Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

60. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, November 22, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Support of Conventional Forces in the 1963 Budget

1. One of the most important questions posed by the 1963 Budget is the adequacy of the support accorded conventional forces. There is no doubt that this budget makes more ample provisions for this type of force than the previous Eisenhower budgets. But the inadequacy of the support in previous years accentuates the need for a drastic reversal of former budget patterns and a heavy weighing of effort to compensate for this past neglect. Is the 1963 Budget doing enough in light of these considerations?

2. The effectiveness of our conventional war forces depends upon several factors: their size, modernization and quantity of equipment, mobility, and geographical location.

a. Size of Conventional Forces. The decision to retain a 16-division Army structure along with a 3-division Marine Corps provides a divisional structure which will meet anticipated strategic needs within acceptable limits of risk. However, this structure needs to be filled with adequate trained manpower. The Army considers that it needs 1,055,700 men to support this 16-division program, whereas the Secretary of Defense is now proposing roughly 960,000.

It is my understanding that the principal difference between these two figures is represented by the 39,000 reinforcements which have been sent recently to Europe to make our present deployments combat ready. I feel that these men should be kept there as they are necessary for sustained combat. We are not justified to place our troops in the presence of the enemy without giving them all the means necessary to defend themselves.

b. Modernization and Quantity of Equipment. The conventional forces have a large backlog of deferred procurement which has delayed their modernization and prevented the accumulation of the stocks necessary to support a war prior to the availability of new production. At the present time, as a result of logistical shortages, it is doubtful that we could sustain more than three or four divisions in action for a significant period in a distant theater such as Southeast Asia while retaining our readiness for combat in other parts of the world. This is not an acceptable strategic position in which to remain. The 1963 Budget should contain all the funds necessary for an accelerated modernization of forces and build-up of war reserve stockages.

The Army is receiving 2.6 billion in new money to apply against its shortages. Something over a billion dollars of this sum is necessary to offset wearout and obsolescence. Only a little more than a billion is thus available to offset deferred procurement of the past. In my opinion, at least a billion more should be added to the Army procurement account in FY 1963 to allow it to move forward at a maximum orderly rate to maximum logistic readiness.

c. Mobility and Location. The mobility of conventional forces depends both upon their means of transport and their location in relation to areas of employment. The present budget properly emphasizes the need to improve strategic air transport. It does not, however, advance the cause of strategic sea lift. At a minimum, some troop ships and heavy lift cargo vessels should remain in the active fleet under centralized MSTS control and the program for roll on-roll off cargo ships of one per year should be protected.

In addition, because of its vastness special measures to increase mobility are necessary in the Pacific in order to reduce the reaction time of conventional forces, particularly of Army forces. One such measure should be the location of an Army division in the Western Pacific, probably in the Philippines. Another measure would be the preparation of one of our Korean divisions for rapid strategic movement. This action would require the replacement by Americans of the Korean personnel now in the structure of one of the American divisions and the preparation of plans to permit its rapid transport from Korea to some other part of the Pacific area.

3. The foregoing discussion has concerned itself primarily with Army divisions as these are the easy units for assessing conventional strength. Also, those elements of the Marines, Navy and Air Force which contribute to conventional war-making should receive corresponding attention. In particular, consideration should be given to increasing the Air Force manpower to maintain on active status the present tactical fighter units which are due to return to an inactive status following the termination of the so-called Berlin crisis.

4. In summary, the following actions should be considered in order to give greater emphasis on the development of conventional forces in the 1963 Budget:

a. An Army personnel ceiling of 1,055,700.

b. An increase of one billion dollars in Army procurement.

c. Increased funds for strategic sea transport.

d. The location of an Army division in the Western Pacific, and the preparation of one of the U.S. divisions in Korea for rapid strategic movement.

e. Retention of the present 25 tactical fighter units in the permanent structure of the Air Force.

Maxwell D. Taylor

¹

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD Budget 1963 11/61-12/61. Secret.
1. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.