Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

13. Memorandum from Major General Lansdale to McNamara and Gilpatric, June 3¹

June 3, 1963

SUBJECT

• Visit to Bolivia

At the invitation of General Andrew P. O’Meara, CINCARIB, I accompanied him on his 26–31 May visit to Bolivia. It gave me an unusual close-up view of one of your senior commanders at work and of one of his twenty country problems.

The trip took us not only to such centers as La Paz and Cochabamba, but also into the remote frontier region of northeast Bolivia, along the borders of Brazil and Peru, where imaginative Civic Action projects are in progress. While much of what was learned and done on the trip is being reported through normal channels by CINCARIB and the Country Team in La Paz, including a harder fix on stories we heard of a current border crossing by Communist guerrilleros, some personal comments might be of interest.

Highlights. Reflecting on what I saw and heard as a newcomer, in little more than five long and full days, my impressions can be summed up as follows:

a. Bolivia is a land of the vexing paradox for the U.S. Its people are warmly friendly towards us (the smiles and waved hands of the children reminded me of the Philippines), yet it has fallen in love with Marxism (of both the Lenin and Trotsky versions). Again, Americans are most excited by Bolivian pioneering over the Andes eastward into nearly empty but fabulously promising country; Bolivians are most aroused by looking westward towards the Pacific, longing for a seaport. Perhaps this is because of the basic paradox; a land of wide-open spaces, Bolivia has hidden its capital city of La Paz down in a crevice, almost as though it wanted its leaders to become moles.

b. “Civic Action” is making a dramatic change in the psychological climate, both for military and civilian Bolivians. The vividly brutish portrayal of the military as monsters inflicting pain on the lowly Indian, as seen in the huge mural in the Presidency, must be striking an increasingly false note to Bolivian viewers. The Civic Action program is stressing the public service role of the Bolivian military, in much the same manner as the U.S. military were the pathfinders, engineers, and guardians in the opening of our own West. The Bolivian people are starting to respond, most favorably.

c. Although nearly unspoken, U.S. policy has moved down the Left fork of the political road in Bolivia, mostly because hardly a trace remains of the Right fork. On this Left fork, we now look upon President Paz as being on the right edge, opposed to Vice President Lechin on the left edge—so we have moved in with Paz. Yet, there is the beginning of a path off towards objectives more in harmony with U.S. beliefs, which richly deserves stronger U.S. help in development. The beginning of this path is in the cadastral ideas proposed by Julio Sanjines, director of Civic Action, who wants to convince unbelieving campesino settlers that they really own their own land by including an aerial photo showing property boundaries with each title deed given in Civic Action settlements. A slight shift of emphasis in the Civic Action program, to stress the rights and responsibilities of the individual Bolivian, might well give us the dynamic key we have lacked (spoken of as a missing “political mystique” in the Country Team briefing). Our present in-country resources in the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, U.S. military, AID, and USIS could target in on land ownership by the campesino, as a base to be rapidly broadened into such political objectives as individual liberty, free elections (in the U.S. sense), and the rule of law (rather than militia bands).

d. It is probable that Bolivia serves the Communists as a Switzerland—a transit area to other Latin American places for people, funds, and matériel. There is merit in John Stutesman’s idea of fuller lateral reporting between U.S. Country Teams, [1½ lines not declassified]. The activities of European Bloc Communists, let alone Cuban Communists, seemed to be notorious even out in the villages of the boon-docks.

e. On this trip, General O’Meara showed considerable skill as a U.S. cold war commander. He spotted cold war essentials and acted on them firmly, with a balanced sensing of the political, psychological, economic, and military factors involved, while being warmly human in his encouragement of those Bolivians who are moving towards our objectives. I believe his visit, particularly his traverse into remote areas, did much to bolster the U.S. position in Bolivia.

f. The U.S. Country Team in La Paz has made a remarkably fine start in the closely-integrated teamwork required for a cold war win—in its Civic Action program. I trust that Washington departments and agencies will continue their strong backing of this integrated effort. It is making a vital difference.

Nationalism. The present Bolivian government is generating much enthusiastic nationalism among the people, presumably to create national unity. One was good to see and hear—the singing of the national anthem on all public occasions (every man, woman, and child joined in to sing this lustily and proudly). The other is fraught with problems for us—a Bolivian drive to regain a seaport on the Pacific.

