57. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Force Structure and Defense Budget
1. The major issue which was presented by Secretary McNamara’s memorandum on the Defense budget1 is that of the balance between the long-range strategic striking force and the general purpose (limited war) forces. Speaking broadly, the Secretary’s proposed Planning Guidelines resolved the inevitable doubts and uncertainties on the high side with respect to long-range striking forces, and, on the low side with respect to [Page 210] the general purpose forces. The purpose of the following is to present a case for a different force structure which would resolve these issues the other way.
2. The two elements of the strategic striking force which show rapid growth in the Secretary’s memorandum and proposed Guidelines are the hardened and dispersed Minuteman and Polaris missiles. The B-52 force remains constant, and, while the Atlas and Titan both show substantial growth, the new sites involved are now under construction and the missiles have already been bought. The proposed Minuteman and Polaris forces grow as follows:
| 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | |
| Polaris | ||||||
| Submarines | 6 | 9 | 18 | 30 | 35 | 41 |
| Missiles | 96 | 144 | 288 | 480 | 560 | 656 |
| Minuteman | ||||||
| Missiles | — | 150 | 600 | 700 | 800 | 900 |
These forces were proposed on the basis of the old estimates of the probable development of Russian missile strength. If we take into account the newer estimates (shown in comparison with the estimates underlying the DOD calculations in Annex I attached), we find we can accept a significantly smaller force as follows:
| 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | |
| Minuteman (HD) | 150 | 300 | 400 | 500 | 600 |
| Polaris | |||||
| Missiles | 144 | 288 | 464 | 464 | 464 |
| Submarines | 9 | 18 | 29 | 29 | 29 |
The proposed Polaris force represents the submarines we have already bought, coming into service on the present schedule. The proposed Minuteman deployment involves postponing the achievement of the planned 4th wing from the end of FY 1963 to the end of FY 1967.
The rationale for these lower forces is two-fold. First, as will be explained in the paragraph immediately following, they can do the job. Second, if they can do the job the risks of having higher forces are considerable. In setting the level of our strategic force, we must always consider the possibility of interaction between the size of our force and the size of the Soviet force. It is dangerous for us to seek to achieve a full first strike capability, because such a goal will almost certainly provoke a Soviet reaction in the same direction. Both sides will spend more of their resources on larger forces and neither will gain in security. The present plan provides for an extremely sharp increase in our strategic striking power between July 1963 and July 1964. Our total long-range missile strength, which is now in the neighborhood of 120, will by July 1963 have grown to over 500 and by July 1964 it will have more than doubled again to over 1100. Will not such a sharp increase present the appearance of our [Page 211] seeking a first strike posture, and thus have a high probability of provoking a response in kind by the Soviets? They are perfectly capable of such response. At present, the most sensible interpretation of their own missile deployment is that it rests on the concept of finite deterrence. It is certainly to our advantage to have them continue to hold that concept. The Air Force has in the past equated national security with an ever increasing strategic striking force, and this position has wide popular appeal and support. This view is filled with dangers; to the extent that the best evidence indicates it lacks justification, it is important to move our military planning away from it as soon as possible.
3. We can safely rely on the proposed smaller force for two reasons: First, the number of missiles we expect the Russians to have is lower than that on which the plans were made. On this basis alone, the task the Memorandum shows as requiring 700 Minutemen in the force (Median assumptions, 1965, column I), could be done by some 550. This involves not only a smaller number of targets for us to strike at, but also a higher survival rate for our forces under the Russian first strike, on the basis of which the calculations are made. Second, the targeting concepts underlying the calculations in the Secretary’s memorandum are unnecessarily conservative. No targets are assigned to the theatre forces. Only Polaris strikes against cities are taken into account in estimating casualties and destruction in built-up areas. At least the medium-range bomber and recovery airfields and the medium-range ballistic missiles could be assigned to the theatre forces. Some of the surviving SAC B-52’s would be available for strikes on cities. The missiles we program against Soviet military targets would cause considerable casualties all over the Soviet Union, which are not taken into account in the casualty estimates from fallout presented in the memorandum. When all these adjustments are made in the calculations, the proposed smaller forces become adequate for the defined goal: to maintain a survivable second strike capability which can both blunt the further Soviet threat and provide a reserve force capable of threatening attack on Soviet cities on a large scale.
4. The Secretary’s memorandum offers no explicit rationale for fixing the size of the Army at 14 divisions comparable to the analysis contained in Appendix I on long-range striking forces,2 and the Secretary pointed out in our staff discussions that as yet no such analysis has been made. Nonetheless, the recommendation is similar to that contained in the Secretary’s memorandum to the President of May 10, 1961,3 on the reappraisal of the capabilities of conventional forces. That analysis rested on two doubtful assumptions: First, that we would not be engaged in a conventional war on a scale greater than that of the Korean [Page 212] conflict (250,000-300,000 men); second, that we would not be engaged in more than one such war at any one time. If in fact it is our policy to raise the nuclear threshold in the NATO area, as well as in the rest of the world, the first of these assumptions may be inappropriate. The appropriateness of the second one is also open to question, although here a policy question is involved as to the circumstances in which we would be willing to commit U.S. troops in other theatres, that is as yet unsettled.
5. The planned 14-division army raises the question of whether or not the extra forces provided by calling up the reservists and National Guardsmen in connection with the Berlin crisis should be retained on active duty. The Secretary’s proposal calls for the return of these men to reserve status and a consequent reduction in the active duty strength of the Army to 920,000 men. This reduction raises a number of questions. It may make it more difficult for us to convince our Allies to increase their conventional war capabilities in NATO. It may diminish significantly the message conveyed by our other military preparations to the Soviets, who are impressed by ground force strength. Further, there is an important efficiency question involved. If there is any substantial probability that future re-examination of the ultimate size of the Army would lead to a higher requirement than 14 divisions, it would seem wasteful to reduce and then increase its size in the course of the next year or two. This in turn raises the question of the extent to which, in fixing the ultimate size of the Army, it is wise to rely on calling up and then demobilizing reserves as crises arise, if, as seems likely, crises will occur with fair frequency in the future.
6. With respect to the size of the Army, the proposed alternate program is to recommend that the Berlin augmentation be maintained in FY 1963 and that otherwise the Secretary’s program for strengthening the logistic support and tactical air complement of the present force be carried out. This would involve not only keeping the Army at the level of 16 divisions with 970,000 men. Further, the proposed Planning Guidelines should not now be issued, and the Department of Defense should be instructed to produce an analysis and proposed Planning Guideline for the period 1964-67 early next year. At that point, the question of phasing down can be examined in the light of a clear conception of what our ultimate goals are.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/61-12/61. Top Secret. Forwarded to the President with several other documents, including Document 58. In a November 22 covering memorandum, Bundy commented that this memorandum “sketches the argument for a much smaller strategic force than McNamara is arguing. This is well worth attention because the argument is not developed anywhere else in your papers.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1963 Defense Budget 11/16-12/61)↩
- Document 50.↩
- Document 46.↩
- Document 27.↩
- Top Secret.↩