Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

12. Memorandum of conversation, April 24, between Kennedy and Ambassador Sanchez de Lozada¹

April 24, 1963

SUBJECT

• Presentation of Credentials

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Ambassador Enrique Sanchez de Lozada of Bolivia
• Ambassador Duke, U/PR
• Taylor G. Belcher, ARA/WST

After an exchange of pleasantries regarding the Ambassador’s former service in Washington and his pleasure at being reassigned to what he referred to as his “second country”, the Ambassador brought up the subject of the proposed Paz visit. Sanchez de Lozada expressed his President’s regret that internal problems in Bolivia prevented him from coming to Washington as had been tentatively planned and he now hoped that it might be possible to arrange a visit sometime in September or October when the internal situation would have clarified. President Kennedy said that he was certain that something could be arranged and indicated that Ambassador Duke should look into the question of the visit schedule. The President went on to inquire about the existing situation in Bolivia. The Ambassador replied that he considered that despite the ever present unrest due to the impoverished condition of many of the people of his country, and despite the efforts of the Communists who did have influence in certain fields, particularly the mine unions, the situation was basically stable. This was due in large part, he said, to the major social changes which the Bolivian revolution had effected. The fact that almost 200,000 new land owners had been created by the Bolivian agrarian reform program made for a solid base of support for the MNR regime in the countryside.

Although the situation was under control, the Ambassador said that with the country in a crucial pre-electoral period it was necessary to do everything possible to move ahead rapidly with the new $80 million development program in order to show that the Alliance for Progress was in fact moving ahead in Bolivia. The President asked what was holding up the program and Mr. Belcher said that basically it was a question of completing the necessary feasibility and engineering studies in order to be able to give final approval to the development projects. For this purpose a sizeable feasibility loan had been made and the engineering studies were being carried out. Some of them would be completed in the very near future although the major construction projects could probably not get under way until next year. The Ambassador said that during the recent visit of the Foreign Minister the question of moving the AID programs forward had been discussed and it had been agreed that the Ambassador and officials of State and AID would work closely together to ensure that the program moved as fast as possible.

As the meeting broke up the question of a possible Autumn visit came up again and the President told the Ambassador that he was sure that something could be arranged and that Mr. Duke would look into it.

1. Exchange of views during presentation of credentials. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.