The seaport issue arose early and stayed with us throughout the visit. Knowing that the Bolivians had an Army and Air Force, but no Navy, it was a surprise to see a Bolivian Admiral standing with Bolivian military commanders to greet us when we arrived at the La Paz airport. He was the newly promoted Brigadier General Ronant Monje Roca, Commander, Bolivian River and Lake Force. Later in the trip, General Monje (he doesn’t call himself Admiral—yet) gave me a souvenir banner of his River and Lake Force. It shows the ocean rather than a river or lake, and bears the slogan: “Volveremos al mar por la fuerza del derecho!” (“We shall return to the sea by force of law”). In Army schools and installations, on blackboards, on signs, similar slogans such as “The Sea is our Destiny!” were everywhere. At an Air Force luncheon, General Ayala pointedly called my attention to a large mural showing Bolivia reaching the Pacific.

It is evident that a highly emotional drive is on to obtain a Pacific seaport for Bolivia. If the U.S. makes a mis-step and appears to be opposed to this move, the Communists will sieze this patriotic issue for their own—and have Bolivia handed them on a silver platter. If present legal moves to obtain a seaport fail, and Bolivian tempers flare, we may yet see two of our Latin American friends at war with each other. Chile is currently working hard to make its northern coastal area an integral and patriotic part of Chile. Somebody surely has lifted the lid of a Pandora’s Box in Bolivia.

Civic Action. A major purpose of the trip was to take a look at Bolivia’s Civic Action program. It was well worth the long journey.

The marked success of this program seems to stem from exceptional Bolivian leadership and from equally exceptional joint U.S. military-civilian teamwork in support. Bolivian leadership is mostly in the person of one man, Mr. Julio Sanjines, Director, Civic Action Office USAID, although a number of other Bolivian military and civilians have caught the fire of enthusiasm for this program. Sanjines attended West Point (when I asked him who his best friend was in the U.S., he named Lt. Colonel Jack Cushman, whom he identified as a West Point classmate now on the Secretary of the Army’s staff—actually, Cushman has transferred to Vietnam), apparently quit a career in the Bolivian Army to become a successful businessman, and recently was made a Lt. Colonel in the Bolivian Army (although he only went by his civilian status when travelling with us). Sanjines is a real “operator,” in the best sense of the word.

A story will illustrate, mostly as told me by Sanjines. The miners of Achacachi, dominated by Communists and with their own armed militia, have borne a long and bloody hatred for the Bolivian military. Achacachi is a dry and dusty place, noted for its shortage of water. It was picked for a Civic Action well-drilling project. Rather than announce this early, as a politico would be tempted to do, Sanjines moved into Achacachi with a crew of engineers, including Army men in civilian clothes, and made a quietly unobtrusive survey for potential water sources; the survey showed promising sites. The well-drilling crews and equipment were readied and put on a standby basis in La Paz, alert to move on signal. Sanjines then had a leading La Paz newspaper (owned by Sanjines, Clarence Boonstra informed me) send reporters to Achacachi to ask the people how they would like a Civic Action project to provide fresh water to the city. The people interviewed replied: “All the government ever does is talk, not act,” “The Army is worthless and would never do anything for us,” and similar comments. Sanjines met with town officials, told them of the proposed project, and was invited to give it a try. He signaled La Paz, the Army engineers (in uniform) and equipment showed up promptly and went to work, completing the new water works in record time. The La Paz newspaper then publicized the Civic Action triumph, complete with earlier scoffing interviews. It made quite a convincing story.

A large delegation from Achacachi met us at the La Paz airport. They shouted rousing cheers for the Bolivian Army, for U.S. aid, and for General O’Meara. He walked around and shook hands with each of the happily grinning miners, then at their insistence had his picture taken with them. When I followed suit, shaking hands, they enthusiastically insisted on a picture with the U.S. Air Force too, so our Air Force Mission and aircraft crew folks joined me for a group picture with these miners. The moral, of course, is that this is a sharp contrast to their attitude towards the Bolivian and U.S. military just a short while ago.

The whole range of the Bolivian Civic Action program, in public works, in public health, in public education, in agriculture, and in the colonization of the empty areas of eastern Bolivia, has been reported elsewhere by others. Thus, I will not repeat details here. However, it is timely to note two striking features. One is that there is a really dedicated effort being given to Civic Action, particularly by the Bolivian military; the military finished its share of building public schools ahead of time and is being assigned the building of more from the yet uncompleted share of Bolivian civilian agencies; when I asked about an old USAF T–13, the only aircraft stationed at the frontier town of Riberalta, the Bolivian Air Force proudly told me they used it for Civic Action, to bring sick and injured to the hospital from remote jungle farms (the rear cockpit has been altered from a one-seater and now takes four passengers); General Monje stressed that a major mission of his River and Lake Force will be Civic Action.

