Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

36. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 11-3-61

Washington, July 11, 1961.

SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1966

The Problem

To examine the scale and nature of the Sino-Soviet Bloc air defense system,¹ and probable trends in its capabilities through mid-1966.

Summary and Conclusions

1. The scale of effort presently being applied to the continuing improvement and modernization of the Soviet air defense system is indicative of the high priority assigned to this mission. During the past two to three years, the Soviet air defense establishment has been undergoing a major transition which has significantly improved its capabilities. The principal aspects of this transition are: (a) the extensive deployment of surface-to-air missile sites; (b) the installation of air defense communications and control systems with semiautomatic features; (c) the deployment of new fighters and radars to Eastern Europe and areas near the borders of the USSR; and (d) a consolidation of air defense districts. Other developments include the advent of radars with better detection and height-finding capabilities, and the equipment of interceptors with more advanced electronic gear and armament, including air-to-air missiles. (Paras. 16-24)

Surface-to-Air Missiles

2. The Soviets now have operational two types of surface-to-air missiles designed for defense against medium and high altitude air attacks. The first of these (SA-1), which has been operational for about five years, is deployed only around Moscow in a massive complex of 56 sites, each having 60 launching positions. This system was apparently designed to counter the massed air raid threat of the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. (Paras. 25-26)

3. Since late 1957, the USSR has been engaged in the extensive deployment of a second-generation surface-to-air missile system (SA-2), which appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small numbers of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons rather than a massed raid threat. Considering the pattern of deployment, the length of time the program has been under way, and the extent of our intelligence coverage, we estimate that 350-400 sites (each with six launchers) are now operational at about 70 defended areas in the USSR. By mid-1962, the Soviets probably will have deployed roughly 500 SA-2 sites at about 100 urban-industrial areas in the USSR. There is little evidence on possible requirements for defense of field forces, but we estimate that some 80-120 mobile missile units may be deployed by the end of 1963 for the protection of such semifixed targets as major headquarters and logistics centers. We believe that the USSR intends to provide SA-2 defenses for the fixed launching complexes of its long range ballistic missile forces, but we are unable to estimate the level and extent of defenses planned. (Paras. 27-33)

4. Deployment of SA-2 sites in the European Satellites has been under way for more than a year. The heaviest deployment has occurred in East Germany where as many as 20 sites may be operational or under construction. Some of these, located on a ring around Berlin, are manned by East German forces; others, which defend important Soviet military targets, are assigned to Soviet field forces. We believe that additional SA-2 sites will be deployed in the Satellites during the next year or two, and that some mobile units may be provided for Satellite ground forces. We have no reliable evidence indicating the deployment of surface-to-air missiles in Communist China, although some deployment may have taken place or be planned for the future. (Paras. 34-36)

5. The Soviets have had under development a surface-to-air system (SA-3) which we believe is specifically designed to engage targets at very low altitudes. Although no operational sites have been observed, we believe that this system will probably be available for operational use in 1961. Considering the scale and pace of the SA-2 program, we believe that SA-3 will be extensively deployed within the next three or four years, supplementing existing missile defenses of fixed targets and field forces. (Paras. 37-38)

Antimissile Program

6. To develop defenses against ballistic missiles, the Soviets have had under way for several years an extensive and high priority program which we believe to be directed primarily toward defense against IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basis for a firm estimate on the date of initial operational deployment of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile system or its effectiveness against the various types of Western ballistic missiles. For political as well as military reasons, the Soviets probably would wish to deploy antimissile defenses in a few critical areas even if the available system provided only a limited, interim capability. Considering these factors and the present status of the Soviet research and development program, we estimate that in the period 1963-1966 the Soviets will begin at least limited deployment of an antimissile system. We believe that for some years to come, the Soviets are likely to have only a marginal capability under most favorable conditions for interference with US satellites. (Paras. 40-46)

[Here follows discussion of fighters, supporting equipment, and deployment.]

Civil Defense

11. About 80 million Soviet citizens over the age of 16 have received some instruction in civil defense and about one-fourth of these have probably received good basic grounding in elementary civil defense techniques. The bulk of the population still lacks adequate shelters, although the USSR has a substantial lead over any of the Western Powers in the construction of urban shelters which could provide some protection against fall-out, debris, and fire. In the past two years, the Soviets have given increasing attention to preattack evacuation of nonessential civilians in the event of a threatening situation, but this program appears to be still in the planning stage. Even with limited warning, the existence of a disciplined organization, the use of shelter, and the widespread knowledge of simple techniques such as first aid would probably reduce casualties considerably, especially among key personnel. However, Soviet civil defense is not prepared to cope with the effects of large-scale nuclear attack. Moreover, it would function extremely poorly under conditions of short warning time. (Paras. 73-76)

Warning Time

12. The amount of warning time available significantly affects the capabilities of air defense in various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now give Moscow and many other targets in the interior more than one hour’s warning of medium and high altitude attacks made with Western bombers of the B-52 type. Soviet assurance of such detection would be greatly reduced by extremely low level penetrations. The supersonic bombers and air-to-surface missiles now being added to Western inventories could reduce this warning time by as much as 50 percent. Moreover, the more limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defended targets in such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles increase, and as Western ballistic missiles become a greater threat, the problem of warning time will become more critical. (Para. 78)

Current Capabilities and Future Trends

13. The present capabilities of the Soviet air defense system would be greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers in daylight and clear weather at altitudes between about 3,000 and about 45,000 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to about 50,000 feet, and some up to about 55,000 feet, but the capabilities of the fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor visibility. In the increasingly widespread areas defended by surface-to-air missiles, air defense capabilities would be virtually unimpaired by weather conditions and would extend to about 60,000 feet, with some capabilities up to about 80,000 feet. (Para. 79)

14. Despite its recent and considerable improvements, however, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in coping with a large-scale air attack employing a variety of weapons and sophisticated tactics, even within the foregoing altitudes. At altitudes below about 3,000 feet, the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; below about 1,000 feet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. At present, the USSR has little capability for active defense against very low altitude attacks. (Paras. 80-81)

15. The Soviets are making vigorous efforts to counter Western weapon systems. Within the next five years, they will probably introduce improved radars and all-weather interceptors, a surface-to-air missile system designed to counter low altitude air attack, and antimissile defenses. However, they probably will still not achieve a high degree of assurance in coping with a large-scale sophisticated attack by manned bombers. They would probably expect to destroy a significant number of attackers, but given the increasing complexity of the air defense problem, we doubt they will be confident of the extent to which they can reduce the weight of such an attack. The air defense problem has been radically altered by the advent of long-range ballistic missiles. Barring an unforeseen technological breakthrough, the USSR’s air defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missiles assume a larger proportion of the West’s total nuclear delivery capability. (Paras. 82-83)²

[Here follow the body of the paper and two annexes, totaling 25 pages.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Top Secret. A dissemination notice and table of contents are not printed. According to a note on a covering page, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the drafting. The estimate was concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on January 17. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
1. Includes defenses against missiles and satellites. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. NIE 11-3-62, “Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1967,” dated October 31, 1962, reached an almost identical conclusion regarding Soviet missile defenses and the overall weakness of Soviet missile and air defense capabilities.NIE 11-3-62 did, however, assign somewhat more effectiveness to Soviet defenses against bombers by the end of the projected period. Also pertinent is NIE 11-5-61, “Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles,” dated April 25, 1961. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry)