58. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Nike-Zeus Program, FY 1963 Budget
1. With regard to the Nike-Zeus program, the Department of Defense is faced with the following alternatives:
- a.
- Stop the program and start another one, while accepting a further delay in the schedule for operational readiness.
- b.
- Continue the R&D program, but do not go into production.
- c.
- Go into production following the 12 battery program.
- d.
-
Go into production with the objective of reaching the NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) goal of 70 batteries.
In addition to these, one other has come up in the budget discussions:
- e.
- “Hand tool” two batteries and deploy them quickly in order to meet some of the psychological pressures for a missile defense.
2. In favor of continuing the Nike-Zeus program in some form is the fact that this is the only system in sight before 1970 which offers a possibility of intercepting ICBMs over cities. Even its critics agree that it should be able to deal with current non-decoyed ICBMs of the type which we are producing. They also recognize that improvements can be injected into the program while production is taking place.
A deployment of Nike-Zeus should have a very considerable psychological effect on our own people and upon the Soviet war planners. At a minimum, it will drive the USSR to a decoy program that will be both expensive and restrictive upon the useful payload of their missile warheads.
3. On the other hand, it is admitted that the development of decoys will present the Zeus missile-makers with a serious problem. A decoyed attack will result in a significant shrinkage of the area which can be protected by a single Nike battery. The radius of effective coverage will be reduced from 75 miles to something considerably less—perhaps as little [Page 215] as 20 miles—and under certain conditions the present defense system could be penetrated. Later developments can offset these disabilities somewhat by increasing the velocity of the Nike missile so that the time for an effective attack is reduced and more time can be allowed for discrimination. The R&D people can always point out how much this can be improved with further research. But if we wait for the ultimate system we shall be permanently undefended.
4. On balance, it appears to me sensible to do two things: to embark upon a limited initial production program for Nike-Zeus, and to accelerate research and development on the radar and missile improvements already in sight with a view toward incorporating them in the later production models. This course has the advantages of affording some protection for certain of our cities, of doing something to offset any psychological gains the Soviets might achieve from their announcement of an anti-ICBM, and of hedging our bets on future improvements. There is no reason to announce now where the missile sites will be located; rather, the batteries should be distributed according to a site priority established by NORAD. While there conceivably is a danger that public opinion would occasion a runaway on the part of the program, there is certainly nothing inevitable about such a development, especially if the Zeus program is brought into prior relation to the offensive elements of our strategic weapon systems, and with civil defense programs as well. The important thing is to embark upon the Nike-Zeus production with enthusiasm and confidence. We have past expressions of pessimism to offset if we are to get a solid psychological return from the decision to go into production.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/61-12/61. Secret. Forwarded to the President with several other documents, including Document 57. In his November 22 covering memorandum, Bundy commented concerning this memorandum: “Most of the rest of us do not agree with it, but his argument is interesting.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/61-12/61)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