. Basic Strengths and Weaknesses of the Regime

A. On the eve of the abortive opposition landings in Cuba the Castro regime had changed greatly from that which took power some two years earlier with plaudits of all but small proportion of Cuban population. In its transformation from a liberating movement appealing to all classes to a radical revolutionary regime it had lost many of its initial assets and acquired various liabilities. At the same time it had developed new and important sources of strength.

B. Liabilities

1. Progressive alienation of most of those with stake in society, including much of organized labor and students as well as middle and upper classes. Alienation of some of peasantry. Internal and external opposition stirrings.

2. Economic problems and disruptions.

3. Dissipation of initial support in 26th July movement and in military.

C. Strengths

1. Continuing importance of Castro as symbol of authority and prophet of reform—appeal of Castro and program to rural and urban poor.

2. Growing strength, experience and self-confidence of Communist and other activists manning the apparatus—increasing going concern value.

3. Increasingly effective controls over all phases of economic and social life and progressive elimination of dissidents.

4. Development of militia as security arm specifically tied to regime—impact of equipment and training.

5. Impact of Bloc economic, military and moral support, both in meeting specific problems and shortages and in bolstering confidence and prestige of regime.

6. Continuing usefulness of US as scapegoat.

II. Repercussions of Defeat of Opposition Landings—Short Term Prospects

A. Assessment of internal advantages gained, with caveats about continuation of grumbling and opposition, reaction to mass arrests, probable misgivings in militia.

1. Likelihood of stepped up military and security preparations.

B. Outlook over next six months

III. Longer Term Prospects

A. Over next 1-5 years regime likely to face serious problems in consolidating its position:

1. Regime will probably continue to face at least latent hostility of large proportion of population and has still to reconstitute broad, organized following among peasants and urban poor. Possibility of flareup.

2. Problems of adjustment and deferred maintenance likely to plague economy, increasing sources of discontent.

3. Regime still overly dependent on Castro as individual, though growth of Communist apparatus is likely to reduce this.

4. In time coherence, dedication, freedom from corruption and other distractions among those manning the state apparatus may decline—and at least some possibility of dissension at the top remains.

5. Probable decline in usefulness of US as scapegoat.

B. On other hand, Castro regime has important opportunities:

1. In time, economic and social reform program likely to tie well-being of increasing numbers to the state, thus reducing incentives to buck the system.

2. The longer Castro goes on, the more likely the regime is likely to be accepted by Cuban people and rest of hemisphere as a going concern—grumbling (as in Yugoslavia) will not seriously threaten the regime. Impact of indoctrination.

3. Little likelihood of serious slackening in Bloc support.

4. Internal acceptance of exile groups likely to decline.

C. The extent to which latent and active opposition will continue to pose serious problems for the regime will probably depend primarily on:

1. The extent to which the regime does in fact provide a tolerable livelihood for the Cuban people.

2. The extent to which hopes of successful (if eventual) overthrow are kept alive:

a. Ability of opposition elements to maintain at least symbolic opposition in the mountains.

b. Impact of apparent acceptance of regime by its neighbors—whether or not Cuba remains isolated or is accepted by Latin neighbors.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files, Cuba Papers, 1961. Secret. This draft of SNIE 85-61 was apparently circulated for comment at least to the Department of Defense. There is nothing on the source text to indicate reaction to the draft or any subsequent revision of the estimate. SNIE 85-61, as finally approved and circulated, has not been found.