61. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk0

SUBJECT

  • FY 1963 Defense Budget

Attached is a copy of a brief memorandum reflecting conversations which my staff has had with General Taylor’s people on last weekend’s Hyannis Port discussions1 of the FY 1963 Defense Budget (Attachment A).

You will note that, whereas the 16-division level was agreed to, apparently Secretary McNamara felt that this could be done within a 960,000 manning level. This would be about 175,000 below current force levels and about 100,000 below what I understand are the service recommendations. How this can be done, of course, remains to be seen. If such economy of personnel can in fact be obtained it will be most desirable. However, our proper concern in State is how the matter comes out publicly. If it comes out in the form of a 16-division force it would meet our purposes. However, as I understand the budget presentation, it is likely to come out in terms of the manning level and, therefore, in terms of a [Page 220] very marked reduction below our current force levels. This has obviously serious implications with respect to our current Berlin strategy, both in its effects on the Soviet Union and on our allies.

I recommend that you discuss the matter in the foregoing terms with Secretary McNamara.

Attachment A2

Memorandum for the Record

SUBJECT

  • FY ‘63 DOD Budget Decisions

1. The following reflects the debriefing received from Colonel Ewell, of General Taylor’s staff, on the status of the decisions on the FY ‘63 DOD Budget as reflected in the series of Presidential meetings held at Hyannis Port over this last weekend:

a.
General War Offensive Forces. The only major decision was to omit mobile Minutemen. This reflects the consensus judgment that the GWO category was too large. The mobile Minuteman was considered the least soundly justified of the various components within this category.
b.

General War Defensive Forces. The 12 battery Nike-Zeus program was approved. Apparently the so-called six city program as such, was not agreed to. I take it that this means that the Research and Development and the Production will move forward on the 12 battery program, but that the deployment of the missiles is left open.

A Civil Defense program of $700 million per annum, projected over a five year period (for a total of $3.5 billion) was agreed to. As I understand it this represents the mid-range as between a $400 million proposed program and a $900 million program. The lower end of the range would involve maximum individual self help efforts. The $700 million range adds to this, assistance to selected institutions in meeting civil defense requirements (e.g. hospitals). The upper end of the range, the $900 million program, would have included assistance to other major social institutions (particularly in the industrial area).

c.
General Purpose Forces. The 16, as contrasted to the 14, division level was agreed to. However, the significance of this decision, from a political point of view, was significantly undermined by virtue of the decision reached on the force levels. Apparently, Secretary McNamara proposed a 960 thousand level for meeting the 16 division requirement. This would be about 100 thousand below the minimum service recommendations and about 175 thousand below current force levels. Apparently the President took the initiative in arguing for a higher level and Secretary McNamara was directed to take another look at the numbers implications. (On this point, however, the best guess seems to be that the likely revised recommendations from Secretary McNamara will probably not exceed 980 thousand. In short, we must still accept a fairly sizeable force cut within the new budget.) Finally, there was apparently no discussion of reserves versus regular forces.
d.
MRBM’s. These were approved for Research and Development purposes, I gather with an expression of a certain amount of reluctance on the part of the President. Interestingly enough, part of the justification for the MRBM increment was that it would serve to develop a new generation of mobile missiles which would offset the loss of the mobile Minutemen program. By implication this certainly means that some emphasis will be placed on a mobile land-based weapon. There was no indication that sea versus land deployment was discussed.
Seymour Weiss3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/11-2961. Top Secret.
  2. One such discussion at Hyannis Port took place the morning of November 24. Present were Kennedy, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Gilpatric, Sorensen, Bell, Taylor, Bundy, Kaysen, Harold Brown, and Wiesner. No memorandum of the meeting has been found. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)
  3. Top Secret. Drafted by Weiss.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.