37. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Rowen)0
The latest version of the Military Section of the BNSP1 (of which I have two copies) is in the following situation.
McNamara has decided he does not wish to push on this now. In McNamara’s judgment this would result only in six-eight weeks of arguing inside the Pentagon, which he doesn’t want. Nitze feels that the change in local war notions as a consequence of Berlin planning does NOT go deep enough and that the Services consider them an aberration. They have not changed their fundamental attitude and justify their resistance in terms of the old BNSP. Rowen himself has no sense of what the situation is on this point.
Of the 20 copies, only two have been sent outside the DOD, one to Owen2 and one to me.
Rowen thinks that I should push ahead on getting the President’s concern focused on these problems, especially for general war problems: See Paragraph 5 and 6 of Policy for General War. Rowen has no view on the tactical problem of whether what should be pushed to the President is the whole BNSP draft or simply a memorandum addressed to the issues of Paragraphs 5 and 6.3
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Carl Kaysen Series, BNSP 7/61-11/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Kaysen.↩
- Undated. (Ibid.)↩
- Henry Owen of the Policy Planning Council.↩
- These paragraphs stressed the progressive adoption of “the concept of flexibility for general war” and stated that the option of engaging “in the destruction of the enemy’s principal military capabilities while at the same time minimizing damage to his population, urban-industrial complexes, and government controls” would become available by November 1 and would “represent an addition to SIOP-62.” No documentation has been found indicating a briefing of the President from this draft.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