The second striking feature of Civic Action in Bolivia is the fine teamwork evident between civilians and military, both Bolivian and U.S. CINCARIB seems to have made a special effort to get U.S. military advisors and equipment into places where they count; AID, particularly Alexander Firfer, has backed Civic Action projects aggressively with plans, funds, advice, matériel, and other help. At the colonization project at Santa Ana (500 families—from the Altiplano—2,000 persons—settled so far in this extremely productive area), it was deeply stirring to note the catchy, enthusiastic teamwork under Walter Gonzalez, Alto Beni Project Engineer (for the Corporacion Boliviana de Fomento); his team included the Bolivian 2nd Engineer Battalion advised by U.S. Army Engineers (now putting finishing touches on a 3,000 meter long airfield runway hacked out of the jungle and eager to extend the highway now connecting La Paz on into further fertile areas of the Alto Beni), Bolivian and U.S. civilians (including young Peace Corps Americans helping start nuclei of settlers), Bolivian and U.S. Air Force personnel helping with some airlift, and an unusual U.S. Army doctor, Captain Lavern G. Borg, providing support to a medical team from the Middle American Research Unit (which arrived on 24 March 1963 and has since eradicated the main reservoir of infection of “Pinta disease”—which depigments the skin—among the Mosetenean Indians who live at Santa Ana, and who were warned by the Communists that the doctors would be bad for them; Borg’s dramatic treatment of the chief’s brother, who had turned blue, has made him a revered person locally). The Washington officials who backed his concept of combined teamwork can be deservedly proud.

Propaganda. The U.S. Military Mission officers told me that they were getting strong support from USIS in the psychological battle with the Communists in Bolivia, especially in material for use with the Bolivian military. I noticed evidence of this in the military schools we visited, USIS comic books being particularly dog-eared from much reading, and was impressed most favorably by the skilled use made of this material in Cochabamba by Lt. Colonel Hector Aranda, both in the Bolivian Special Forces Center of Instruction which he commands and in his classes on Counterinsurgency at the nearby Command and General Staff College. Lt. Colonel Malcolm Nurnberg, who commands the U.S. Air Force Mission to Bolivia, gave me details of how Mission aircraft carry out constant distribution of USIS matérial, each flight in-country carrying hundreds of pounds for delivery at every stop made.

However, the Communists are a strong, entrenched, persistent enemy in this psychological battle. At times, their work has a quaint touch to it. Two examples during our visit illustrate the Communist work. The first was at a new school-house built by the Bolivian military for the colonization project at the little settlement named Puerto Rico. The school’s teacher, Miss Justa Chamairo, had requested a U.S. flag for the school. Thus, there was a ceremony in the school-house, with General O’Meara presenting a U.S. flag and with Alex Firfer presenting a handsome Alliance for Progress metal plaque—both received with warm gratitude. The pupils crowded into the one-room school, after a lusty singing of the Bolivian national anthem, were called upon by the teacher to give recitations (with gestures). The oldest girl pupil proudly recited, in Spanish, a poem circulated by the Communists about the labor martyrs of Chicago, apparently dated to the Haymarket Riots. (Sanjines inquired, then hastily explained that it was the only poem about the U.S. the girl could find—she intended to honor the visit of the Norte-Americanos!)

The second example was at the colonization project at Santa Ana. The 500 families in this fine Bolivian-U.S. jungle settlement, where reading matter is scarce, are the target of a special Communist propaganda effort, according to Walter Gonzales, the project engineer. He commented that truck drivers, in the transport union, were smuggling in loads of Communist literature with the regular supplies they hauled from Caranavi. U.S. Country Team members accompanying us on the trip immediately ordered delivery of USIS material to the Santa Ana settlers. I trust that this effort will be continued as thousands of new settlers arrive; it would be a macabre joke if the U.S. and Bolivian governments helped these people get a fresh start in life—and the Communists then taught them how to live it, the Communist way.

Relations. As in other countries, I was alert in Bolivia for signs of the human spirit breaking through the international barriers. Comments already have been made above about the warmly friendly attitude of the Bolivian people towards us. Also, I noted that U.S. personnel at all places visited seemed to be working in close friendship with their Bolivian associates. This was particularly evident in an evening get-together at the home of Colonel Truman Cook, Chief of the U.S. Military Group. Beyond this, there are some further significant stories.

On the orbital space flights of Astronaut Gordon Cooper over South America in May, the Bolivian campesinos toiled to construct huge signs on the mountains above La Paz, in the hope that Cooper would read them. The signs were made of 50-gallon oil drums, filled with kerosene—all brought up the mountain by hand—and lighted at night when Cooper was due to orbit above. One sign read: “Cooper in Orbit.” The second read: “Man of the Century.” Lt. Colonel Nurnberg of our Air Force Mission said that the Mission had a surprise visit, after Cooper’s successful flight, by a big delegation of Bolivian youngsters from the La Paz Model Airplane Club—bearing a huge bouquet of flowers for the U.S.

Relaxing in the evening with local Bolivian officials in Cobija, I made mental notes on two USAF officers whom the Bolivians seemed to hold in special affection. One was Lt. Colonel Louis McAdory who accompanied us, who was welcomed with enthusiastic bear hugs, and upon urging danced the La Quaca with a local girl. The other was in La Paz, but really introduced to me in Cobija from the many local Bolivians asking anxiously: “Where is our friend, Zorro of the Andes? Why didn’t you bring him with you?” Upon inquiry, I learned that “Zorro of the Andes” is Lt. Colonel Ed Fox. Those who know Latin temperaments will understand the esteem associated with Zorro.

Air Travel. There was a marked change in the air travel to and from Panama this time over my recent trip to Venezuela. National and PanAm gave me luxury treatment, as if they knew of my previous report. I hope other U.S. officers benefit, too.

Note: I have omitted a number of events, such as border crossing by Communist guerrillas, which are being reported through normal channels. Also, I spent a day in Panama visiting CINCARIB schools and units, as well as the Inter-American Police Academy, and am passing along items of special interest—such as Project Pista—separately.

This was a well-planned trip, with a full schedule for every hour, to permit a good look at known developments for which U.S. officials making the trip had assigned responsibilities. It made sense, but was quite different from my usual approach to an area. An operational look would dig below surface into such matters as:

[text not declassified]

b. How do we put some effective bare-knuckles into our psychological operations? There’s a tough, scrappy nature just below the surface of the Bolivian campesino, so do we just want to make friends with him or do we want to have him aroused to action on our side with much of that energetic devotion he put into the carbineros? Isn’t it time to tip off this resourceful campadre that he can start helping on our side, as quickly as he realizes it is his own? (This is worth an executive look by practical realists, with a view towards getting more meaningful results. Bolivia reminded me too much of Laos, where we did a technically beautiful psychological operation, but the Communists just kept going for the jugular. Who can forget the Laos election of May 1958, when the people of Laos fell in love with candidates helped by U.S. airdrops of bulldozers, food, and other matériel—and the people voted for Pathet Lao candidates, simply because some of the best candidates on our side were out “doing good” for the people with our help—and forgot to ask the people to vote for them? Are we going to have this all over again in Bolivia?)

c. How much of a transit, staging, resupply or safe area is Bolivia to the Communists? (If I were a responsible U.S. official in Lima, I would be pressing my counterpart in La Paz to get me a hard-fix on whether or not the Communist guerrilla leader Blanco actually had found a safe-haven in Bolivia; from Rio, I would ask La Paz to tell me about Communist passengers of local airlines who fly to Brazilian towns near the Bolivian border, which can be crossed with no questions asked). Jose Arze Murillo, Minister of Government of Bolivia, has asked for U.S. help in tracking down facts about the Communist situation in Bolivia; [2 lines not declassified]. At the same time, lateral reporting and tips to potential leads between U.S. agencies in several countries seem well worth an executive look; with eyes up on Cuba, a lot might be going on underfoot locally of real significance. Also, the U.S. military might well find it timely to get in on the 30 May opportunity opened by the Bolivian Minister of Government, to help create an effective counter-intelligence capability in the Bolivian military. The NCO School at Cochabamba appeared to be a most tempting haven for a Communist apparat, yet I was unable to get any fix for lack of information: there must be other such invitations to the Communists among the Bolivian military, which we have been thwarted from exploring before 30 May 1963. [1½ lines not declassified]

(While time and program didn’t permit a full exploration of the three topics noted above, with General O’Meara and U.S. officials in La Paz, I believe you will find them sympathetic towards further development somewhat along the lines indicated).

1. Report on visit to Bolivia. Secret. 10 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.