Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

46. Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, July 28, 1961.

Memorandum of decision, July 27, 1961, test ban scenario

1. The Panofsky Panel Report¹ will receive comment from the Joint Chiefs of Staff before August 4.² This Report, with JCS comment, will be presented to the National Security Council on August 8.³ The President will review the advice of these bodies and if he does not change his present intention, he will then consult with Ambassador Dean and announce that in view of the Panel Report he is sending Mr. Dean back to Geneva for one last try. Before the President’s announcement,⁴ but late enough to prevent leakage, selected members of the Panel (Panofsky, Bradbury, and Foster, preferably) will brief the JCAE.

2. Mr. Dean will return to Geneva about August 20; his main task will be to make one last effort to obtain Soviet agreement to the draft treaty as tabled. He will remain about a week, and if no progress is made he will return about August 28. The President will then announce that in the light of Soviet folly he now has concluded that no workable treaty is possible, and he may add that in view of the seriousness of the situation he proposes to put the matter, himself, before the United Nations. He will reserve further comment until that time.

3. Early in the General Assembly Session, the President will make a major speech largely or wholly devoted to disarmament. He hopes to have a strong and imaginative general proposal to make, but he will also want to refer to the test ban (unless it still seems essential at this later date to keep the two subjects separate). At this stage, he may put forward the Thompson proposal.

4. The President may, at some appropriate point, reach a decision to authorize stand-by preparations for tests of nuclear weapons, such tests to begin not earlier than 1962. Such authorization will be as quiet as possible, and in the event of leaks it will promptly be made clear in backgrounding that these are stand-by preparations only.

5. Appropriate parts of this plan will be communicated by Mr. Dean to the JCAE, by Mr. Schlesinger to Ormsby-Gore, and by the President to Macmillan (Bundy to draft a letter).⁵

6. Meanwhile, Mr. Dean will produce an imaginative disarmament plan, Mr. Schlesinger an eloquent white paper, and Senator Humphrey a statute for the new disarmament agency.

McG. B.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2861. Top Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: “DR saw Sat” (July 29). A covering note from Lucius Battle to Secretary Rusk reads in part: “Mac Bundy called me today and stated that he was sending to me the attached memorandum of decision which grew out of conversations between the President and Mr. Arthur Dean. He said that you probably should have been present but that if you had any objection to the attached understanding it was not too late to make changes and that you should speak to the President.” Another copy of this memorandum is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General 4/61-8/61.
1. Document 42.
2. Document 48.
3. See Document 53.
4. For text of the President’s announcement of August 10, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 274-276. The President stated that Dean would return to Geneva on August 24.
5. Document 50.